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List of Parties in this Case
There are no other parties beyond those given in the foregoing caption in
this case. For the sake of clarity, the parties are, at times, referred to herein as
follows:
1. Utah State Tax Commission, Petitioner in the trial court, Appellee in the
Utah Court of Appeals, is at times referred to herein as "Commission"
or "Tax Commission."
2. H. Douglas Goff and Lisa Goff, Respondents in the trial court,
Appellants in the Utah Court of Appeals, are at times referred to herein
as "Mr. Goff with respect to H. Douglas Goff, "Mrs. Goff with
respect to Lisa Goff, and "Goffs" when reference is to both Mr. Goff
and Mrs. Goff.
3. The Third District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah is,
at times, referred to herein as the "trial court" or "district court."
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Statement of Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction of the Utah Court of Appeals is derived pursuant to a WRIT
OF MANDATE AND JUDGMENT issued by the Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki,
Third District Court Judge, Salt Lake County on September 21, 2004 and entered
that same day.
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to U.C.A. §78-2a-3 (2) (j).

1

Statement of the Issues
The issues of this appeal are as follows:
1. Whether the Commission acted within its statutory jurisdiction,
authority, or limitations of its statutory right when there is no evidence on the
record that the Goffs are taxpayers as the term is used Utah Code, Ann. (U.C.A.)
section 59-1-707? The trial court's final order is reviewed for correctness,
granting no deference to the district court's ruling. U.C.A. § 59-1-707, . Radinsky
v. U.S., 622 F.Supp. 412, 413, 56 A.F.T.R.2d 85-6157, 86-1 USTC P 9161 at 413
(U.S.D.C, D.Colo. 1985); Girard Trust Bank v. United States, 226 Ct.Cl. 366, 643
F.2d 725, 47 A.F.T.R.2d 81-1607, 81-1 USTC P 13,394 (Ct. CI. 1981); In Re
Western Trading Co, 340 F.Supp. 1130 at 1133 (U.S.D.C, D. Nevada 1972);
Estate of Goetzv. United States, 286 F.Supp. 128 (U.S.D.C.,W.D. Missouri 1968);
Brafman v. United States, 384 F.2d 863 (5th Cir. 1967). This issue was preserved
at trial. See TRIAL RECORD, P. 298, p. 4, lines 15-20.
2. Whether the trial court denied the Goffs their rights to administrative due
process of law by accepting jurisdiction in this case, when the question of whether
the Goffs are persons required to file Utah income tax returns was already before
the Commission, pursuant to the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, as a part of
a request for agency action, and the Commission has yet to act on that request for

2

agency action?1 The trial court's final order is reviewed for correctness, granting
no deference to the its ruling. See U.C.A. § 63-46b-l et seq., Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254, 267, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970); Board of Regents of
State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548; Grannis v.
Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394, 34 S.Ct. 779, 58 L.Ed. 1363 (1914), Armstrong v.
Manzo, 380 U.S. 545,552, 85 S.Ct. 1187, 14 L.Ed.2d 62 (1965). This issue was
preserved at Trial. See TRIAL RECORD, P. 298, p. 90, lines 15 - 24, p. 114,1. 12
through p. 116,1.24.
3. Whether the district court erred when it overruled the Goffs' objections
to the entering of Tax Commission Records as evidence of either 1) gross income
as it is defined by 26 U.S.C. § 61, or 2) any other income of a character or nature
that would fall within the confines of Title 26, subtitle A, U.S.C. A. when the
witnesses who testified about the records admit that they do not have first hand
knowledge of the truth of the matters contained in those records and those records
are based on unverified hearsay within hearsay. The trial court's final order is
reviewed for correctness, granting no deference to the its ruling. Utah Rules of

In its memorandum Decision in this case, dated January 6, 2005, the Utah Court
of Appeals summarily affirmed the trial court's order as to the issue of whether the
Commission is required to exhaust its administrative remedies. The Goffs have
petitioned the Utah Supreme Court for its Writ of Certiorari (case number
20050103-SC) to review the record on that issue and other questions. The issue
presented in "b." above, necessarily includes a discussion of a requirement to
exhaust administrative remedies in order to fully examine the due process
question. The Goffs reserve the right to expand their argument of this issue should
the Utah Supreme Court grant certiorari and reverse and remand on the question of
whether the Commission was required to exhaust administrative remedies.
3

Evidence, Rules 801, 802, 803, 805; U.S. v. Vigneau, 187 F.3d 70, (1 st Cir. 1999);
Alexander v. CIT Technology Financing Services, Inc., 217 F.Supp.2d 867, 880
(N.D. 111. 2002); Johnson v. Lutz, 253 N.Y. 124, 170 N.E. 517 (N.Y. 1930); J.S.v.
State, 939 P.2d 196, at 201 (C.A. Utah 1997), Cf. State v. Johnson, 856 P.2d 1064,
at 1071 (Utah 1993). This issue was preserved at trial. See TRIAL RECORD, P.
298, p.33, line 13 - p. 37, line 17. See also, p. 50, line 15 and p. 56, line 10 and p.
73,1. 12-24.
4. Whether the district court erred in overruling the Goffs' objection to the
entry into evidence of certain of the Commission's records (Exhibit P-l) and
records of the Utah Department of Workforce Services ("DWS") (Exhibit P-5),
when the records contain unverified double hearsay and all witnesses testifying
about the records admitted that they could not testify to the truth of the matters
contained in the records? The trial court's ruling is reviewed for correctness,
granting no deference to its ruling. Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 805; U.S. v.
Vigneau, 187 F.3d 70, (1 st Cir. 1999); Alexander v. CIT Technology Financing
Services, Inc., 217 F.Supp.2d 867, 880 (N.D. 111. 2002); Johnson v. Lutz, 253 N.Y.
124, 170 N.E. 517 (N.Y. 1930); JS v. State, 939 P.2d 196, at 201 (C.A. Utah
1997), Cf. State v. Johnson, 856 P.2d 1064, at 1071 (Utah 1993). This issue was
preserved at trial. See TRIAL RECORD, P. 298, p.33, line 13 - p. 37, line 17. See
also, p. 50, line 15 and p. 56, line 10 and p. 73,1. 12 - 24.
5. Whether the district court erred in ruling that exhibit D-6 which was
entered into evidence, would support a holding that the Goffs received income
4

sufficient to require them to file tax returns, when the exhibit was not offered as
evidence of the truth of the matters contained therein and contains only hearsay
within hearsay to the issue of income? The trial court's ruling is reviewed for
correctness, granting no deference to its ruling. Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule
805; U.S. v. Vigneau, 187F.3d70, (1 st Cir. 1999); Alexander v. CIT Technology
Financing Services, Inc., 217 F.Supp.2d 867, 880 (N.D. 111. 2002); Johnson v.
Lutz, 253 N.Y. 124, 170 N.E. 517 (N.Y.1930); J.S v. State, 939 P.2d 196, at 201
(C.A. Utah 1997), Cf. State v. Johnson, 856 P.2d 1064, at 1071 (Utah 1993);
Murray v. United States, 10 F.2d 409, 411 (7th Cir. 1926). This issue was
preserved at trial. See TRIAL RECORD, P. 298 at pages 121-122.
6. Whether the district court erred in ruling that appellant Lisa Goff waived
her right to not be compelled to give evidence against herself in her testimony,
when the District Court did not advise her of this right prior to her testimony
pertaining to income? The trial court's ruling is reviewed for correctness, granting
no deference to its ruling. Utah Constitution, Article I, section 12; United States
Constitution, Amendment V; United States Constitution, Amendment XIV; Brady
v. U S., 397 U.S. 742, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970). This issue speaks
directly to the trial court's abridgement of Ms. Goff s constitutionally protected
right against self-incrimination. Mr. Goff objected to the questions at trial. See
Transcript at pages 19-20.
7. Whether the district court erred in sustaining the Commission's objection
to the admission of Exhibit D-7, the Goffs' Notice, Access and Evidentiary
5

Hearing Request dated April 22, 2004, when Exhibit D-7 is the document which
the Goffs used to initiate their request for agency action pursuant to the
Administrative Procedures Act (U.C.A. § 63-46b-l et seq.)? The trial court's
ruling is reviewed for correctness, granting no deference to its ruling. Utah Rules
of Evidence, Rule 402. This issue was preserved at trial. See TRIAL RECORD,
P. 298 at p. 92, lines 1 8 - 2 4 .
Should the Court find that certain of the above issues were not preserved at
trial, the Goffs pray for the Court's forgiveness and request the Court consider the
issues as it has done in the past. See Jensen v. State Tax Com'n, 835 P.2d 965,
"Questions not raised in an administrative tribunal are generally not subject to
judicial review . . . we occasionally will depart from strict application of this rule
for pro se litigants . . . " citation omitted.

6

Constitutional Provisions, Statutes, Rules and Regulations

Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations whose
interpretation is determinative of this appeal or of central importance to this appeal
are set out verbatim in Addendum 1 hereto. The brief contains the citations either
within the text or footnoted to the text. The Appellants rely on the provisions set
forth in the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 24 (a) (6) and Rule 24 (a)
(11) as well as the language in the Court's Order dated April 6, 2005.

7

Statement of the Case

On April 22, 2004, the Goffs mailed their letter captioned NOTICE,
ACCESS and EVIDENTIARY HEARING REQUEST to Ms. Brenda Salter, an
auditor employed by the Auditing Division of the Utah State Tax Commission.2
The Goffs letter sought the Commission's answers to questions about how Utah's
tax laws and federal tax laws impacted the Goffs.3 With their letter, the Goffs
submitted their affidavits which outlined all facts they believe relevant to
determining what impact the state and federal income tax laws would have on
them.4
While waiting for a response to their letter, the Goffs were served with a
verified petition for writ of mandate and judgment against Lisa Goff5 which the
Commission filed with the trial court June 2, 2004.6 Sometime later, the Goffs
learned that the Commission filed a second verified petition for writ of mandate
and judgment against H. Douglas Goff that had yet to be served. Mr. Goff
accepted service in the trial court July 12, 2004 at which time the trial court
ordered consolidation of the two cases into one.

2

See TRIAL RECORD, P. 26-100, See also, Exhibit D-7.
Id.
4
Id.
5
See TRIAL RECORD, p. 1-7.
6
Id.
7
See TRIAL RECORD, p. 130-131.
3

8

August 16, 2004, the trail court held a hearing on the merits and found for
the Commission8 and held that the Goffs are required to file Utah individual
income tax returns for the years 1996 through 2002 (excluding 1999 with respect
to Mr. Goff).9 The trial court entered its final order titled Writ of Mandate and
Judgment which ordered the Goffs to file state income tax returns for the years at
issue and pay the Commission's attorney fees and costs.10 The Goffs appealed
from the trial court's final order in its entirety,11 and the Commission motioned for
summary disposition based on the issues set forth in the Goffs' docketing
statement.12
After receiving the Commission's motion, the Goffs' response in
opposition thereto and the Commission's request to submit for decision, the Utah
Court of Appeals ("Court of Appeals") summarily affirmed the trial court's final
order as to two issues, namely, 1) that the Commission was not required to exhaust
administrative remedies in this case prior to petitioning the trial court for writs of
mandate, and 2) that the Commission presented sufficient evidence regarding the
federal tax structure and definitions that would determine whether the Goffs are
required to file federal income tax returns which would invoke the Utah statute
requiring the filing of Utah income tax returns.13

8

See TRIAL RECORD, Pp. 263-266,298..
Id.
10
Id.
11
See TRIAL RECORD, p, 269-271.
See Docketing Statement, Motion for Summary Disposition.
13
See Memorandum Decision, p. 3, third para.. See also U.C.A. § 59-10-502.

9

9

The Court of Appeals denied the Commission's motion for summary
disposition on the evidentiary issue of the Goffs' income where the documents the
Commission introduced as evidence of the Goffs' income for the years at issue
were based on unsworn statements of third parties and on unsworn statements of
other parties yet further removed from the documents that the Commission
introduced into evidence.14 The trial court overruled the Goffs' objections

15

to

said documents being received into evidence.16 The Court of Appeals found that
the Goffs have identified a substantial issue and decided to allow briefing on that
issue to continue.17 The Court of Appeals Memorandum Decision of January 6,
2005 is silent as to the other issues raised in the Goffs Docketing Statement and
the Commission's Motion for Summary Disposition.
On February 7, 2005, the Goffs filed their Petition for Writ of Certiorari to
the Court of Appeals as to those issues where the trial court's order was summarily
affirmed by the Court of Appeals in its Memorandum Decision entered January 6,
2005.18 The Utah Supreme Court has since denied the Goffs Motion for Writ of
Certiorari filed February 7, 2005..

15

The grounds for the Goffs' objection is that the documents contain unverified
hearsay within hearsay to the truth of the matters contained with the documents.
16
See TRIAL RECORD, p. 298, p. 33,1. 13 thru p. 34,1. 12 and p. 73,1. 12 thru 1.
24.
17
See Addendum 6 hereto (Memorandum Decision), p. 3.
18
See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, case no. 20050103-SC.
10

Summary of Argument
The Utah State Tax Commission is granted authority from the Utah
Legislature to oversee the taxing laws of the State of Utah.19 The Legislature has
based the state's individual income tax on the federal income tax system.
Therefore, a person whose income, the State of Utah seeks to tax must first fall
within the confines of the federal taxing laws, because " 'state taxable income' in
the case of a resident individual means his federal taxable income .. ." with certain
91

modifications and adjustments.

The problem with the Commission's case in this

matter is that they have failed to show that 1) the Goffs income, if any, falls with
the federal taxing statutes, 2) the tax imposed by Title 26, Subtitle A of the United
States Code has general applicability within the states of the Union, (i.e., are laws
of the United States and not mere Acts of Congpess), and 3) the Goffs status,
individually or as marriage partners, is that of a "taxpayer." The foregoing are
elements that must be proved before the provisions found in U.C.A. § 59-1-707
may be brought to bear on the Goffs.
Even if the Goffs had accepted taxpayer status, the problems with the
Commission's case are evidentiary ones. First is a lack of evidence of the federal
laws themselves (both statutory and administrative). The Commission only
addressed the federal statutes that may impose a requirement to file federal income
19
20
21

See U.C.A. §59-1-210(5).
See U.C.A. § 59-10-102 et seq.
See U.C.A. §59-10-112.
11

tax returns on the Goffs. What was lacking was the evidence that they do impose
such a requirement. Without a federal taxing statute that imposes the federal
income tax on the Goffs in evidence on the record of this case, there is no
requirement to file.

Absent a federal requirement for the Goffs to file income tax

returns, there is no requirement for them to file state income tax returns.23
Therefore, the trial court's final order is not grounded in the requirements of the
law. Second, the Commission's evidence of income in this case is fraught with
evidentiary problems in that all the evidence of income that is on the record was
objected to as not meeting the requirements for exception to the hearsay rule.24
The exhibits the Commission introduced are documents that contain hearsay
within hearsay and are therefore inadmissible because they do not meet the criteria
of Rule 805, in that the Commission is not the maker of the records, but adopted
the records of the IRS who adopted the records of others, none of which were
transferred under seal or by affidavit to the Commission.
There are additional issues of the trampling of the Goffs' constitutionally
protected rights of due process of law and the bar against self-incrimination. The
Commission has no authority to petition the trial court for its writ of mandate

22

See 26 U.S.C. §6012.
See U.C.A. §59-10-502
24
See Utah Rules of Evidence, Rules 801, 802, 803, 805.
25
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 805. Hearsay within hearsay. Hearsay included
within hearsay is not excluded under the hearsay rule if each part of the combined
statements conforms with an exception to the hearsay rule provided in these rules.
23

12

unless the party they seek to compel is a taxpayer.

The status of "taxpayer" has

not been proven as it may or may not apply to the Goffs in this matter.

Absent

proof of taxpayer status, the Goffs reject the notion that they are taxpayers.
Additionally, Ms. Goff was not advised of her constitutional right to not
incriminate herself before she testified in this matter.

While it may not be the

usual practice for the court to Mirandize29 a witness before giving testimony, it
should have been done in this case, because Ms. Goff was an opposing party in
this case, was not represented by an attorney, did not have enjoy the benefit of
assistance of counsel, and it was foreseeable that her testimony as to matters of
income, if given, could be used against her in criminal actions that may grow out
of this case. Any testimony given by Ms. Goff relating to income before she
learned of her right to not give testimony that could forseeably be used against her
in the future should have been stricken.
For any one of more of the foregoing reasons, the Writ of Mandate and
Judgment of the trial court should be vacated, or at a minimum, reversed.

zo

See U.C.A. §59-1-707.
See TRIAL RECORD, P. 298 at p.4 1. 15 - 25.
28
See TRIAL RECORD, P. 298 at p. 18 1. 20 - p. 19 1. 22.
Mirandize means to advise one of their constitutionally protected rights before
eliciting statements from them. From the landmark Supreme Court decision in
Miranda v. Arizona.
27
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Argument

I. The Commission acted outside of its statutorily authorized
jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, when there is no evidence on the
record that the Goffs are or were taxpayers as the term is used in
U.C.A. § 59-1-707.
Title 26 U.S.C. § 7701 (a) (14) defines the term "taxpayer" as ". . . any
person subject to any internal revenue tax." U.C.A. § 59-10-103 (1) (w) defines,
for the purposes of that chapter, the term "taxpayer" as ". . . any individual, estate,
or trust or beneficiary of an estate or trust, whose income is subject in whole or
part to the tax imposed by this chapter."
Prior to filing its Verified Petitions for Writ of Mandate, the Commission
received from the Goffs a request for agency action, wherein the Goffs asked for a
determination grounded in findings of fact and conclusions of law whether the
Goffs possess the status of "taxpayers."

The Goffs raised the issue in their

motion to dismiss that was filed in the court on June 25, 2004.

At the hearings

held on August 16, 2004, the Goffs reiterated that the issue of whether the Goffs
are taxpayers has not been affirmatively established in a record either before the
trial court or elsewhere.32 The Commission has acquiesced to the Goffs position,

JU
31
32

See Exhibit D-7.
See TRIAL RECORD, P. 22 - 100. at p. 22 - 24.
See TRIAL RECORD, P. 298 at p. 4,1. 15 - 20.
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because they have remained silent to the Goffs' assertion of lack of taxpayer status
and the time to speak up as to that issue was at trial — if not before.
The record shows the Commission's silence as to the Goffs' inquiry. From
Brenda Salter's testimony at pp. 89-94, beginning at page 89, line 4:
Q.

BY MR. GOFF: Is one of your duties to respond to the questions

that people ask about their tax status?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Back in April did you receive a letter from my wife and I — or my

wife and me titled a notice access and evidentiary hearing request?
A.

I did.

Q.

The subpoena you were served told you to bring that letter with you.

Do you have the letter?
A.

I have a copy of it.

[At this point, there was a discussion with the court about Exhibit D-7 which is the
Goffs' request for agency action. The discussion pertained to, among other things,
the relevance of Exhibit D-7. Continuing from the record:
THE COURT: You can make your argument as you want.
Ms. Salter, you may have received this. Did you ever answer it?
THE WITNESS: I did not.
THE COURT: You did not. Okay. So that was what you wanted. She
didn=t answer it. So there - what your position is that without her answering it
33

Id. See also, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 8 (d).
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there is no findings or conclusions, using your words, to indicate that you=re liable
in any way, correct? Is that your position? And then you can argue that.
MR. GOFF: I=d like to proffer it into evidence, too.
THE COURT: You=ve proffered it. I=m not receiving it. D-7 is not
received as being irrelevant here. You can argue it at the end of the case, Mr.
Goff, and I understand what your argument is. You=ve said it a number of times,
and I=m not that dense that it doesn=t get it, but you can argue it at the correct
time.
MR. GOFF: Thank you.
THE COURT: Thank you. Any other questions of Ms. Salter, other than
for the use of D-7?
Q.

BY MR. GOFF: Ms. Salter, why did you not answer our request -

our April 22nd letter?
A.

I discussed it with my manager and he had already answered the

questions — most of the questions - well, the questions in that.
Q.

Okay. Who is your manager?

A.

Danny.

THE COURT: Mr. Engh?
Q.

BY MR. GOFF: Mr. Engh felt that you had - that the -- the

questions raised herein were already answered?
A.

Were answered sufficiently, yes.

Q.

In what form?
16

A.

He wrote a letter to you. I witnessed the letter that he gave - sent to

Q.

He=s reference - he=s referencing a letter - he was referencing a

you.

letter sent to -- in March of this year?
A.

To -- I=m not sure of the date.

MR. GOFF: Okay. Your Honor, that letter is not in evidence or hasn=t
been -- it hasn=t been presented to the Court.
THE COURT: No.
MR. GOFF: Okay.
THE COURT: But her testimony is in.
[END QUOTATION OF TRANSCRIPT]
Utah law specifically states that, "An income tax return with respect to the
tax imposed by this chapter shall be filed by: (1) every resident individual, estate,
or trust required to file a federal income tax return for the taxable year . . ,"34
(emphasis added..)
Utah's "writ of mandate" statute states:
"If a taxpayer fails to file any return required pursuant to Title 59 within 60
days of the time prescribed, the commission may petition for a writ of
mandate to compel the taxpayer to file the return. The petition may be
filed, in the discretion of the commission, in the Tax Division of the Third
Judicial District or in the district court for the county in which the taxpayer
resides or has his principal place of business. In the case of a nonresident
taxpayer the petition shall be filed in the Third District Court."35 emphasis
added.
See U.C.A. §59-10-502(1).
See U.C.A. § 59-1-707(1) (a).
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The writ of mandate statute is a remedy the Commission may use to
enforce compliance against taxpayers and not against any other class.36 There is
no evidence on the record that the Goffs are taxpayers as the term is used in the
internal revenue laws of the United States or as the term is used in U.C.A. §59-1707. In fact, the record says that such a determination of the Goffs' status never
took place.37
Daniel Engh, a Commission Audit Manager responsible for determining
taxpayer status, testifies at p. 108 of the transcript as follows:
Q.

Was there any efforts made to determine whether we [the Goffs] are

persons that fall within the confines of subtitle (a) that determine—
A.

Probably.

Q.

But you - can you recall specifically?

A.

No.

Q.

You are the individual - you are the person charged with making

those types of determinations?
A.

Along with the auditors, yes.

MR. GOFF: Okay. Thank you, Mr. Engh.
[END QUOTATION OF TRANSCRIPT]

Id. See also, Radinsky infra.
See TRIAL RECORD, P. 298, p.76,1. 24 - p. 77,1. 6.
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Absent the Goffs acceptance of the taxpayer "hat," a finding by the
Commission that they are taxpayers as the term is used in U.C.A. § 59-1-707 is a
required element to invoke the provisions of that statute, because the statute, as it
states, applies to taxpayers and not to all persons. By remaining silent to the Goffs
charge that attempts have been made to cast them as taxpayers when that is not a
fact affirmatively established in a record [of any proceedings of which the Goffs
are aware],39 it is incumbent on the Commission to either prove the contrary or
accept the Goffs' position. The Commission failed to show that the Goffs are
taxpayers and, arguably, accepts the Goffs' position that they are nontaxpayers.
The authority the Commission cites for bringing this action against the
Goffs, U.C.A." § 59-1-707, is clear that it is a remedy available to the Commission
to apply against "taxpayers." At trial, the Commission presented no testimony or
evidence that proves the Goffs are "taxpayers" as the term is used in U.C.A. § 591-707. In fact, the Commission's audit manager, Mr. Engh, testified that the
Commission made no determination of the Goffs' status with respect to taxpayer
status.40 Yet without the Commission establishing the district court's subject
matter jurisdiction, the district court took jurisdiction in this case as evidenced by

In his dissent from the majority opinion in Economy Plumbing & Heating Co.,
infra, Judge Nichols compared taxpayer status with a hat, "I see no reason why a
claimant may not put on the hat of a taxpayer, or reject it, as he chooses, in a
situation such as we have here. He can make his choice according to his position."
39
See TRIAL RECORD, P. 298, p. 4,1. 15 - 20 and p.89,1. 7 - p. 92,1. 11.
40
See TRIAL RECORD, P. 298, p. 76, line 24 - p. 77, line 6.
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its final order.41 At an earlier opportunity when the Goffs' requested information
from the Commission, the Commission chose to remain silent when asked whether
the Goffs are persons required to file returns.42 The Goffs find no statutory basis
within the writ of mandate statute (U.C.A. § 59-1-707) for the Commission to seek
what it terms "a permissible remedy" to seek a court order to compel an individual
who is other than a "taxpayer" to file a return of any type.43 The statute provides a
remedy for the Commission to seek such writs against taxpayers44 — not against
individuals who have not been determined to be taxpayers — and the Commission
has failed to provide any proof through testimony or evidence that the Goffs are
taxpayers as the term is used in the writ of mandate statute.45
Furthermore, the Commission, and the trial court for this matter, can not
continue to treat the Goffs as having a legal position of "taxpayers" in that there is
no evidence in the record:
a) that the Goffs are " . . . individual[s], estate[s], or trusts[s] or
beneficiary[ies] of an estate or trust, whose income is subject in whole or part to
the tax imposed by [Title 59,] chapter [10 of the Utah Code, Ann.]"46

41

See TRIAL RECORD PP. 263 - 268 (Writ of Mandate and Judgment).
See Exhibit D-7 or Exhibit 1 to Respondents' Petition to Dismiss Verified Writs
of Mandate. See also transcript from page 89, line 4 through page 92, line 11.
43
See TRIAL RECORD, P. 298, p. 89, line 4 and p. 92, line 11.
44
The Commission admits that Utah income tax returns are required to be filed by
taxpayers. See Verified Petitions for Writ of Mandate, p. 3. ^ 12.
45
See TRIAL RECORD, P. 298, p. 89, line 4 and p. 92, line 1 1 . .
46
See U.C.A. § 59-10-103 (1) (w).
42
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b) of any procedurally proper, lawful assessment for taxes. Until such time
that a procedurally proper, lawful assessment is made, the Goffs do not have the
status of "taxpayer."47
c) that the Goffs filed a petition in a tax court, therefore acquiescing to or
assuming the status of "taxpayer." To file a petition in the non-judicial court
inherently assumes the jurisdiction of the "court" and the legal position of a
48

taxpayer.
Since there is no evidence on the record of the required jurisdictional
elements that the Goffs are "taxpayers", the Goffs' status is that of nontaxpayers.
Title 59, U.C.A. and its associated agency, the Utah State Tax Commission have
no statutory authority over a nontaxpayer.49 Without such evidence on the record,
the trial court lacks jurisdiction to hear the issue because the Commission
approached the Court with U.C.A. § 59-1-707 as the statute that gives the
Commission authority to seek a Writ of Mandate, but when challenged as to

4/

See. Radinsky v. U.S., 622 F.Supp. 412, 413, 56 A.F.T.R.2d 85-6157, 86-1
USTC P 9161 at 413 (U.S.D.C, D.Colo. 1985); Girard Trust Bank v. United
States, 226 Ct.Cl. 366, 643 F.2d 725, 47 A.F.T.R.2d 81-1607, 81-1 USTC P
13,394 (Ct. CI. 1981); In Re Western Trading Co, 340 F.Supp. 1130 at 1133
(U.S.D.C, D. Nevada 1972); Estate ofGoetz v. United States, 286 F.Supp. 128
(U.S.D.C.,W.D. Missouri 1968); Brafman v. United States, 384 F.2d 863 (5th Cir.
1967).
48
See. Lively v. CIR, 705 F.2d 1017 (8th Cir., 1983); Ficalora v. CIR, 751 F.2d 85
(2nd Cir., 1983); Charczukv. CIR, 111 F.2d471 (10th Cir., 1985).
49
See Economy Plumbing & Heating v. U S, 200 Ct. CI. 31, 470 F.2d 585, 589
(Ct. CI. 1972).
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whether the Goffs are taxpayers, the Commission was mute, and its employee
testified that no formal determination of the Goffs status as taxpayers was made.50
Therefore, the Commission acted outside its statutory grant of authority
when it filed its Verified Petitions for Writ of Mandate against the Goffs.

II. The Commission failed to show that the Goffs are persons required
to file federal income tax returns. Therefore, they can not be compelled
to file state income tax returns.
Just as Utah taxpayer status is driven by federal law,31 so is the requirement
to file a Utah income tax return.52 U.C.A. § 59-10-502 sets forth that the
requirement for an individual to file a state income tax return is predicated on the
requirement to file a federal income tax return.

Therefore the requirement to file

a federal return is an element that must be proved for the trial court to issue its writ
to compel the Goffs to file the Utah income tax returns mandated by the district
court's writ of mandate and judgment. That requirement, if it exists would be
found in the body of federal law.
There is no evidence on the record of a federal statute coupled with a
substantive implementing regulation that a requirement for the Goffs to file a
federal income tax return exists.54 The requirement to file a federal income tax

5U

See TRIAL RECORD, P. 298, p. 76, line 24 - p. 77, line 6.
See U.C.A. §§ 59-10-102, 59-10-103 (1) (w), 59-10-112.
52
See U.C.A. §59-10-502.
53
Id.
54
See United States v. Mersky, 361 U.S. 431, 438, 80 S.Ct. 459, 463-464, 4
L.Ed.2d 423 (1960).

51
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return is an element that must be on the record before the trial court can exercise
its jurisdiction pursuant to U.C.A. § 59-1-707.
The Commission must prove all elements of section 59-1-707 before a Writ
of Mandate can be issued.55 Absent a federal statute coupled with its substantive
regulation setting forth a requirement for persons in the Goffs' situation to file
federal income tax returns, there is no evidence in the record of a requirement
imposed on the Goffs to file federal income tax returns.56
Furthermore, there is no evidence on the record of a federal taxing statute
that would give rise to a requirement to file a federal income tax return.57 Taxing
statutes must be specific.

This requirement is held in United States of America v.

Community TV, Inc., 327 F.2d 797 (10th Cir., 1964):
"Without question, a taxing statute must describe with some certainty the
transaction, service or object to be taxed, and in the typical situation it
is construed against the Government. Hassett v. Welch, 303 US 303, 58
S.Ct. 559, 82 L. Ed. 858 (1938)."
And, in a most recent case of UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. KUGLIN,
CASE #: 03-CR-20111-ALL, U.S.D.C. Western District of Tennessee (Memphis)

55

See U.C.A. §59-1-707.

56

See Chrysler v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 99 S.Ct. 1705, 60 L.Ed.2d 208, 19 (1979);
Mersky, supra.
57
See Trial Record, P. 298.
58
See United States of America v. Community TV, Inc., 327 F.2d 797 (10th Cir.,
1964).
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(2003), The Jury found Kuglin not guilty of all charges because no tax liability
statute was evidenced.59
Though the courts in Community T. V. or Hassett, supra, did not address
implementing regulations, an implementing regulation shall be prescribed and
published in the Federal Register in accordance with the Administrative
Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (a) (1) and the Federal Registry Act, 44 U.S.C. §
1501 et seq., before enforcement of Title 26 U.S.C. can have the force and effect
of law upon persons proved to come within the statutory authority of the Treasury
Department. See United States v. Mersky, 361 U.S. 431, 80 S.Ct. 459, 4 L.Ed.2d
423 (1960), stating that any claim absent these regulations does not have the force
and effect of law. See, also, California Bankers Association v. Schultz, 416 U.S.
21, 94 S.Ct. 1494, 39 L.Ed.2d 812 (1974); US v. Murphy, 809 F.2d 1427 at 1430
(9th Cir. 1987): U.S. v. Reines, 794 F.2d 506 at 508 (9th Cir. 1986).
In particular, The Supreme Court in Mersky, supra, at 463, articulates that
statute and implementing regulation must operate together before there is any
force of law:
"Once promulgated, these regulations, called for by the statute itself, have
the force of law, and violations therefore incur criminal prosecutions, just
as if all the details had been incorporated into the congressional language.
The result is that neither the statute nor the regulations are complete
without the other, and only together do they have any force."
Both 26 U.S.C. § 7805 and its implementing regulation, 26 C.F.R. §
301.7805-1, clearly state that prescribed rules and regulations are required for the
59

See Addendum 4 hereto.
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enforcement of Title 26 U.S.C.. From the authorities of the courts presented in
Mersky, California Bankers Association, Murphy, Reines, Community TV, and
Hassett, the United States Codes 5 U.S.C. § 552 (a) (1), 26 U.S.C. § 7805, 44
U.S.C. § 1501 et seq., and Code of Federal Regulations, 26 CFR § 301.7805-1, a
judicial tribunal cannot enforce taxpayer obligations absent a proper statutory and
evidentiary showing. The lack of evidence on the record of the required elements,
i.e., a statute coupled with substantive implementing regulation evidencing that the
Goffs are now or ever were subject to a tax equates to an improper foundation of
law necessary for the trial court to enforce its order upon Goffs.
A. The Commission failed to put a federal taxing statute into evidence that
places a tax on the Goffs' income. Without a taxing statute in evidence, there
can be no requirement to file returns. Without a requirement to file returns,
the trial court's order amounts to a denial of the Goffs' constitutionally
protected right to due process of law.
The legal responsibility for a tax must be made by statute. It is a violation
of due process of law,60 if one has to guess what law makes him liable for a tax.
"(A) statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so
vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at it's
meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due
process of law." Connally v General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391
46 S.Ct. 126, 70 L.Ed. 322 (1926).
Here we are not addressing a vague statute, but rather, that there is no
taxing statute or liability statute coupled with implementing regulations included
in the evidence, crucial elements that are required to be evidenced on the record

60

See United States Constitution, Amendment V.
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before the Writ of Mandate can be imposed. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 8
(a) (1) requires the ".. .pleading . .. shall contain . . . a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; ..." Notification of legal
responsibility is "the first essential of due process of law." Connally, supra. There
is no evidence on the record of any Notification of a lawfully and legally imposed
responsibility established under statutory authority alleged in the VERIFIED
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE AND JUDGMENT.61
The United States Supreme Court addresses the issue of lack of a statute
averring a lawful and legal liability in Smith v. U.S., 360 U.S. 1, 79 S.Ct. 991, 3
L.Ed.2d 1041 (1959). The court held that the constitutional right to an indictment,
as restated in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(a), could not be waived by the
defendant and that a proceeding in violation of this constitutional requirement
negated the jurisdiction of the court. The constitutional right to be left alone
unless charged with violating a law, i.e., one charging failure to file a tax return,
(the essence of due process) is no less a constitutional right than being indicted for
an infamous crime. In reversing a conviction, the United States Supreme Court
stated in Vachon v. New Hampshire, 414 U.S. 478 (1974).
"It is beyond question, of course, that a conviction based on a record
lacking any relevant evidence as to a crucial element of the offense charged
violates due process."

See TRIAL RECORD, pp. 1-7.
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In Cole v Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196, 201, 79 S.Ct. 991, 3 L.Ed.2d 1041
(1947), The Supreme Court again reversed a conviction of a crime that was not
charged in the indictment.
"No principle of procedural due process is more clearly established than
that notice of the specific charge, and a chance to be heard in a trial of the
issues raised by that charge, if desired, are among the constitutional rights
of every accused in a criminal proceeding in all courts, state or federal. If,
as the State Supreme Court held, petitioners were charged with a violation
of §1 [and convicted of §2], it is doubtful both that the information fairly
informed them of that charge and that they sought to defend themselves
against such a charge; it is certain that they were not tried for or found
guilty of it. It is as much a violation of due process to send an accused to
prison following conviction of a charge on which he was never tried as it
would be to convict him upon a charge that was never made." citations
omitted.
The Goffs must be given adequate notice of the duties charged against them
and for which they are to be tried. Smith v. OfGrady, 312 U.S. 329, 61 S.Ct. 572,
85 L.Ed. 859 (1941) and, "Conviction upon a charge not made would be sheer
denial of due process." DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 362, 57 S.Ct. 255, 259,
81 L.Ed. 278 (1937). The Commission's silence with respect to the Goffs' request
for agency action has denied the Goffs the opportunity, available to all other
persons, to receive assistance in determining the applicability of the taxing laws to
them in their situation — both state and federal because the state income taxing
laws are founded on the federal ones. In Boyd v. US, 116 U.S. 616, 6 S.Ct. 524,
29 L.Ed. 746 (1886), the court observed the succinct statement by Lord Camden:
"If it is law, it will be found in our books; if it is not to be found there, it is not
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law." Except as provided by statute, the proponent of a rule or order has the
burden of proof. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 556 (d) & (e).
B. Without the Goffs wearing the taxpayer "hat," the Commission lacks
standing to petition the trial court for its writ of mandate.
Since the Commission provided no evidence on the record of the required
elements establishing that the Goffs are "taxpayers," the Commission did not show
that it has standing to sue since 1) Section 59-1-707 is a remedy available to the
Commission against taxpayers and not against other persons, and 2) there is no
evidence on the record of an "injury in fact," a jurisdictional element required in
establishing standing to sue. Supreme Court Justice Thomas summarized for the
Court teachings about standing of a long line of cases as follows:
"A party seeking to invoke a federal court's jurisdiction must demonstrate
three things: (1) 'injury in fact,' by which we mean an invasion of a legally
protested interest that is '(a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or
imminent, not conjectural of hypothetical' ... (2) a causal relationship
between the injury and the challenged conduct, by which we mean that the
injury 'fairly can be traced to the challenged action of the defendant,' and
has not resulted 'from the independent action of some third party not before
the court' ... (3) a likelihood that the injury will be reduced by a favorable
decision by which we mean that the 'prospect of obtaining relief from the
injury as a result of a favorable ruling' is not 'too speculative' ... These
elements are the 'irreducible minimum' ... required by the Constitution."

62

Northeastern Fla. Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors of America v.
Jacksonville, 508 US 656, S.Ct. 2297, 124 L.Ed.2d 586 (1993). See also,
ASARCO v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 109 S.Ct. 2037, 104 L.Ed.2d 696 (1989);
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d
351(1992)
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The above cases contain criminal and civil cases that speak to the issue of injuryin-fact being required to invoke the court's jurisdiction.
Because the Commission did not evidence on the record any of the
foregoing required jurisdictional elements, the trial court does not have
jurisdiction to determine whether there is a federal question pursuant to the United
States Constitution Article I § 8 cl. 3. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,
115 S.Ct. 1624, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995). After extensively surveying the history
of Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the Court identified three broad categories of
activity that Congress may regulate: 1) "the channels of interstate commerce;" 2)
"the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate
commerce, even though the threat may come only from intrastate activities;" and
3) "those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce, i.e., those
activities that substantially affect interstate commerce."
Supreme Court Justice Thomas in the concurring majority opinion in the
case of Lopez, supra, states very clearly:
"Indeed, on this crucial point, the majority and Justice Breyer [the Justice
writing the dissenting opinion] agree in principle: the Federal Government
has nothing approaching a police power." (pg. 64.)
Then Justice Thomas went on to discuss "a regulation of police" (pg. 86),
wherein he stated:
"United States v. Dewitt, 76 U.S. 41, 9 Wall 4, 19 L. Ed. 593 (1870),
marked the first time the court struck down as exceeding the power
conveyed by the commerce clause. In a Two-page opinion, the court
invalidated a nation-wide law prohibiting all sales of naphtha, and
illuminating oils. In so doing, the court remarked that commerce clause has
29

always been understood as limited by its terms; and as virtual denial of any
power to interfere with the internal trade and business of the separate
States."
The Commission did not establish jurisdictional elements on the record that
give the federal taxing statutes applicability to the Goffs under the authority of the
United States Constitution, Article I § 8 els. 17, 18. Special provision is made in
the Constitution for the cession of jurisdiction from the states over places where
the federal government shall establish forts or other military works. It is only in
these places or in territories of the United States, where it can exercise a general
jurisdiction. New Orleans v. United States, 35 U.S. 662, 10 Pet. 662, 9 L.Ed. 573
(1836). "All legislation is prima facie territorial," American Banana Co. v. United
Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 29 S.Ct. 511, 53 L.Ed. 826 (1909). "The canon of
legislative construction which teaches that legislation of Congress, unless a
contrary intent appears is meant to apply only to the territorial jurisdiction of the
United States." Foley Brothers v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 69 S.Ct. 575, 93 L.Ed.
680 (1949); U.S. v. Spelar, 338 U.S. 217, 222, 70 S.Ct. 10, 94 L.Ed. 3 (1949).
"The United States has no constitutional capacity to exercise municipal
jurisdiction, sovereignty or eminent domain, within the limits of state or
elsewhere, except in the cases in which it is expressly granted . . . " Pollard v.
Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 223, 3 How. 212, 11 L.Ed. 565 (1845), "...the states are
separate sovereigns with the respect to the federal government..." Heath v.
Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 106 S.Ct. 433, 88 L.Ed.2d 387 (1985). No sanctions can be
imposed absent proof of jurisdiction. Stanardv. Olesen, 74 S.Ct. 768 (1954). Once
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challenged, jurisdiction cannot be assumed, it must be proven to exist. Stuck v.
Medical Examiners, 94 Ca.2s 751, 211 P2d 389 (1949). See also Maine v.
Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 100 S.Ct. 2502, 65 L.Ed.2d 555 (1980); Brooks v. Yawkey,
200 F. 2d 663 (1 st Cir. 1953). The law requires proof of jurisdiction to appear on
the record of the administrative agency and all administrative proceedings.
Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 94 S.Ct. 1372, 39 L.Ed.2d 577 (1974). If the
tribunal finds absence of proof of jurisdiction over person and subject matter, the
case must be dismissed. Louisville R. R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 29 S.Ct. 42, 53
L.Ed. 126 (1908). Therefore, without evidence of a taxing statute that coupled
with its substantive regulation evidenced on the record that has general
applicability within the states of the Union, the trial court can not conclude that the
Goffs are required to file federal income tax returns and can not compel them to
file state income tax returns.
Title 18 U.S.C. § 7 specifies that the "territorial jurisdiction" of the United
States extends only outside the boundaries of lands belonging to any of the 50
states, and 40 U.S.C. § 255 specifies the legal conditions that must be fulfilled for
the United States government to have exclusive, partial, or no jurisdiction within
the area of lands belonging to the states of the Union. The Exclusive Jurisdiction
Clause of the United States Constitution, Article I § 8 cl. 17, operates under
restrictive terms. To have authority over places purchased from the states for the
building of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, or any other needful buildings.
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The Commission fails to establish on the record the required exclusive Federal
jurisdiction.
There are no internal revenue districts established in States of the Union, as
required by 26 U.S.C. § 7621 and Executive Order # 10289, as amended. The
Internal Revenue Service incursions into States of the Union for purposes
authorized by 26 U.S.C. Chapter 78 are beyond venue prescribed by law. Title 4
U.S.C. § 72, concerning the requirement for all departments of the government to
limit operations to the District of Columbia unless authorized to operate elsewhere
by statute. See also 40 U.S.C. § 255. The Agency's venue and jurisdiction
statements are published in 26 C.F.R. § 601.101:
"Within an internal revenue district the internal revenue laws are
administered by a district director of internal revenue. "Otherwise, "The
Director, Foreign Operations District, [now Assistant Commissioner
(International)] administers the internal revenue laws applicable to
taxpayers residing or doing business abroad, foreign taxpayers deriving
income from sources within the United States, and taxpayers who are
required to withhold tax on certain payments to nonresident aliens and
foreign corporations..."
Absent evidence of the required federal jurisdiction, applicability of the
federal taxing statutes to the Goffs is absent as well. The Goffs, therefore, can not
have "federal taxable income" as the term is used by U.C.A. §§ 59-10-102 and 5910-112. Without evidence of the applicability of the federal taxing statutes to the
Goffs, the Goffs can not be burdened with being "required to file a federal income
tax return" as expressed in U.C.A. § 59-10-502. It follows then that the trial court
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can not compel the filing of state income tax returns due to the provisions of
U.C.A. § 59-10-502.
IV. The evidence before the trial court can not be relied on for the truth
of the matters contained therein and was accepted into evidence over
the Goffs' objections.
Information which the Commission characterized as its own business
records grew out of information transferred from the Internal Revenue Service
("IRS") to the Commission which were not attested to by anyone from the IRS,
were not transferred under seal, and which the Commission's keeper of the records
admits under oath originated from yet other third parties making reports to the
IRS.63 These records do not conform to Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 80564
because they are hearsay within hearsay, and the statements contained within the
Commission records lack the foundation necessary to qualify for an exception to
the hearsay rule as business records65 or any other exception under Utah R. Evid.,
Rule 803. Nor do the records qualify for exception as public records66 as the

w

See TRIAL RECORD, P. 298, p. 38, line 11 - p. 39, line 16.
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 805. Hearsay within hearsay. — Hearsay included
within hearsay is not excluded under the hearsay rule if each part of the combined
statements conforms with an exception to the hearsay rule provided in these rules.
65
See TRIAL RECORD, P. 298, p. 36, line 5, - p. 38, line 2. See also, Utah R.
Evid., Rule 803 (6), Rule 805.
66
Public record - A record that a governmental unit is required by law to keep,
such as land deeds kept at a county courthouse. Public records are generally open
to view by the public. (Garner, Bryan A. ed. 1999. Black's Law Dictionary,
Seventh Edition. St. Paul, Minn. West Group, p. 1279.)
64
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Commission argues, because they are not available to the public at large for
inspection,

and the deficiencies with the lack of foundation of the statements

contained within the Commission records still exist even if they (the Commission
records) were to qualify as public records. The Commission produced no
competent witness that was able to testify to the truth of the matters contained
within the records.69 In Exhibit D-4, a letter to Commission's counsel, Timothy
A. Bodily, dated August 4, 2004, the Goffs requested the name, address and
telephone number of the person who has first hand knowledge of the truth of the
matters contained in the Exhibit D-6.70 Mr. Bodily's response was an affidavit
signed by Dolores Furniss, a witness at trial.71 On cross-examination, Ms. Furniss
admitted that she does not have first-hand knowledge as to the truth of the matters

The public records which set forth the activities of the agency are the 6103 (d)
agreement (TRIAL RECORD, P. 298, p. 37, lines 9 - 1 5 ) and the transmittals
(TRIAL RECORD, P. 298, p. 36, lines 18 - 19) — not the data itself. See Ut. R.
Evid., Rule 803 (8).
68
See TRIAL RECORD, P. 298, p. 35, lines 17-23. See also, Utah R. Evid.,
Rule 803 (8)
69
For Ms. Furniss' admission, see TRIAL RECORD, P. 298, p. 36, line 1 - p. 38,
line 2. For Mr. Engh's admission, see transcript at page 83, lines 12 through 14
The only other Commission witnesses were the Goffs. See TRIAL RECORD, P.
298, p. 2.
70
See Exhibit D-4, "This is our request for the name and address and telephone
number of the person who has personal or first-hand knowledge of the truth of the
matters contained in the attachments to Daniel Engh's affidavit which is Exhibit A
to the Tax Commission's Response in Opposition to Respondents' Petition to
Dismiss Petitioner's Verified Petition for Writ of Mandate, and Injunctive Relief,
and Judicial Notice."
71
See TRIAL RECORD, P. 298, p. 2.
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contained within the Commission records.72 Whether the Commission records
contained in Exhibits P-l and D-6 are business records, public records, both
business records and public records or neither, those records are founded on
hearsay statements of the originators of the information which were reported to the
IRS73 and further hearsay statements of the Internal Revenue Service74 which were
then in turn reported to the Utah State Tax Commission. Such records are
therefore unreliable and inadmissible as evidence of anything let alone evidence
that any payments the Goffs may or may not have received meet a particular
"threshold income requirement"75 espoused by the Commission. This Court
established in its holding inJ.S. v. State, 939 P.2d 196, at 201 (C.A. Utah 1997)76 that
double hearsay may not be the sole basis for disposition in a sentencing
77

proceeding. There is arguably a higher standard of proof where a defendant or
respondent has yet to be judged guilty, or not — liable, or not. In Alexander v.
CIT Technology Financing Services, Inc., the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois ruled regarding Fed. R. Evid. 803 (6) (which the

72

See TRIAL RECORD, P. 298, p. 49, line 9, - p. 50, line 14. Exhibit P-l and
Exhibit D-6 contain for the most part identical records as P-1 except that D-6 does
not bear a seal and signature of Ms. Furniss. See TRIAL RECORD, P. 298, p. 79,
lines 9 - 14. See also, Exhibits P-l and D-6.
73
See TRIAL RECORD, P. 298, p. 55, line 12-22.
74
See TRIAL RECORD, P. 298, p. 36, line 25 - p. 38, line 2.
75
See Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 805. See also, U.S. v. Vigneau, 187 F.3d 70,
at75(l s t Cir. 1999).
76
939 P.2d 196, at 201 (C.A. Utah 1997), Cf. State v. Johnson, 856 P.2d 1064, at
1071 (Utah 1993).
77
Id.
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Supreme Court's Advisory Committee on the Rules of Evidence has adopted )
that the business records exception does not extend to unverified statements
contained within a business record that are made by third parties.79 The United
States Court of Appeals, First Circuit commenting on Rule 803 (6) in U.S. v.
Vigneau*0 stated:
"The classic case is Johnson v. Lutz, 253 N.Y. 124, 170 N.E. 517
(N.Y. 1930), which excluded an unredacted police report
incorporating the statement of a bystander (even though the police
officer recorded it in the regular course of business) because the
informant was not part of that business. The Advisory Committee
Notes to Rule 803(6) cite Johnson v. Lutz and make clear that the
rule is intended to incorporate its holding." (187 F.3d 70, at 75)
In this case, the district court relies on Commission records containing unverified
statements which were forwarded from the Internal Revenue Service, who gleaned
the information from other parties by way of those parties' reports.

l

Ms. Furniss'

testimony is that in neither instance were the records ever verified, transmitted by
affidavit or under seal attesting to the truth of the matters contained therein.82 The
only witnesses other than the Goffs that the Commission presented were Ms.
Fumiss and Daniel Engh, both employed by the Commission and both admitting
that they have no first hand or personal knowledge of the truth of the matters
"This rule is the federal rule verbatim. The 2001 amendment adopts changes
made to Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6) effective December 1, 2000." (Advisory
Committee Note to Rule 803, Utah Rules of Evidence.)
19
Alexander v. CIT Technology Financing Services, Inc., 217 F.Supp.2d 867, 880
(N.D. 111. 2002).
80
U.S. v. Vigneau, 187 F.3d 70, at 75 (1 st Cir. 1999).
81
See TRIAL RECORD, P. 298, p. 54, line 1 8 - p . 55, line 11. See also, Id., p.
38, line 2 2 - p . 39, line 16.
82
See TRIAL RECORD, P. 298, p. 36, line 1 - p. 38, line 2.
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contained in the Commission records.

Pursuant to Utah R. Evid., Rule 807 the

Goffs requested identification of the person who could testify to the truth of the
or

matters contained within the Commission's records and the person the
Commission identified, Dolores Furniss, admits that she 1) did not verify the third
party statements contained in the Commission records and 2) can not testify to the
truth of those third party statements contained in the Commission records.
With respect to Exhibit P-5, similar foundational problems exist. Also, the
Goffs had no opportunity to confront a witness competent to testify to the truth of
the matters contained in Exhibit P-5. Like Exhibits P-l and D-6, the statements
contained within the exhibits did not originate with the Department of Workforce
Services ("DWS"), but from reports to DWS by businesses or other entities.
Exhibit P-5 displays no certification from the parties who allegedly reported the
information to DWS. Therefore, P-5 contains unverified statements by third
parties. Exhibit P-5 therefore does not conform to Rule 805, Utah Rules of
Evidence because P-5 contains unverified hearsay within hearsay.
The Tax Commission introduced two Exhibits, P-l and P-5 at Trial. Each
exhibit contains unverified hearsay statements from parties other than the
83

For Ms. Furniss' admission, see TRIAL RECORD, P. 298, p. 36, line 1 - p. 38,
line 2. For Daniel Engh's admission, see transcript at page 83, lines 12 through
14. See page 79, lines 9 through 14 for identification of the exhibit discussed as
Exhibit D-6.
84
Formerly Rule 803 (24) prior to November 1, 2004.
85
See Exhibit D-4. See also, TRIAL RECORD, P. 298, p. 85, line 4 - p. 86, line
21.
86
See TRIAL RECORD, P. 298, p. 49, line 9 - p. 50, line 14.
87
See Exhibit P-5. See also, TRIAL RECORD, P. 298, p. 73, lines 1 2 - 2 3 .
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Commission.

In the case of Exhibit P-l, the lack of verification was present on

two levels, not verified as to the sources of the information by the IRS and not
verified by the Tax Commission when received from the IRS.89 Exhibit P-5
contains two certifications that attest to similar if not identical facts, 1) that the
documents are copies of DWS's records, 2) that the enclosed records relate to
reports filed for H. Douglas Goff and Lisa Goff, outlining their social security
numbers, and 3) that the enclosed documents are true, complete and correct
copies.90 Both certifications are signed by one Tani Pack Downing.91 Neither
certification claims that Tani Pack Downing is the custodian of the Department of
Workforce Service's records.

The certifications do not claim that the records are

business records; nor do they claim the records are public records.

The

certifications do not state the sources of the information presented in the records or
that DWS had verified the reported information.94 The certifications are silent as
to whether the DWS records qualify for any exceptions to the hearsay rule under
Utah R. Evid., Rule 803 or Rule 804.95 Further, the first notice the Goffs were
given of these records was at Trial. In fact, the notarized certification is dated the
88

With respect to P-l, see TRIAL RECORD, P. 298, p. 38, line 11 - p. 39, line
16. With respect to P-5, see TRIAL RECORD, P. 298, p. 73, lines 12 - 23. See
also Exhibit P-5.
89
See TRIAL RECORD, P. 298, p. 38, line 11 - p. 39, line 16.
90
See Exhibit P-5.
91
Id.
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
Id.
95
Id.
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day of Trial.

The Goffs, therefore, had no opportunity to request identification

of persons with personal knowledge of the truth of the matters contained in the
records as they had done with respect to Exhibit D-6.97 The Commission, in
effect, denied the Goffs any opportunity to confront and question a competent
witness as to the veracity of any of the Commission records presented in Exhibit
P-5.
The Goffs introduced Exhibit D-6 which contains many identical printouts
of the Commission records in P-l. (P-l contains all printouts contained in D-6
plus additional documents.) However, D-6 (Affidavit of Daniel Engh) was
introduced for the purpose of questioning Mr. Engh as to his statements in D-6. It
QO

was not introduced as evidence of the truth of the matters contained therein.
Exhibit D-6 contains printouts of records which are identical to the Commission
Records represented by several of the printouts in P-l and as discussed earlier
herein, and therefore is fraught with the same foundational deficiencies with
regard to Rule 805, Utah Rules of Evidence. In spite of this, the district court
states, "D-6 is still in evidence, isn't it? I don't care what purpose you used it for.
Once it's in evidence I can use it for any purpose I want."99
As discussed earlier, this Court as well as other courts have ruled that
double hearsay or hearsay within hearsay is inadmissible without each part of the

See Exhibit D-4 (Letter from the Goffs to Tim Bodily).
See Murray, infra.
See TRIAL RECORD, P. 298, p. 126, lines 1 - 3 .
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statements qualifying for an exception to the hearsay rule100 because such
statements taken in their entirety are unreliable. The Court of Appeals, Seventh
Circuit held, ". . . the fact that they were the quoted statements of others does not
make them hearsay. Proof of the fact that a certain statement was made is not
hearsay of that fact. It is hearsay of the truth of the statement."101
The district court can not rely on Exhibit D-6, as evidence of the truth of
the matters contained therein and remain consistent with this Court's holdings in
J.S. and Johnson, supra.
In summary, there are three exhibits in this case, P-1, P-5 and D-6 that the
Commission alleges address income. None of these three exhibits can be relied
on as evidence of the truth of the matters contained therein, because all three of
these exhibits contain double hearsay and arguably triple hearsay where all parts
of the combined statements do not conform with any exception to the hearsay rule
provided in the Utah R. of Evid., Rules 803 or 804. Furthermore, when asked to
identify the person who has personal or first hand knowledge of the truth of the
matters contained in the records for which Rule 807, Utah Rules of Evidence
provides,102 the Commission failed to identify a competent witness.
V, All evidence admitted and purporting to be evidence of income was
inadmissible, and with no evidence of income, the trial court's findings
and final order are unsupported and unjustified.

100

See J.S., Alexander, Vigneau, supra.
Murray v. United States, 10 F.2d 409, 411 (7th Cir. 1926)
102
Formerly Rule 803 (24), Utah Rules of Evidence.

101
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Without any admissible evidence of gross income as defined in 26 U.S.C. §
61, the district court is unjustified in its ruling that the Goffs are required to file
state income tax returns. This lack of evidence alone is enough to justify
overturning the final order of the district court in this case.
A. The Evidence Was Improperly Admitted.
The Commission's case relies chiefly on three pieces of evidence, Exhibits
P-1, P-5 and D-6, all of which should have been excluded insofar as they are
admitted to show evidence of income. The Commission's primary piece of
evidence — Exhibit P-1 — is inadmissible because it lacks the foundation
required by Utah R. of Evid., Rule 805 The Goffs challenged its admission,
having exposed that exhibit's deficiencies, and the district court, over the Goffs'
objection, admitted Exhibit P-1 into evidence. The Commission's allegation that
the Commission records come in under the business records exception is
unfounded, because there is no evidence in the Trial Record that any of the
Commission records were made from information transmitted by a person with
knowledge. Dolores Furniss did not verify the records received from the IRS104
and was unable to identify who transmitted the records.105 These foundational

w

" See TRIAL RECORD, P. 298, p.33, line 13 - p. 37, line 17. See also, p. 50,
line 15 - p . 56, line 10.
104
See TRIAL RECORD, P. 298, p. 36, line 25 - p. 37, line 6.
105
See TRIAL RECORD, P. 298, p. 48, line 25 - p.49, line 5. See also, TRIAL
RECORD, P. 298, p. 36, line 25 - p. 37, line 6.
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deficiencies in the Commission's records persist under a public records exception
for which the records arguably do not qualify.
The records of the Department of Workforce Services (Exhibit P-5) are
similarly inadmissible as evidence of the truth of the matters contained in them
because the records' unverified statements by unrelated third parties constitute
unverified hearsay within hearsay which disqualifies Exhibit P-5 for admissibility
under Utah R. of Evid., Rule 805.106 This deficiency in P-5 exists even if the
records themselves qualify as business records or public records under Utah R. of
Evid., Rule 803.107 Further on the matter of DWS records, the Goffs repeat and
reallege their arguments in Part IV herein and relate the same argument to Exhibit
P-5.
The documents in Exhibit D-6 are copies of the records contained in
Exhibit P-1. Because such is the case, the Goffs repeat and reallege their
arguments as they relate to Exhibit P-1 and relate them to Exhibit D-6. Therefore,
Exhibit D-6 can not be relied on for truth of the matters contained in it.
B. All of the evidence that speaks to the issue of income was improperly
admitted and therefore justifies reversal or a decision to vacate the trial
court's order.
ALL THREE PIECES of evidence were improperly admitted for purposes
of ascertaining the truth of the matters contained in them leaving nothing to

See Footnote 41, supra for text of Rule 805.
See Utah R. Evid., Rule 805.
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support the final order of the trial court. In support of this conclusion, the Goffs
repeat and reallege their arguments in section IV herein.
VI. The trial court erred in ruling that Mrs Goff waived her right to
not give testimony against herself.
Both Mr. and Mrs. Goff were called to testify at the hearing on the merits.
Mrs. Goff was the first witness called. When on the stand, opposing counsel
1 08

questioned her about income figures in exhibit P-l.

Mr. Goff objected to the

fact that the court had not advised a party to the hearing, not represented by
counsel, who was called by opposing counsel of her basic, constitutionally
protected rights when he recognized the potential that Mrs. Goffs testimony could
be used against her at a future, possibly criminal trial.109 The United States
Supreme Court has held that:
"Waivers of constitutional rights not only must be voluntary but must be
knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant
circumstances and likely consequences." Brady v. U. S.9 397 U.S. 742, 90
S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970)
Immediately upon learning of the "likely consequences" of her testimony,
Mrs. Goff invoked her right to abstain from self-incrimination and was unavailable
to testify on matters of her income.
Mrs. Goffs immediate silence upon becoming aware of the likely
consequences is the best evidence that 1) she was previously unaware of the
implications of her testimony, and 2) the wisdom of the holding in Brady.
108
109

See TRIAL RECORD, P. 298, p. 18,1. 20 - p. 19,1. 9.
See TRIAL RECORD, P. 298, p. 19, lines 17-22.
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Courts ask all the time if a defendant is aware of the implications of their
actions. They do so for sound reasons and out of respect for the rights of accused
persons. The fact that it didn't happen here is egregious error. This court should
order Mrs. Goffs testimony stricken and restore her to her position prior to taking
the witness chair.

Conclusion
The Commission failed to prove that the Goffs are, in their present
situation, affected by the federal taxing statutes found in Title 26, Subtitle A of the
United States Code. Without proving that the federal statutes contemplate a tax on
the Goffs in their situation, the Commission failed to prove that a requirement to
file federal income tax returns exists, ergo it failed to prove that a requirement
exists for the Goffs to file state income tax returns.
The Commission presented documents purporting to evidence the Goffs
income which the court accepted into evidence over the Goffs objections. Without
arguing the nature of the matters contained in the documents, all those documents
are hearsay within hearsay to the truth of the matters contained in them and do not
comply with Utah R. of Evid., R. 805 to meet an exception to the hearsay rule
under Rule 803. They are, therefore, inadmissible and the trial court erred when it
accepted the documents as evidence of the truth of the matters contained in them.
Therefore, for any one or more of the foregoing reasons, the Court should
find that error was made in the trial court that has caused the Goffs undue harm,

44

and vacate the trial court's final order in this case that was entered September 21,
2004.
Prayer
Hence, for any one or more of the foregoing reasons, the Goffs pray this
Honorable Court to vacate the Writ of Mandate and Judgment of the trial court
below and issue its order to the Third District Court to release the bonds or
deposits in lieu of bond that were made to the court below to bring this appeal if
vacating the trial court's writ and judgment serves Justice. In the alternative, the
Goffs pray the judgment and writ of the court below be reversed and remanded to
the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with this Court's decision.
RESPECTFULLY RESUBMITTED this 6th

day of June, 2005.

ro Per

AM
Lisa Goff, Appellant Pro Bfef/
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Constitutional Provisions, Statutes, Rules and Regulations
Constitutional Provisions

United States Constitution, Article I § 8 cl. 3
[The Congress shall have power] To regulate commerce with foreign
nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes;

United States Constitution, Article I § 8 cl. 17
[The Congress shall have power] To exercise exclusive legislation in all
cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten miles square) as
may, by cession of particular states, and the acceptance of Congress,
become the seat of the government of the United States, and to exercise like
authority over all places purchased by the consent of the legislature of the
state in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines,
arsenals, dockyards, and other needful buildings;-And

United States Constitution, Article I § 8 cl. 18
[The Congress shall have power] To make all laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and
all other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the United
States, or in any department or officer thereof.

United States Constitution, Amendment V
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual
service in time of war or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for
the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be
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deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.

United States Constitution, Amendment XIV
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject
to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state
wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.

Utah Constitution, Article I, section 12
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf,
to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process
to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy
public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the
offense is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all
cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be
compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed.
The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife
shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against
his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination,
the function of that examination is limited to determining whether probable
cause exists unless otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this
constitution shall preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined
by statute or rule in whole or in part at any preliminary examination to
determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with respect to
release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by
statute or rule.
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Statutes
Federal Statutes

4 U.S.C. § 72
Sec. 72. Public offices; at seat of Government
All offices attached to the seat of government shall be exercised
in
the District of Columbia, and not elsewhere, except as otherwise
expressly provided by law.

5 U.S.C. § 552 (a) (1)
Sec. 552. Public information; agency rules, opinions, orders,
records, and proceedings
(a) Each agency shall make available to the public information as
follows:
(1) Each agency shall separately state and currently publish in the
Federal Register for the guidance of the public-(A) descriptions of its central and field organization and the
established places at which, the employees (and in the case of a
uniformed service, the members) from whom, and the methods whereby,
the public may obtain information, make submittals or requests, or
obtain decisions;
(B) statements of the general course and method by which its
functions are channeled and determined, including the nature and
requirements of all formal and informal procedures available;
(C) rules of procedure, descriptions of forms available or the
places at which forms may be obtained, and instructions as to the
scope and contents of all papers, reports, or examinations;
(D) substantive rules of general applicability adopted as
authorized by law, and statements of general policy or
interpretations of general applicability formulated and adopted by
the agency; and
(E) each amendment, revision, or repeal of the foregoing.
Except to the extent that a person has actual and timely notice of the
terms thereof, a person may not in any manner be required to resort to,
or be adversely affected by, a matter required to be published in the
Federal Register and not so published. For the purpose of this
paragraph, matter reasonably available to the class of persons affected
thereby is deemed published in the Federal Register when incorporated
by
reference therein with the approval of the Director of the Federal
Register.
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5 U.S.C. §§ 556 (d) & (e)
Sec. 556. Hearings; presiding employees; powers and duties;
burden of proof; evidence; record as basis of decision
(d) Except as otherwise provided by statute, the proponent of a
rule
or order has the burden of proof. Any oral or documentary evidence may
be received, but the agency as a matter of policy shall provide for the
exclusion of irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious evidence. A
sanction may not be imposed or rule or order issued except on
consideration of the whole record or those parts thereof cited by a
party and supported by and in accordance with the reliable, probative,
and substantial evidence. The agency may, to the extent consistent with
the interests of justice and the policy of the underlying statutes
administered by the agency, consider a violation of section 557(d) of
this title sufficient grounds for a decision adverse to a party who has
knowingly committed such violation or knowingly caused such violation
to
occur. A party is entitled to present his case or defense by oral or
documentary evidence, to submit rebuttal evidence, and to conduct such
cross-examination as may be required for a full and true disclosure of
the facts. In rule making or determining claims for money or benefits
or
applications for initial licenses an agency may, when a party will not
be prejudiced thereby, adopt procedures for the submission of all or
part of the evidence in written form.
(e) The transcript of testimony and exhibits, together with all
papers and requests filed in the proceeding, constitutes the exclusive
record for decision in accordance with section 557 of this title and,
on
payment of lawfully prescribed costs, shall be made available to the
parties. When an agency decision rests on official notice of a material
fact not appearing in the evidence in the record, a party is entitled,
on timely request, to an opportunity to show the contrary.

18 U.S.C. § 7
Sec.

7. Special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the
United States defined

The term SNspecial maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the
United States' 1 , as used in this title, includes:
(1) The high seas, any other waters within the admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction of the United States and out of the
jurisdiction of any particular State, and any vessel belonging in
whole or in part to the United States or any citizen thereof, or to
any corporation created by or under the laws of the United States,

4~

Appellants Brief

Addendum 1

or of any State, Territory, District, or possession thereof, when
such vessel is within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of
the
United States and out of the jurisdiction of any particular State.
(2) Any vessel registered, licensed, or enrolled under the laws
of the United States, and being on a voyage upon the waters of any
of the Great Lakes, or any of the waters connecting them, or upon
the Saint Lawrence River where the same constitutes the
International Boundary Line.
(3) Any lands reserved or acquired for the use of the United
States, and under the exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction thereof,
or any place purchased or otherwise acquired by the United States
by
consent of the legislature of the State in which the same shall be,
for the erection of a fort, magazine, arsenal, dockyard, or other
needful building.
(4) Any island, rock, or key containing deposits of guano,
which
may, at the discretion of the President, be considered as
appertaining to the United States.
(5) Any aircraft belonging in whole or in part to the United
States, or any citizen thereof, or to any corporation created by or
under the laws of the United States, or any State, Territory,
district, or possession thereof, while such aircraft is in flight
over the high seas, or over any other waters within the admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction of the United States and out of the
jurisdiction of any particular State.
(6) Any vehicle used or designed for flight or navigation in
space and on the registry of the United States pursuant to the
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies and the Convention on Registration of Objects
Launched into Outer Space, while that vehicle is in flight, which
is
from the moment when all external doors are closed on Earth
following embarkation until the moment when one such door is opened
on Earth for disembarkation or in the case of a forced landing,
until the competent authorities take over the responsibility for
the
vehicle and for persons and property aboard.
(7) Any place outside the jurisdiction of any nation with
respect to an offense by or against a national of the United
States.
(8) To the extent permitted by international law, any foreign
vessel during a voyage having a scheduled departure from or arrival
in the United States with respect to an offense committed by or
against a national of the United States.

26 U.S.C. § 61
Sec. 61. Gross income defined

(a) General definition

~5~

Appellant's Brief

Addendum 1

Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, gross income means
all income from whatever source derived, including (but not limited to)
the following items:
(1) Compensation for services, including fees, commissions,
fringe benefits, and similar items;
(2) Gross income derived from business;
(3) Gains derived from dealings in property;
(4) Interest;
(5) Rents;
(6) Royalties;
(7) Dividends;
(8) Alimony and separate maintenance payments;
(9) Annuities;
(10) Income from life insurance and endowment contracts;
(11) Pensions;
(12) Income from discharge of indebtedness;
(13) Distributive share of partnership gross income;
(14) Income in respect of a decedent; and
(15) Income from an interest in an estate or trust.
(b) Cross references
For items specifically included in gross income, see part
II
(sec.
71 and following). For items specifically excluded from
gross income, see part III (sec. 101 and following).

26 U.S.C. § 6012
Sec. 6012. Persons required to make returns of income

(a) General rule
Returns with respect to income taxes under subtitle A shall be made
by the following:
(1)(A) Every individual having for the taxable year gross
income
which equals or exceeds the exemption amount, except that a return
shall not be required of an individual-(i) who is not married (determined by applying section
7703), is not a surviving spouse (as defined in section 2(a)),
is not a head of a household (as defined in section 2 (b)), and
for the taxable year has gross income of less than the sum of
the exemption amount plus the basic standard deduction
applicable to such an individual,
(ii) who is a head of a household (as so defined) and for
the taxable year has gross income of less than the sum of the
exemption amount plus the basic standard deduction applicable
to
such an individual,
(iii) who is a surviving spouse (as so defined) and for the
taxable year has gross income of less than the sum of the
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exemption amount plus the basic standard deduction

applicable

to
such an individual, or
(iv) who is entitled to make a joint return and whose gross
income, when combined with the gross income of his spouse, is,
for the taxable year, less than the sum of twice the exemption
amount plus the basic standard deduction applicable to a joint
return, but only if such individual and his spouse, at the
close
of the taxable year, had the same household as their home.
Clause (iv) shall not apply if for the taxable year such spouse
makes a separate return or any other taxpayer is entitled to an
exemption for such spouse under section 151 (c) .
(B) The amount specified in clause (i), (ii), or (iii) of
subparagraph (A) shall be increased by the amount of 1 additional
standard deduction (within the meaning of section 63(c)(3)) in the
case of an individual entitled to such deduction by reason of
section 63(f) (1) (A) (relating to individuals age 65 or m o r e ) , and
the amount specified in clause (iv) of subparagraph (A) shall be
increased by the amount of the additional standard deduction for
each additional standard deduction to which the individual or his
spouse is entitled by reason of section 63(f)(1).
(C) The exception under subparagraph (A) shall not apply to any
individual-(i) who is described in section 63(c)(5) and who has-(I) income (other than earned income) in excess of the
sum of the amount in effect under section 63(c)(5)(A) plus
the additional standard deduction (if any) to which the
individual is entitled, or
(II) total gross income in excess of the standard
deduction, or
(ii) for whom the standard deduction is zero under section
63(c) (6) .
(D) For purposes of this subsection-(i) The terms
standard deduction'', x 'basic standard
v
deduction'' and 'additional standard deduction'' have the
respective meanings given such terms by section 63 (c) .
(ii) The term v 'exemption amount'' has the meaning given
such term by section 151(d). In the case of an individual
described in section 151(d)(2), the exemption amount shall be
zero.
(2) Every corporation subject to taxation under subtitle A;
(3) Every estate the gross income of which for the taxable year
is $600 or more;
(4) Every trust having for the taxable year any taxable income,
or having gross income of $600 or over, regardless of the amount of
taxable income;
(5) Every estate or trust of which any beneficiary is a
nonresident alien;
(6) Every political organization (within the meaning of section
527(e) (1)), and every fund treated under section 527(g) as if it
constituted a political organization, which has political
organization taxable income (within the meaning of section
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527(c) (1)) for the taxable year or which has gross receipts of
$25,000 or more for the taxable year (other than an organization to
which section 527 applies solely by reason of subsection (f)(1) of
such section); and \1\

\1\ So in original,

(7) Every homeowners association (within the meaning of section
528(c)(1)) which has homeowners association taxable income (within
the meaning of section 528(d)) for the taxable year.\l\
(8) Every individual who receives payments during the calendar
year in which the taxable year begins under section 3507 (relating
to advance payment of earned income credit).\1\
(9) Every estate of an individual under chapter 7 or 11 of
title
11 of the United States Code (relating to bankruptcy) the gross
income of which for the taxable year is not less than the sum of
the
exemption amount plus the basic standard deduction under section
63(c) (2) (D) . \ 1 \
except that subject to such conditions, limitations, and exceptions and
under such regulations as may be prescribed by the Secretary,
nonresident alien individuals subject to the tax imposed by section 871
and foreign corporations subject to the tax imposed by section 881 may
be exempted from the requirement of making returns under this section.
(b) Returns made by fiduciaries and receivers
(1) Returns of decedents
If an individual is deceased, the return of such individual
required under subsection (a) shall be made by his executor,
administrator, or other person charged with the property of such
decedent.
(2) Persons under a disability
If an individual is unable to make a return required under
subsection (a), the return of such individual shall be made by a
duly authorized agent, his committee, guardian, fiduciary or other
person charged with the care of the person or property of such
individual. The preceding sentence shall not apply in the case of a
receiver appointed by authority of law in possession of only a part
of the property of an individual.
(3) Receivers, trustees and assignees for corporations
In a case where a receiver, trustee in a case under title 11 of
the United States Code, or assignee, by order of a court of
competent jurisdiction, by operation of law or otherwise, has
possession of or holds title to all or substantially all the
property or business of a corporation, whether or not such property
or business is being operated, such receiver, trustee, or assignee
shall make the return of income for such corporation in the same
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manner and form as corporations are required to make such returns.
(4) Returns of estates and trusts
Returns of an estate, a trust, or an estate of an individual
under chapter 7 or 11 of title 11 of the United States Code shall
be
made by the fiduciary thereof.
(5) Joint fiduciaries
Under such regulations as the Secretary may prescribe, a return
made by one of two or more joint fiduciaries shall be sufficient
compliance with the requirements of this section. A return made
pursuant to this paragraph shall contain a statement that the
fiduciary has sufficient knowledge of the affairs of the person for
whom the return is made to enable him to make the return, and that
the return is, to the best of his knowledge and belief, true and
correct.
(6) IRA share of partnership income
In the case of a trust which is exempt from taxation under
section 408(e), for purposes of this section, the trust's
distributive share of items of gross income and gain of any
partnership to which subchapter C or D of chapter 63 applies shall
be treated as equal to the trust's distributive share of the
taxable
income of such partnership.
(c) Certain income earned abroad or from sale of residence
For purposes of this section, gross income shall
without
regard to the exclusion provided for in section 121
from sale of principal residence) and without regard
provided for in section 911 (relating to citizens or
United States living abroad).

be computed
(relating to gain
to the exclusion
residents of the

(d) Tax-exempt interest required to be shown on return
Every person required to file a return under this section for the
taxable year shall include on such return the amount of interest
received or accrued during the taxable year which is exempt from the
tax
imposed by chapter 1.
(e) Consolidated

returns

For provisions relating to consolidated returns by
affiliated corporations, see chapter 6.

26 U.S.C. § 7621
Sec. 7621. Internal revenue districts
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(a) Establishment and alteration
The President shall establish convenient internal revenue districts
for the purpose of administering the internal revenue laws. The
President may from time to time alter such districts.
(b) Boundaries
For the purpose mentioned in subsection (a), the President may
subdivide any State, or the District of Columbia, or may unite into one
district two or more States.

26 U.S.C. § 7701 (a) (14)
Sec.

7701. Definitions

(a) When used in this title, where not otherwise distinctly
expressed or manifestly incompatible with the intent thereof-(14) Taxpayer
The term ''taxpayer'' means any person subject to any internal
revenue tax.

26 U.S.C, § 7805
Sec. 7805. Rules and regulations

(a) Authorization
Except where such authority is expressly given by this title to any
person other than an officer or employee of the Treasury Department,
the
Secretary shall prescribe all needful rules and regulations for the
enforcement of this title, including all rules and regulations as may
be
necessary by reason of any alteration of law in relation to internal
revenue.
(b) Retroactivity of regulations
(1) In general
Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, no temporary,
proposed, or final regulation relating to the internal revenue laws
shall apply to any taxable period ending before the earliest of the
following dates:
(A) The date on which such regulation is filed with the
Federal Register.
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(B) In the case of any final regulation, the date on which
any proposed or temporary regulation to which such final
regulation relates was filed with the Federal Register.
(C) The date on which any notice substantially describing
the expected contents of any temporary, proposed, or final
regulation is issued to the public.
(2) Exception for promptly issued regulations
Paragraph (1) shall not apply to regulations filed or issued
within 18 months of the date of the enactment of the statutory
provision to which the regulation relates.
(3) Prevention of abuse
The Secretary may provide that any regulation may take effect

or
apply retroactively to prevent abuse.
(4) Correction of procedural defects
The Secretary may provide that any regulation may apply
retroactively to correct a procedural defect in the issuance of any
prior regulation.
(5) Internal

regulations

The limitation of paragraph (1) shall not apply to any
regulation relating to internal Treasury Department policies,
practices, or procedures.
(6) Congressional

authorization

The limitation of paragraph (1) may be superseded by a
legislative grant from Congress authorizing the Secretary to
prescribe the effective date with respect to any regulation.
(7) Election to apply retroactively
The Secretary may provide for any taxpayer to elect to apply
any
regulation before the dates specified in paragraph (1).
(8) Application to rulings
The Secretary may prescribe the extent, if any, to which any
ruling (including any judicial decision or any administrative
determination other than by regulation) relating to the internal
revenue laws shall be applied without retroactive effect.
(c) Preparation and distribution of regulations, forms, stamps, and
other matters
The Secretary shall prepare and distribute all the instructions,
regulations, directions, forms, blanks, stamps, and other matters
pertaining to the assessment and collection of internal revenue.
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(d) Manner of making elections prescribed by Secretary
Except to the extent otherwise provided by this title, any election
under this title shall be made at such time and in such manner as the
Secretary shall prescribe.
(e) Temporary

regulations
(1) Issuance

Any temporary regulation issued by the Secretary shall also be
issued as a proposed regulation.
(2) 3-year duration
Any temporary regulation shall expire within 3 years after the
date of issuance of such regulation.
(f) Review of impact of regulations on small business
(1) Submissions to Small Business Administration
After publication of any proposed or temporary regulation by

the
Secretary, the Secretary shall submit such regulation to the Chief
Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration for
comment on the impact of such regulation on small business. Not
later than the date 4 weeks after the date of such submission, the
Chief Counsel for Advocacy shall submit comments on such regulation
to the Secretary.
(2) Consideration of comments
In prescribing any final regulation which supersedes a proposed
or temporary regulation which had been submitted under this
subsection to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business
Administration-(A) the Secretary shall consider the comments of the Chief
Counsel for Advocacy on such proposed or temporary regulation,
and
(B) the Secretary shall discuss any response to such
comments in the preamble of such final regulation.
(3) Submission of certain final

regulations

In the case of the promulgation by the Secretary of any final
regulation (other than a temporary regulation) which does not
supersede a proposed regulation, the requirements of paragraphs (1)
and (2) shall apply; except that-(A) the submission under paragraph (1) shall be made at
least 4 weeks before the date of such promulgation, and
(B) the consideration (and discussion) required under
paragraph (2) shall be made in connection with the promulgation
of such final regulation.
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40 U.S.C. § 255
Sec. 255. Approval of title prior to Federal land purchases;
payment of title expenses; application to Tennessee Valley
Authority; Federal jurisdiction over acquisitions
Unless the Attorney General gives prior written approval of the
sufficiency of the title to land for the purpose for which the property
LS being acquired by the United States, public money may not be
expended
for the purchase of the land or any interest therein.
The Attorney General may delegate his responsibility under this
section to other departments and agencies, subject to his general
supervision and in accordance with regulations promulgated by him.
Any Federal department or agency which has been delegated the
responsibility to approve land titles under this section may request
the
Attorney General to render his opinion as to the validity of the title
to any real property or interest therein, or may request the advice or
assistance of the Attorney General in connection with determinations as
to the sufficiency of titles.
Except where otherwise authorized by law or provided by contract,
the expenses of procuring certificates of titles or other evidences of
title as the Attorney General may require may be paid out of the
appropriations for the acquisition of land or out of the appropriations
made for the contingencies of the acquiring department or agency.
The foregoing provisions of this section shall not be construed to
affect in any manner any existing provisions of law which are
applicable
to the acquisition of lands or interests in land by the Tennessee
Valley
Authority.
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the obtaining of
exclusive jurisdiction in the United States over lands or interests
therein which have been or shall hereafter be acquired by it shall not
be required; but the head or other authorized officer of any department
or independent establishment or agency of the Government may, in such
cases and at such times as he may deem desirable, accept or secure from
the State in which any lands or interests therein under his immediate
jurisdiction, custody, or control are situated, consent to or cession
of
such jurisdiction, exclusive or partial, not theretofore obtained, over
any such lands or interests as he may deem desirable and indicate
acceptance of such jurisdiction on behalf of the United States by
filing
a notice of such acceptance with the Governor of such State or in such
other manner as may be prescribed by the laws of the State where such
Lands are situated. Unless and until the United States has accepted
jurisdiction over lands hereafter to be acquired as aforesaid, it shall
be conclusively presumed that no such jurisdiction has been accepted.

44 U.S.C. § 1501 et seq.
TITLE 44—PUBLIC PRINTING AND DOCUMENTS
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CHAPTER 15--FEDERAL REGISTER AND CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS
Sec. 1501. Definitions
As used in this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires-" d o c u m e n t " means a Presidential proclamation or Executive
order and an order, regulation, rule, certificate, code of fair
competition, license, notice, or similar instrument, issued,
prescribed, or promulgated by a Federal agency;
"Federal agency'' or "agency'' means the President of the
United States, or an executive department, independent board,
establishment, bureau, agency, institution, commission, or separate
office of the administrative branch of the Government of the United
States but not the legislative or judicial branches of the
Government;
"person'' means an individual, partnership, association, or
corporation; and
"National Archives of the United States'' has the same meaning
as in section 2901(11) of this title.

Sec. 1502. Custody and printing of Federal documents;
appointment of Director
The Archivist of the United States, acting through the Office of
the
Federal Register, is charged with the custody and, together with the
Public Printer, with the prompt and uniform printing and distribution
of
the documents required or authorized to be published by section 1505 of
this title. There shall be at the head of the Office a director,
appointed by, and who shall act under the general direction of, the
Archivist of the United States in carrying out this chapter and the
regulations prescribed under it.

Sec. 1503. Filing documents with Office; notation of time;
public inspection; transmission for printing
The original and two duplicate originals or certified copies of a
document required or authorized to be published by section 1505 of this
title shall be filed with the Office of the Federal Register, which
shall be open for that purpose during all hours of the working days
when
the National Archives Building is open for official business. The
Archivist of the United States shall cause to be noted on the original
and duplicate originals or certified copies of each document the day
and
hour of filing. When the original is issued, prescribed, or promulgated
outside the District of Columbia, and certified copies are filed before
the filing of the original, the notation shall be of the day and hour
of
filing of the certified copies. Upon filing, at least one copy shall be
immediately available for public inspection in the Office. The original
shall be retained by the National Archives and Records Administration
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and shall be available for inspection under regulations prescribed by
the Archivist, unless such original is disposed of in accordance with
disposal schedules submitted by the Administrative Committee of the
Federal Register and authorized by the Archivist pursuant to
regulations
issued under chapter 33 of this title; however, originals of
proclamations of the President and Executive orders shall be
permanently
retained by the Administration as part of the National Archives of the
United States. The Office shall transmit immediately to the Government
Printing Office for printing, as provided by this chapter, one
duplicate
original or certified copy of each document required or authorized to
be
published by section 1505 of this title. Every Federal agency shall
cause to be transmitted for filing the original and the duplicate
originals or certified copies of all such documents issued, prescribed,
or promulgated by the agency.

Sec.

1504.
Federal Register'1; printing; contents;
distribution; price

Documents required or authorized to be published by section 1505 of
this title shall be printed and distributed immediately by the
Government Printing Office in a serial publication designated the
Federal Register.ff The Public Printer shall make available the
facilities of the Government Printing Office for the prompt printing
and
distribution of the Federal Register in the manner and at the times
required by this chapter and the regulations prescribed under it. The
contents of the daily issues shall be indexed and shall comprise all
documents, required or authorized to be published, filed with the
Office
of the Federal Register up to the time of the day immediately preceding
the day of distribution fixed by regulations under this chapter. There
shall be printed with each document a copy of the notation, required to
be made by section 1503 of this title, of the day and hour when, upon
filing with the Office, the document was made available for public
inspection. Distribution shall be made by delivery or by deposit at a
post office at a time in the morning of the day of distribution fixed
by
regulations prescribed under this chapter. The prices to be charged for
the Federal Register may be fixed by the Administrative Committee of
the
Federal Register established by section 1506 of this title without
reference to the restrictions placed upon and fixed for the sale of
Government publications by sections 1705 and 1708 of this title.
(Pub. L. 90-620, Oct. 22, 1968, 82 Stat. 1274.)

Sec. 1505. Documents to be published in Federal Register
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(a) Proclamations and Executive Orders; Documents Having General
Applicability and Legal Effect; Documents Required To Be Published by
Congress. There shall be published in the Federal Register-(1) Presidential proclamations and Executive orders, except
those not having general applicability and legal effect or
effective
only against Federal agencies or persons in their capacity as
officers, agents, or employees thereof;
(2) documents or classes of documents that the President may
determine from time to time have general applicability and legal
effect; and
(3) documents or classes of documents that may be required so
to
be published by Act of Congress.
For the purposes of this chapter every document or order which
prescribes a penalty has general applicability and legal effect.
(b) Documents Authorized To Be Published by Regulations; Comments
and News Items Excluded. In addition to the foregoing there shall also
be published in the Federal Register other documents or classes of
documents authorized to be published by regulations prescribed under
this chapter with the approval of the President, but comments or news
items of any character may not be published in the Federal Register.
(c) Suspension of Requirements for Filing of Documents; Alternate
Systems for Promulgating, Filing, or Publishing Documents; Preservation
of Originals. In the event of an attack or threatened attack upon the
continental United States and a determination by the President that as
a
result of an attack or threatened attack-(1) publication of the Federal Register or filing of documents
with the Office of the Federal Register is impracticable, or
(2) under existing conditions publication in the Federal
Register would not serve to give appropriate notice to the public
of
the contents of documents, the President may, without regard to any
other provision of law, suspend all or part of the requirements of
law or regulation for filing with the Office or publication in the
Federal Register of documents or classes of documents.
The suspensions shall remain in effect until revoked by the
President, or by concurrent resolution of the Congress. The President
shall establish alternate systems for promulgating, filing, or
publishing documents or classes of documents affected by such
suspensions, including requirements relating to their effectiveness or
validity, that may be considered under the then existing circumstances
practicable to provide public notice of the issuance and of the
contents
of the documents. The alternate systems may, without limitation,
provide
for the use of regional or specialized publications or depositories for
documents, or of the press, the radio, or similar mediums of general
communication. Compliance with alternate systems of filing or
publication shall have the same effect as filing with the Office or
publication in the Federal Register under this chapter or other law or
regulation. With respect to documents promulgated under alternate
systems, each agency shall preserve the original and two duplicate
originals cr two certified copies for filing with the Office when the
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President determines that it is practicable.
(Pub. L. 90-620, Oct. 22, 1968, 82 Stat. 1274.)

Sec. 1506. Administrative Committee of the Federal Register;
establishment and composition; powers and duties
The Administrative Committee of the Federal Register shall consist
of the Archivist of the United States or Acting Archivist, who shall be
chairman, an officer of the Department of Justice designated by the
Attorney General, and the Public Printer or Acting Public Printer. The
Director of the Federal Register shall act as secretary of the
committee. The committee shall prescribe, with the approval of the
President, regulations for carrying out this chapter. The regulations
shall provide, among other things-(1) the manner of certification of copies required to be
certified under section 1503 of this title, which certification may
be permitted to be based upon confirmed communications from outside
the District of Columbia;
(2) the documents which shall be authorized under section
1505 (b) of this title to be published in the Federal Register;
(3) the manner and form in which the Federal Register shall be
printed, reprinted, and compiled, indexed, bound, and distributed;
(4) the number of copies of the Federal Register, which shall
be
printed, reprinted, and compiled, the number which shall be
distributed without charge to Members of Congress, officers and
employees of the United States, or Federal agency, for official
use,
and the number which shall be available for distribution to the
public; and
(5) the prices to be charged for individual copies of, and
subscriptions to, the Federal Register and reprints and bound
volumes of it.
(Pub. L. 90-620, Oct. 22, 1968, 82 Stat. 1275; Pub. L. 98-497, title I,
Sec. 107(b)(5), Oct. 19, 1984, 98 Stat. 2287.)

Sec. 1507. Filing document as constructive notice; publication
in Federal Register as presumption of validity; judicial
notice;
citation
A document required by section 1505(a) of this title to be
published
in the Federal Register is not valid as against a person who has not
had
actual knowledge of it until the duplicate originals or certified
copies
of the document have been filed with the Office of the Federal Register
and a copy made available for public inspection as provided by section
1503 of this title. Unless otherwise specifically provided by statute,
filing of a document, required or authorized to be published by section
1505 of this title, except in cases where notice by publication is
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insufficient in law, is sufficient to give notice of the contents of
the
document to a person subject to or affected by it. The publication in
the Federal Register of a document creates a rebuttable presumption-(L) that it was duly issued, prescribed, or promulgated;
(2) that it was filed with the Office of the Federal Register
and made available for public inspection at the day and hour stated
in the printed notation;
(3) that the copy contained in the Federal Register is a true
copy of the original; and
(4) that all requirements of this chapter and the regulations
prescribed under it relative to the document have been complied
with.
The contents of the Federal Register shall be judicially noticed
and
without piejudice to any other mode of citation, may be cited by volume
and page number.
(Pub. L. 90-620, Oct. 22, 1968, 82 Stat. 1276.)

Sec. 1508

Publication in Federal Register as notice of hearing

A n o t i c e of hearing or of opportunity to be heard, required or
authorized to be given by an Act of Congress, or which may otherwise
properly be given, shall be deemed to have been given to all persons
residing within the States of the Union and the District of Columbia,
except in cases where notice by publication is insufficient in law,
when
the notice is published in the Federal Register at such a time that the
period between the publication and the date fixed in the notice for the
hearing oi for the termination of the opportunity to be heard i s —
(1) not less than the time specifically prescribed for the
publication of the notice by the appropriate Act of Congress; or
(2) not less than fifteen days when time for publication is not
specifically prescribed by the Act, without prejudice, however, to
the effectiveness of a notice of less than fifteen days where the
shorter period is reasonable.
(Pub. L. 90-620, Oct. 22, 1968, 82 Stat. 1276.)

Sec,

1509. Costs of publication, etc.

(a) The cost of printing, reprinting, wrapping, binding, and
distributing the Federal Register and the Code of Federal Regulations,
and, except as provided in subsection (b), other expenses incurred by
the Government Printing Office in carrying out the duties placed upon
it
by this chapter shall be charged to the revolving fund provided in
section 309. Reimbursements for such costs and expenses shall be made
by
the Federal agencies and credited, together with all receipts, as
provided m section 309(b).
(b) The cost of printing, reprinting, wrapping, binding, and
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distributing all other publications of the Federal Register program,
and
other expenses incurred by the Government Printing Office in connection
with such publications, shall be borne by the appropriations to the
Government Printing Office and the appropriations are made available,
and are authorized to be increased by additional sums necessary for the
purposes, the increases to be based upon estimates submitted by the
Public Printer.
(Pub. L. 90-620, Oct. 22, 1968, 82 Stat. 1277/ Pub. L. 95-94, title IV,
Sec. 408(a)(1), Aug. 5, 1977, 91 Stat. 683.)

Historical and Revision Notes
Based on 44 U.S. Code, 1964 ed., Sec. 309 (July 26, 1935, ch. 417,
Sec. 9, 49 Stat. 5 0 2 ) .
A reference to section 10 of Act June 19, 1934 is deleted because
of
the repeal of that section by Act June 30, 1949.

Sec. 1510. Code of Federal Regulations
(a) The Administrative Committee of the Federal Register, with the
approval of the President, may require, from time to time as it
considers necessary, the preparation and publication in special or
supplemental editions of the Federal Register of complete codifications
of the documents of each agency of the Government having general
applicability and legal effect, issued or promulgated by the agency by
publication in the Federal Register or by filing with the
Administrative
Committee, and are relied upon by the agency as authority for, or are
invoked or used by it in the discharge of, its activities or functions,
and are in effect as to facts arising on or after dates specified by
the
Administrative Committee.
(b) A codification published under subsection (a) of this section
shall be printed and bound in permanent form and shall be designated as
the ' s Code of Federal Regulations.' 1 The Administrative Committee shall
regulate the binding of the printed codifications into separate books
with a view to practical usefulness and economical manufacture. Each
book shall contain an explanation of its coverage and other aids to
users that the Administrative Committee may require. A general index to
the entire Code of Federal Regulations shall be separately printed and
bound.
(c) The Administrative Committee shall regulate the supplementation
and the collation and republication of the printed codifications with a
view to keeping the Code of Federal Regulations as current as
practicable. Each book shall be either supplemented or collated and
republished at least once each calendar year.
(d) The Office of the Federal Register shall prepare and publish
the
codifications, supplements, collations, and indexes authorized by this
section.
(e) The codified documents of the several agencies published in the

Appellant's Brief

Addendum 1

supplemental edition of the Federal Register under this section, as
amended by documents subsequently filed with the Office and published
in
the daily issues of the Federal Register shall be prima facie evidence
of the text of the documents and of the fact that they are in effect on
and after the date of publication.
(f) The Administrative Committee shall prescribe, with the approval
of the President, regulations for carrying out this section.
(g) This section does not require codification of the text of
Presidential documents published and periodically compiled in
supplements to Title 3 of the Code of Federal Regulations.
(Pub. L. 90-620, Oct. 22, 1968, 82 Stat. 1277.)

Sec. 1511. International agreements excluded from provisions of
chapter
This chapter does not apply to treaties, conventions, protocols,
and
other international agreements, or proclamations thereof by the
President.
(Pub. L. 90-620, Oct. 22, 1968, 82 Stat. 1278.)

State Statutes

U.C.A. § 59-1-210 (5)
59-1-210. General powers and duties.
The powers and duties of the commission are as follows:
(5) to administer and supervise the tax laws of the state;

U.C.A. § 59-1-707
59-1-707. Writ of mandate requiring taxpayer to file return.
(1) (a) If a taxpayer fails to file any return required pursuant to Title 59
within 60 days of the time prescribed, the commission may petition for a writ of
mandate to compel the taxpayer to file the return. The petition may be filed, in
the discretion of the commission, in the Tax Division of the Third Judicial
District or in the district court for the county in which the taxpayer resides or
has his principal place of business. In the case of a nonresident taxpayer the

'20-

Addenduni 1

Appellant's Brief

petition shall be filed in the ' I hird District Court.
(b) The court shall grant a hearing on the petition for a writ of mandate
within 20 days after the filing of the petition or as soon thereafter as the court
may determine, having regard foi the rights of the parties and the necessity of a
speedy determination of the petition.
(c) Upon a finding of failure to file a return within 60 days of the time
prescribed pursuant to Title 59, the court shall issue a writ of mandate requiring
the taxpayer to file a return. The order of the court shall include an award of
attorneys' fees, court costs, witness fees, and all other costs in favor of the
prevailing party.
(2) Nothing in this section shall linui ihe remedies otherwise available to the
commission under Title 59 or i>ther laws of this state.

102

59-10-102.
laration of intent
The intent of the Legislature in the enactment of this chapter is to accomplish
the following objectives:
(1) to impose on each resident individual, estate, or trust for each taxable year a
tax measured by the amount of his "taxable income" for such year, as determined
for federal income tax purposes, subject to certain adjustments; and
(2) to impose on each nonresident individual, estate, or trust for each taxable
year a tax measured by the amount allocable to this Mate of his "taxabie IIK ome"
for such year, as determined for federal income tax purposes, subjeci u> cei tain
adjustments; and
(3) to adopt for Utah individual income tax purposes, by reference, the
provisions of the federal income tax laws which are applicable in arriving at the
amount of income subject to tax for federal income tax purposes which, it is
believed, will:
(a) promote consistency in tax treatment of persons required ir tile returns of
income for both federal individual iikume tax and I Mali null* iduai aieome tax
purposes; and
(b) enable a taxpayer to prepare his required Utah income tax return foi any
taxable year with a minimum expenditure of additional time and effort after
having prepared his federal income tax return for such year;
(4) to conform, to the extent practicable, certain of the existing rules of
procedure under and foi tl le administration of the Utah individual income tax law
to corresponding or apposite rules of administration and procedure prescribed by
the federal income tax laws, with a view to reduction of duplication of effort,
promotion of better understanding of requirements, and greater consistency
between state and federal procedures and administration
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ILC.A. § 59-10-103 (1) (w)
59-10-103. Definitions.
(1) As used in this chapter:
(w) "Taxpayer" means any individual, estate, or trust or beneficiary of an estate
or trust, whose income is subject in whole or part to the tax imposed by this
chapter.

U.C.A.§ 59-10-112
59-10-112. State taxable income of resident individual.
"State taxable income" in the case of a resident individual means his federal
taxable income (as defined by Section 59-10-111) with the modifications,
subtractions, and adjustments provided in Section 59-10-114. The state taxable
income of a resident individual who is the beneficiary of an estate or trust shall be
modified by the adjustments provided in Section 59-10-209.

U.C.A. § 59-10-502
59-10-502. Persons required to file returns.
An income tax return with respect to the tax imposed by this chapter shall be
filed by:
(1) every resident individual, estate, or trust required to file a federal income
tax return for the taxable year; and
(2) every nonresident individual, estate, or trust having federal gross income
derived from sources within the state for the taxable year and required to file a
federal income tax return for such taxable year.

U.C.A. § 63-46b-l et seq. (Utah Administrative Procedures Act)
63-46b-0.5. Short title.
This act is known as the "Administrative Procedures Act."
Enacted by Chapter 87, 1991 General Session
63-46b-l. Scope and applicability of chapter.
(1) Except as set forth in Subsection (2), and except as otherwise provided by a statute
superseding provisions of this chapter by explicit reference to this chapter, the provisions
~22<
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of this chapter apply to every agency of the state and govern:
(a) state agency action that determines the legal rights, duties, privileges, immunities,
or other legal interests of ati identifiable person, including agency action to grant, deny,
revoke, suspend, modify, annul, withdraw, or ^mcnd an authority, right, or license; and
(b) judicial review of the action.
(2) This chapter does not govern:
(a) the procedure for making agency rules, or judicial review of the procedure or rules;
(b) the issuance of a notice of a deficiency in the payment of a tax, the decisioi i to
waive a penalty or interest on taxes, the imposition of and penalty or interest on taxes, or
the issuance of a tax assessment, except that this chapter governs an agency action
commenced by a taxpayer or by another person authorized by law to contest the validity
or correctness of the action;
(c) state agency action relating to extradition, to the granting of a pardon or parole, a
commutation or termination of a sentence, or to the rescission, termination, or revocation
of parole or probation, to the discipline of, resolution of a grievance of, supervision of,
confinement of, or the treatment of an inmate or resident of a correctional facility, the
Utah State Hospital, the Utah State Developmental Center., or a pci>oi: it, me eusnuh or
jurisdiction of the Division of Substance Abuse and Mental Health. 01 a person on
probation or parole, or judicial review of the action;
(d) state agency action to evaluate, discipline, employ, transfer, reassign, 01 promote a
student or teacher in a school or educational institution, or judicial review of the action;
(e) an application for empIo\ ment and inicrnal personnel action A itliin an agency
concerning its own employees, or judicial review of the action;
(f) the issuance of a citation or assessment under Title 34A, Chapter 6, Utah
Occupational Safety and Health Act, and Title 58, Chapter 3a, Architect Licensing Act,
Chapter 11a, Cosmetologist/Barber, Esthetician, Electrologist, and Nail I echnician
Licensing Act, Chapter 17b, Pharmacy Practice Act, Chapter 22, Professional Engineers
and Professional Land Surveyor Licensing Act, Chapter 53, Landscape Architects
Licensing Act, Chapter 55, Utah Construction Trades Licensing Act, Chapter 63,
Security Personnel Licensing Act, and Chapter 76, Professional Geologist Licensing Act,
except that this chapter governs an agency action commenced by the employer, licensee,
or other person authorized by law to contest the validity or correctness of the citation, or
assessment;
(g) state agency action relating to management of state funds, the management aiiu
disposal of school and institutional trust land assets, and contracts for the purchase or sale
of products, real property, supplies, goods, or services by or for the state, or by o\ lor an
agency of the state, except as provided in those contracts, or judicial review of the action
(h) state agency action under Title 7, Chapter 1, Article 3, Powers and Duties of
Commissioner of Financial Institutions, Title 7, Chapter 2, Possession of Depository
Institution by Commissioner, Title 7, Chapter 19, Acquisition of Failing Depository
Institutions or Holding Companies, and Title 63, Chapter M). I !tah Go\ernniental
Immunity Act, or judicial review of the action;
(i) the initial determination of a person's eligibility for unemployment benefits, the
initial determination of a person's eligibility for benefits under Title 34A, Chapter 2,
Workers'
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Compensation Act, and Title 34A, Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, or the
initial determination of a person's unemployment tax liability;
(j) state agency action relating to the distribution or award of a monetary grant to or
between governmental units, or for research, development, or the arts, or judicial review
of the action;
(k) the issuance of a notice of violation or order under Title 26, Chapter 8a, Utah
Emergency Medical Services System Act, Title 19, Chapter 2, Air Conservation Act,
Title 19, Chapter 3, Radiation Control Act, Title 19, Chapter 4, Safe Drinking Water Act,
Title 19, Chapter 5, Water Quality Act, Title 19, Chapter 6, Part 1, Solid and Hazardous
Waste Act, Title 19, Chapter 6, Part 4, Underground Storage Tank Act, or Title 19,
Chapter 6, Part 7, Used Oil Management Act, except that this chapter governs an agency
action commenced by a person authorized by law to contest the validity or correctness of
the notice or order;
(1) state agency action, to the extent required by federal statute or regulation, to be
conducted according to federal procedures;
(m) the initial determination of a person's eligibility for government or public
assistance benefits;
(n) state agency action relating to wildlife licenses, permits, tags, and certificates of
registration;
(o) a license for use of state recreational facilities;
(p) state agency action under Title 63, Chapter 2, Government Records Access and
Management Act, except as provided in Section 63-2-603;
(q) state agency action relating to the collection of water commissioner fees and
delinquency penalties, or judicial review of the action;
(r) state agency action relating to the installation, maintenance, and repair of
headgates, caps, values, or other water controlling works and weirs, flumes, meters, or
other water measuring devices, or judicial review of the action;
(s) (i) a hearing conducted by the Division of Securities under Section 61-1-11.1; and
(ii) an action taken by the Division of Securities pursuant to a hearing conducted
under Section 61-1-11.1, including a determination regarding the fairness of an issuance
or exchange of securities described in Subsection 61-1-11.1(1); and
(t) state agency action relating to water well driller licenses, water well drilling
permits, water well driller registration, or water well drilling construction standards, or
judicial review of the action.
(3) This chapter does not affect a legal remedy otherwise available to:
(a) compel an agency to take action; or
(b) challenge an agency's rule.
(4) This chapter does not preclude an agency, prior to the beginning of an adjudicative
proceeding, or the presiding officer during an adjudicative proceeding from:
(a) requesting or ordering a conference with parties and interested persons to:
(i) encourage settlement;
(ii) clarify the issues;
(iii) simplify the evidence;
(iv) facilitate discovery; or
(v) expedite the proceeding; or
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(b) grai itii lg a tii it leb ' I t 1 : ;!:i )! i to disi it liss c i; foi si u i n i. ia,i ; >* JI idj 51 1 1 :M it if tl M * 1 eqi lirei t lei its
of ' ' '
Rule 12(b) or Rule 56 of the I Jtah Rules of Civil Procedure are met by the moving party,
except to the extent that the requirements of those rules are modified by this chapter.
(5) (a) A declaratory proceeding authorized by Section 63-46b-21 is not governs i
this chapter, except as explicitly provided in that section.
(b) Judicial review of a declaratory proceeding authorized by Section *> t-4oh*: - ,
governed by this chapter.
(6) This chapter does not preclude an agency from enacting a rule affecting or
governing an adjudicative proceeding or from following the rule, if the rule is enacted
according to the procedures outlined in Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative
Rulemaking Act, and if the rule conforms to the requirements of this chaptei
(7) (a) If the attorney general issues a written determination that a provision of this
chapter would result in the denial of funds or services to an agency of the state from the
federal government, the applicability of the provision to that agency shall be suspended to
the extent necessary to prevent the denial.
(b) The attorney general shall report the suspension to the Legislature at its next
session.
i
(8) Nothing 111 this chapter may be mien-•<>< • * ;
:
jurisdiction to review final agency action.
(9) Nothing in this chapter may be interpreted to restrict a presiding officer, for good
cause shown, from lengthening or shortening a time period prescribed in this chapter,
except the time period established for ji idicial review.

Amended by Chapter 235, 2004 General Session
63-46b-2. Definitions.
(1) As used in this chapter:
(a) "Adjudicative proceeding" means an agency actioi1 01 proceeding described in
Section 63-46b-l.
(b) "Agency" means a board, commission, department, division, officer, council,
office, committee, bureau, or other administrative unit of this state, including the agency
head, agency employees, or other persons acting on behalf of or under the authority of the
agency head, but does not mean the Legislature, the courts, the governor, any political
subdivision of the state, or any administrative unit of a political subdivision of the state.
(c) "Agency head" means an individual or body of individuals in whom the ultimate
legal authority of the agency is vested by statute.
(d) "Declaratory proceeding" means a proceeding authorized and governed by Section
63-46b-21.
(e) "License" means a franchise, permit, certification, approval, registration, charter,
or similar form of authorization required by statute.
(f) "Party" means the agency or other person commencing an adjudicative proceeding,
all respondents, all persons permitted by the presiding officer to intervene w proceeding, j.id all persons authorized by statute or agency rule to participate as parties
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in an adjudicative proceeding.
(g) "Person" means an individual, group of individuals, partnership, corporation,
association, political subdivision or its units, governmental subdivision or its units, public
or private organization or entity of any character, or another agency.
(h) (i) "Presiding officer" means an agency head, or an individual or body of
individuals designated by the agency head, by the agency's rules, or by statute to conduct
an adjudicative proceeding.
(ii) If fairness to the parties is not compromised, an agency may substitute one
presiding officer for another during any proceeding.
(iii) A person who acts as a presiding officer at one phase of a proceeding need not
continue as presiding officer through all phases of a proceeding.
(i) "Respondent" means a person against whom an adjudicative proceeding is initiated,
whether by an agency or any other person.
(j) "Superior agency" means an agency required or authorized by law to review the
orders of another agency.
(2) This section does not prohibit an agency from designating by rule the names or
titles of the agency head or the presiding officers with responsibility for adjudicative
proceedings before the agency.

Amended by Chapter 169, 1988 General Session
63-46b-2.1. Bases for certain recommendations and decisions limited.
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (2), no agency may recommend or rule on the
custody, placement, including foster placement, or other disposition alternative for a
minor, or the termination of parental rights, based on the fact that a parent or guardian of
the minor lawfully does one or more of the following:
(a) legally possesses or uses a firearm or other weapon;
(b) espouses particular religious beliefs; or
(c) schools the minor or other minors outside the public education system or is
otherwise sympathetic to schooling a minor outside the public education system.
(2) Subsection (1) does not prohibit a recommendation or ruling based on the
compatibility of a minor with a particular custody, placement, or other disposition
alternative as determined by the presence of any of the factors in Subsections (l)(a)
through (l)(c).

Enacted by Chapter 344, 2004 General Session
63-46b-3. Commencement of adjudicative proceedings.
(1) Except as otherwise permitted by Section 63-46b-20, all adjudicative proceedings
shall be commenced by either:
(a) a notice of agency action, if proceedings are commenced by the agency; or
(b) a request for agency action, if proceedings are commenced by persons other than
the agency.
(2) A notice of agency action shall be filed and served according to the following
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requirements:
(a) The notice of agency action shall be in writing, signed by a presiding officer, and
shall inchiik(i) the names and mailing addresses of all persons to whom notice is being given by
the presiding officer, and the name, title, and mailing address of any attorney or
employee who has been designated to appear for the agency;
(ii) the agency's file number or other reference number;
(iii) the name of the adjudicative proceeding;
(iv) the date that the notice of agency action was mailed;
(v) a statement of whether the adjudicative proceeding is to be conducted informally
according to the provisions of rules adopted under Sections 63-46b-4 and 63-46b-5, or
formally according to the provisions of Sections 63-46b-6 to 63-46b-• r
(vi) if the adjudicative proceeding is to be formal, a statement that each respondent
must file a written response within 30 (lavs of the mailing date of the -oowee of agency
action;
(vii) if the adjudicative proceeding is to be formal, or if a hearing is required by statute
or rule, a statement oi lhe i.-^ .u«d place of any scheduled hearing, a statement of the
purpose for \* hich the hearing is to be held, and a statement that a party who fails to
attend or participate in the hearing may be held in default;
(viii) if the adjudicative proceeding is to be informal and a hearing is required by
statute or rule, or if a hearing is permitted by rule and may be requested by a party within
the time prescribed by rule, a statement that the parties may request a hearing witlliii the
time provided by the agency's rules;
(ix) a statement of the legal author it
;i
proceeding is to be maintained;
(x) the name, title, mailing address, and iJephone imuber of the presiding officer; and
(xi) a statement of the purpose of the adjudicative proceeding and. to the extent known
by the presiding officer, the questions to be decided.
(b) When adjudicative proceedings are commenced b; ' it! :ie agency, tl le agency :>1 mil:
(i) mail the notice of agency action to each party;
(ii) publish the notice of agency action, if required by statute; and
(iii) mail the notice of agency action \o anv other person who has a right to notice
under statute or rule.
(3) (a) Where the law applicable to the agency permits persons other than the agency
to initiate adjudicative proceedings, that person's request for agency action shall be in
writing and signed by the person invoking the jurisdiction of the agency, or by that
person's representative, and shall include:
(i) the names and addresses of all persoi is to \ vi IC i i. i a c :>[: y of tl le i eqi lest for agei icy
action is being sent;
(ii) the agency's file number or other reference number, if known;
(iii) the date that the request for agency action was mailed;
(iv) a statement of the legal authority and jurisdiction undei wl iiicl i. agency acti : i i is
requested;
(v) a statement of the relief or action soughi fov: uL- ;iguicv; and
(vi) a statement of the facts and reasons forming the basis for relief or agency action.
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(b) The person requesting agency action shall file the request with the agency and
shall mail a copy to each person known to have a direct interest in the requested agency
action.
(c) An agency may, by rule, prescribe one or more forms eliciting the information
required by Subsection (3)(a) to serve as the request for agency action when completed
and filed by the person requesting agency action.
(d) The presiding officer shall promptly review a request for agency action and shall:
(i) notify the requesting party in writing that the request is granted and that the
adjudicative proceeding is completed;
(ii) notify the requesting party in writing that the request is denied and, if the
proceeding is a formal adjudicative proceeding, that the party may request a hearing
before the agency to challenge the denial; or
(iii) notify the requesting party that further proceedings are required to determine the
agency's response to the request.
(e) (i) Any notice required by Subsection (3)(d)(ii) shall contain the information
required by Subsection 63-46b-5(l)(i) in addition to disclosure required by Subsection
(3)(d)(ii).
(ii) The agency shall mail any notice required by Subsection (3)(d) to all parties,
except that any notice required by Subsection (3)(d)(iii) may be published when
publication is required by statute.
(iii) The notice required by Subsection (3)(d)(iii) shall:
(A) give the agency's file number or other reference number;
(B) give the name of the proceeding;
(C) designate whether the proceeding is one of a category to be conducted informally
according to the provisions of rules enacted under Sections 63-46b-4 and 63-46b-5, with
citation to the applicable rule authorizing that designation, or formally according to
Sections 63-46b-6 to 63-46b-ll;
(D) in the case of a formal adjudicative proceeding, and where respondent parties are
known, state that a written response must be filed within 30 days of the date of the
agency's notice if mailed, or within 30 days of the last publication date of the agency's
notice, if published;
(E) if the adjudicative proceeding is to be formal, or if a hearing is to be held in an
informal adjudicative proceeding, state the time and place of any scheduled hearing, the
purpose for which the hearing is to be held, and that a party who fails to attend or
participate in a scheduled and noticed hearing may be held in default;
(F) if the adjudicative proceeding is to be informal, and a hearing is required by statute
or rule, or if a hearing is permitted by rule and may be requested by a party within the
time prescribed by rule, state the parties' right to request a hearing and the time within
which a hearing may be requested under the agency's rules; and
(G) give the name, title, mailing address, and telephone number of the presiding
officer.
(4) When initial agency determinations or actions are not governed by this chapter, but
agency and judicial review of those initial determinations or actions are subject to the
provisions
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of this chapter, the request for agency action seeking re\ n * •
agency within the time prescribed by the agency's rules.
(5) For designated classes of adjudicative proceedings, an agency ma . h\ ruk
provide for a longer response time than allowed by this section, and may pi\>\ idc or a
shorter response time if required or permitted by applicable federal law.
(6) Unless the agency provides otherwise by rule or order, applications for licenses
filed under authority of Title 32A, Chapters 3, Packaging Agencies, 4, Public Liquor
License, and 5, Private Club I .iquor License are not considered to be a request for agency
action under this chapter.
(7) If the purpose of the adjudicative proceeding is to award a license or oilic.
privilege as to which there are multiple competing applicants, the agency may, by ruic *M
order, conduct a single adjudicative proceeding to determine the award of that license or
privilege.

Amended by Chapter 138, 2001 General Session
63-46b-4, Designation of adjudicative proceedings as informal — Standards ~
Undesignated proceedings formal.
(1) The agency may, by rule, designate categories of adjudicative proceedings to be
conducted informally according to the procedures set forth in rules enacted under the
authority of this chapter if;
(a) the use of the informal procedures does not violate any procedural n^mreir'ent
imposed by a statute other than this chapter;
(b) in the view of the agency, the rights of the pai ties to the proceedings will be
reasonably protected by the informal procedures;
(c) in the view of the agency, the agency's administrative efficiency will be enhanced
by categorizations; and
(d) the cost of formal adjudicative proceedii lgs c i itweighs til le potei itial bet lefits to tl le
public of a formal adjudicative proceeding.
(2) Subject to the provisions of Subsection (3), all agency adjudicative proceedings
not specifically designated as informal proceedings by the agency's rules shall be
conducted formally in accordance with the requirements of this chapter.
(3) Any time before a final order is issued in any adjudicative proceeding. ,.;.
presiding officer may convert a formal adjudicative proceeding to an informal
adjudicative proceeding, or an informal adjudicative proceeding to a formal adjudicative
proceeding if:
(a) conversion of the proceeding is in the public interest; and
(b) conversion of the proceeding does not unfairly prejudice the rights of any pan v.

Enacted b w «-..,:!,

i!

- icr.^-.i , ..^n

63-46b-5. Procedures for informal adjudicative proceedings.
(1) If an agency enacts rules designating one or more categories of adjudicative
proceedings as informal adjudicative proceedings, the agency shall, by rule, prescribe
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procedures for informal adjudicative proceedings that include the following:
(a) Unless the agency by rule provides for and requires a response, no answer or other
pleading responsive to the allegations contained in the notice of agency action or the
request for agency action need be filed.
(b) The agency shall hold a hearing if a hearing is required by statute or rule, or if a
hearing is permitted by rule and is requested by a party within the time prescribed by
rule.
(c) In any hearing, the parties named in the notice of agency action or in the request
for agency action shall be permitted to testify, present evidence, and comment on the
issues.
(d) Hearings will be held only after timely notice to all parties.
(e) Discovery is prohibited, but the agency may issue subpoenas or other orders to
compel production of necessary evidence.
(f) All parties shall have access to information contained in the agency's files and to
all materials and information gathered in any investigation, to the extent permitted by
law.
(g) Intervention is prohibited, except that the agency may enact rules permitting
intervention where a federal statute or rule requires that a state permit intervention.
(h) All hearings shall be open to all parties.
(i) Within a reasonable time after the close of an informal adjudicative proceeding, the
presiding officer shall issue a signed order in writing that states the following:
(i) the decision;
(ii) the reasons for the decision;
(iii) a notice of any right of administrative or judicial review available to the parties;
and
(iv) the time limits for filing an appeal or requesting a review.
(j) The presiding officer's order shall be based on the facts appearing in the agency's
files and on the facts presented in evidence at any hearings.
(k) A copy of the presiding officer's order shall be promptly mailed to each of the
parties.
(2) (a) The agency may record any hearing.
(b) Any party, at his own expense, may have a reporter approved by the agency
prepare a transcript from the agency's record of the hearing.
(3) Nothing in this section restricts or precludes any investigative right or power given
to an agency by another statute.

Amended by Chapter 72, 1988 General Session
63-46b-6. Procedures for formal adjudicative proceedings — Responsive
pleadings.
(1) In all formal adjudicative proceedings, unless modified by rule according to
Subsection 63-46b-3(5), the respondent, if any, shall file and serve a written response
signed by the respondent or the respondent's representative within 30 days of the mailing
date or last date of publication of the notice of agency action or the notice under
Subsection 63-46b-3(3)(d), which shall include:
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(a) the agency's file number or other reference in it i lbei :;
(b) the name of the adjudicative proceeding;
(c) a statement of the relief that the respondent seeks;
(d) a statement of the facts; and
(e) a statement summarizing the reasons that the relief requested should be granted.
(2) The respondent shall send a copy of the response filed under Subsection (1) to
each party.
(3) The presiding officer, or the agency by rule, may permit or require pleadings in
addition to the notice of agency action, the request for agency action, and the response.
All documents permitted or required to be filed shall be filed with the agency and one
copy shall be sent to each party.

Amended b> ( ii.tr.,: : ^

"• • <iuui.i. NC-IOJI

63-46b-7. Procedures for formal adjudicative proceedings -- Discovery and
subpoenas.
11
';• form. J adjudicative proceedings, the agency may, by rule, prescribe means of
discovery adequate to permit the parties to obtain all relevant information necessary to
support their claims or defenses. If the agency does not enact rules under this section
parties may conduct discovery according to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
(2) Subpoenas and other orders to secure the attendance of witnesses or the producing
of evidence in formal adjudicative proceedings shall be issued by the presiding officer
when requested bv anv partv. or may be issued by the presiding officer on his own
motion.
(3) Nothing in this section restricts or precludes any investigative right or power given
to an agency h\ another slaiuU:

Enacted b\ i'; -wa iui, 1987 General Session
63-46l>-?«.
>cedures for formal adjudicative proceedings Hearing procedure.
(1) Except as provided in Subsections 63-46b-3 (d)(i) and (ii). u\ ait formal
adjudicative proceedings, a hearing shall be conducted as follows:
(a) The presiding officer shall regulate the course of the hearing to obtain = .il.
disclosure of relevant facts and to afford all the parties reasonable opportunii} to present
their positions.
(b) On his own motion or upon objection by a party, the presiding officer:
(i) may exclude evidence that is irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious;
(ii) shall exclude evidence privileged in the courts of Utah;
(iii) may receive documentary evidence in the form of a copy or excerpt if the copy or
excerpt contains all pertinent portions of the original document;
(iv) may take official notice of any facts that could be judicially noticed under the
Utah Rules of Evidence, of the record of other proceedings before the agency, and of
technical or scientific facts *•• *i :n ilu- agency's specialized knowledge.
(c) The presiding officer mux not exclude evidence solely because it is hearsay.
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(d) The presiding officer shall afford to all parties the opportunity to present evidence,
argue, respond, conduct cross-examination, and submit rebuttal evidence.
(e) The presiding officer may give persons not a party to the adjudicative proceeding
the opportunity to present oral or written statements at the hearing.
(f) All testimony presented at the hearing, if offered as evidence to be considered in
reaching a decision on the merits, shall be given under oath.
(g) The hearing shall be recorded at the agency's expense.
(h) Any party, at his own expense, may have a person approved by the agency prepare
a transcript of the hearing, subject to any restrictions that the agency is permitted by
statute to impose to protect confidential information disclosed at the hearing.
(i) All hearings shall be open to all parties.
(2) This section does not preclude the presiding officer from taking appropriate
measures necessary to preserve the integrity of the hearing.

Amended by Chapter 72, 1988 General Session
63-46b-9. Procedures for formal adjudicative proceedings — Intervention.
(1) Any person not a party may file a signed, written petition to intervene in a formal
adjudicative proceeding with the agency. The person who wishes to intervene shall mail a
copy of the petition to each party. The petition shall include:
(a) the agency's file number or other reference number;
(b) the name of the proceeding;
(c) a statement of facts demonstrating that the petitioner's legal rights or interests are
substantially affected by the formal adjudicative proceeding, or that the petitioner
qualifies as an intervenor under any provision of law; and
(d) a statement of the relief that the petitioner seeks from the agency.
(2) The presiding officer shall grant a petition for intervention if the presiding officer
determines that:
(a) the petitioner's legal interests may be substantially affected by the formal
adjudicative proceeding; and
(b) the interests of justice and the orderly and prompt conduct of the adjudicative
proceedings will not be materially impaired by allowing the intervention.
(3) (a) Any order granting or denying a petition to intervene shall be in writing and
mailed to the petitioner and each party.
(b) An order permitting intervention may impose conditions on the intervener's
participation in the adjudicative proceeding that are necessary for a just, orderly, and
prompt conduct of the adjudicative proceeding.
(c) The presiding officer may impose the conditions at any time after the intervention.

Amended by Chapter 138, 2001 General Session
63-46b-10. Procedures for formal adjudicative proceedings - Orders.
In formal adjudicative proceedings:
(1) Within a reasonable time after the hearing, or after the filing of any posthearing
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documents permitted by the presiding officer, or within the time required by any
applicable statute or rule of the agency, the presiding officer shall sign and issue an order
that includes:
(a) a statement of the presiding officer's findings of fact based exclusively on
evidence of record in the adjudicative proceedings or on facts officially noted;
(b) a statement of the presiding officer's conclusions of law;
(c) a statement of the reasons for the presiding officer's decision;
(d) a statement of any relief ordered by the agency;
(e) a notice of the right to apply for reconsideration;
(f) a notice of any right to administrative or judicial re^ new of tl le ordei & mailable to
aggrieved parties; and
(g) the time limits applicable to any reconsideration or review.
(2) The presiding officer ma\ use the presiding officer's experience, technical
competence, and specialized knowledge to evaluate the evidence.
(3) A finding of fact that was contested may not be based solely on ^- n v \ . -.ii./e
unless that evidence is admissible under the Utah Rules of Evidence.
(4) This section does not preclude the presiding officer from issuing interim ouiers u(a) notify the parties of further hearings;
(b) notify the parties of provisional rulings on a portion of the issues presented; or
(c) otherwise provide for the fair and efficient conduct of the adjudicative proceeding.

Amended by Chapter 138, 2001 General Session
63-46b-ll. Default.
(1) The presiding officer may enter an order of default against a party if:
(a) a party in an informal adjudicative proceeding fails to participate in the
adjudicative proceeding;
(b) a party to a formal adjudicative proceeding fails to atu
properly scheduled hearing after receiving proper notice; or
(c) a respondent in a formal adjudicative proceeding fails to file a response under
Section 63-46b-6.
(2) An order of default shall >-u .,.uc a statement of the ground- \--u o,-^uu an. -!.. -il be
mailed to all parties.
(3) (a) A defaulted party may seek to have the agency set aside the default order, and
any order in the adjudicative proceeding issued subsequent to the default order, by
following the procedures outlined in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
(b) A motion to set aside a default and any subsequent order shall be i i. lade to tl I *
presiding officer.
(c) A defaulted party may seek agency review under Seciion 63-46b-12, oi
reconsideration under Section 63-46b-13, only on the decision of the presiding officer on
the motion to set aside the default.
(4) (a) In an adjudicative proceeding begun by the agency, or in an adjudicative
proceeding begun by a party that has other parties besides the party in default, the
presiding officer shall, after issuing the order of default, conduct any further proceedings
necessary to complete the adjudicative proceeding without the participation of the party
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in default and shall determine all issues in the adjudicative proceeding, including those
affecting the defaulting party.
(b) In an adjudicative proceeding that has no parties other than the agency and the
party in default, the presiding officer shall, after issuing the order of default, dismiss the
proceeding.

Amended by Chapter 72, 1988 General Session
63-46b-12. Agency review — Procedure.
(1) (a) If a statute or the agency's rules permit parties to any adjudicative proceeding to
seek review of an order by the agency or by a superior agency, the aggrieved party may
file a written request for review within 30 days after the issuance of the order with the
person or entity designated for that purpose by the statute or rule.
(b) The request shall:
(i) be signed by the party seeking review;
(ii) state the grounds for review and the relief requested;
(iii) state the date upon which it was mailed; and
(iv) be mailed to the presiding officer and to each party.
(2) (a) Within 15 days of the mailing date of the request for review, or within the time
period provided by agency rule, whichever is longer, any party may file a response with
the person designated by statute or rule to receive the response.
(b) The party who files a response under Subsection (2)(a) shall mail a copy of the
response to each of the parties and to the presiding officer.
(3) If a statute or the agency's rules require review of an order by the agency or a
superior agency, the agency or superior agency shall review the order within a reasonable
time or within the time required by statute or the agency's rules.
(4) To assist in review, the agency or superior agency may by order or rule permit the
parties to file briefs or other documents, or to conduct oral argument.
(5) Notice of hearings on review shall be mailed to all parties.
(6) (a) Within a reasonable time after the filing of any response, other filings, or oral
argument, or within the time required by statute or applicable rules, the agency or
superior agency shall issue a written order on review.
(b) The order on review shall be signed by the agency head or by a person designated
by the agency for that purpose and shall be mailed to each party.
(c) The order on review shall contain:
(i) a designation of the statute or rule permitting or requiring review;
(ii) a statement of the issues reviewed;
(iii) findings of fact as to each of the issues reviewed;
(iv) conclusions of law as to each of the issues reviewed;
(v) the reasons for the disposition;
(vi) whether the decision of the presiding officer or agency is to be affirmed, reversed,
or modified, and whether all or any portion of the adjudicative proceeding is to be
remanded;
(vii) a notice of any right of further administrative reconsideration or judicial review
available to aggrieved parties; and
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( r iii) tl i.e fii it lie lii i lits applicable to ai :ty appeal 01 review.

Amended by Chapter 138, 2001 General Session
63-465-13. Agency review -- Reconsideration.
(1) (a) Within 20 days after the date that an order is issued lor w Inch review b\ the
agency or by a superior agency under Sectioii 63-461* ! 2 unavailable, and it the order
would otherwise constitute final agency action, any party may file a written request for
reconsideration with the agency, stating the specific grounds upon which relief is
requested.
(b) Unless otherwise provided by statute, thefilinszof ihe request is not a prerequisite
for seeking judicial review of the order.
(2) The request for reconsideration shall be filed with the agency ai id oi ic copy si mil
be mailed to each party by the person making the request.
(3) (a) The agency head, or a person designated for that purpose, shall issue a written
order granting the request or denying the request.
f • ' Tf the aiiene> head or the person designated for that purpose does not issue an
order within 20 days after the filing of the request, the request for reconsideration sir
considered to be denied,

Amended by Chapter 138, 2001 General Notion
63-46b-I4. Judicial review ~ Exhaustion of adi ninistrative i emedies.
(1) A party aggrieved may obtain judicial review of final agency action, except in
actions where judicial review is expressly prohibited by statute
(2) A party may seek judicial review only after exhausting aii adimni.Virativ e remedies
,M i ilable, except that:
(a) a party seeking judicial review need not exhaust administrative remedies if this
chapter or any other statute states that exhaustion is tlot required;
(b) the court may relieve a party seeking judicial review of the requirement to exhaust
any or all administrative remedies if:
(i) the administrative remedies are inadequate; or
(ii) exhaustion of remedies would result in irreparable harm disproportionate u ? I w
public benefit derived from requiring exhaustion.
(3) (a) A party shall file a petition for judicial review of final agency action within ! >
days after the date that the order constituting the final agency action is issued or is
considered to have been issued under Subsection 63-46b-13 (3) (b).
(b) The petition shall name the agency and all other appropriate parties as respondents
at id shall i neet the form requirements specified in this chapter.

Amended b\ < hapter 72, 1988 General Session
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63-46b-15. Judicial review -- Informal adjudicative proceedings.
(1) (a) The district courts have jurisdiction to review by trial de novo all final agency
actions resulting from informal adjudicative proceedings, except that the juvenile courts
have jurisdiction over all state agency actions relating to
(1) the removal or placement of children m state custody,
(n) the support of children under Subsection (l)(a)(i) as determined administratively
under Section 78-3a-906, and
(m) substantiated findings of abuse or neglect made by the Division of Child and
Family Services, after an evidentiary hearing
(b) Venue for judicial review of informal adjudicative proceedings shall be as
provided in the statute governing the agency or, in the absence of such a venue provision,
in the county where the petitioner resides or maintains the petitioner's principal place of
business
(2) (a) The petition for judicial review of informal adjudicative proceedings shall be a
complaint governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and shall include
(I) the name and mailing address of the party seeking judicial review,
(n) the name and mailing address of the respondent agency,
(in) the title and date of the final agency action to be reviewed, together with a copy,
summary, or brief description of the agency action,
(IV) identification of the persons who were parties in the informal adjudicative
proceedings that led to the agency action,
(v) a copy of the written agency order from the informal proceeding,
(vi) facts demonstrating that the party seeking judicial review is entitled to obtain
judicial review,
(vn) a request for relief, specifying the type and extent of relief requested, and
(vin) a statement of the reasons why the petitioner is entitled to relief
(b) All additional pleadings and proceedings in the district court are governed by the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
(3) (a) The district court, without a jury, shall determine all questions of fact and law
and any constitutional issue presented in the pleadings
(b) The Utah Rules of Evidence apply injudicial proceedings under this section

Amended by Chapter 120, 2001 General Session
Amended by Chapter 138, 2001 General Session
63-46b-16. Judicial review — Formal adjudicative proceedings.
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction
to review all final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal
adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review of agency action
with the appropriate appellate court in the form required by the appellate rules of the
appropriate appellate court
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern all additional
filings and proceedings in the appellate court
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's record for judicial review of
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formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure,
except that:
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to shorten, summarize, or
organize the record;
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and copies for the
record:
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to shorten, summarize, or
organize the record; or
(ii) according to any other provision of law.
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's record, it
determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced by any
of the following:
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action is based, is
unconstitutional on its face or as applied;
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any statute;
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution;
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law;
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-making process, or
has failed to follow prescribed procedure;
(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally constituted as a decisionmaking body or were subject to disqualification;
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or implied by the
agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole
record before the court;
(h) the agency action is:
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute;
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency;
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justifies the
inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the
inconsistency; or
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious.

Amended by Chapter 72, 1988 General Session
63-46b-17. Judicial review — Type of relief.
(1) (a) In either the review of informal adjudicative proceedings by the district court or
the review of formal adjudicative proceedings by an appellate court, the court may award
damages or compensation only to the extent expressly authorized by statute.
(b) In granting relief, the court may:
(i) order agency action required by law;
(ii) order the agency to exercise its discretion as required by law;
(iii) set aside or modify agency action;
(iv) enjoin or stay the effective date of agency action; or
(v) remand the matter to the agency for further proceedings.
(2) Decisions on petitions for judicial review of final agency action are reviewable by
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a higher court, if authorized by statute.

Enacted by Chapter 161, 1987 General Session
63-46b-18. Judicial review — Stay and other temporary remedies pending final
disposition.
(1) Unless precluded by another statute, the agency may grant a stay of its order or
other temporary remedy during the pendency of judicial review, according to the agency's
rules.
(2) Parties shall petition the agency for a stay or other temporary remedies unless
extraordinary circumstances require immediate judicial intervention.
(3) If the agency denies a stay or denies other temporary remedies requested by a
party, the agency's order of denial shall be mailed to all parties and shall specify the
reasons why the stay or other temporary remedy was not granted.
(4) If the agency has denied a stay or other temporary remedy to protect the public
health, safety, or welfare against a substantial threat, the court may not grant a stay or
other temporary remedy unless it finds that:
(a) the agency violated its own rules in denying the stay; or
(b) (i) the party seeking judicial review is likely to prevail on the merits when the
court finally disposes of the matter;
(ii) the party seeking judicial review will suffer irreparable injury without immediate
relief;
(iii) granting relief to the party seeking review will not substantially harm other parties
to the proceedings; and
(iv) the threat to the public health, safety, or welfare relied upon by the agency is not
sufficiently serious to justify the agency's action under the circumstances.

Enacted by Chapter 161, 1987 General Session
63-46b-19. Civil enforcement.
(1) (a) In addition to other remedies provided by law, an agency may seek
enforcement of an order by seeking civil enforcement in the district courts.
(b) The action seeking civil enforcement of an agency's order must name, as
defendants, each alleged violator against whom the agency seeks to obtain civil
enforcement.
(c) Venue for an action seeking civil enforcement of an agency's order shall be
determined by the requirements of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
(d) The action may request, and the court may grant, any of the following:
(i) declaratory relief;
(ii) temporary or permanent injunctive relief;
(iii) any other civil remedy provided by law; or
(iv) any combination of the foregoing.
(2) (a) Any person whose interests are directly impaired or threatened by the failure of
an agency to enforce an agency's order may timely file a complaint seeking civil
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enforcement of that order, but the action may not be commenced:
(i) until at least 30 days after the plaintiff has given notice of his intent to seek civil
enforcement of the alleged violation to the agency head, the attorney general, and to each
alleged violator against whom the petitioner seeks civil enforcement;
(ii) if the agency has filed and is diligently prosecuting a complaint seeking civil
enforcement of the same order against the same or a similarly situated defendant; or
(iii) if a petition for judicial review of the same order has been filed and is pending in
court.
(b) The complaint seeking civil enforcement of an agency's order must name, as
defendants, the agency whose order is sought to be enforced, the agency that is vested
with the power to enforce the order, and each alleged violator against whom the plaintiff
seeks civil enforcement.
(c) Except to the extent expressly authorized by statute, a complaint seeking civil
enforcement of an agency's order may not request, and the court may not grant, any
monetary payment apart from taxable costs.
(3) In a proceeding for civil enforcement of an agency's order, in addition to any other
defenses allowed by law, a defendant may defend on the ground that:
(a) the order sought to be enforced was issued by an agency without jurisdiction to
issue the order;
(b) the order does not apply to the defendant;
(c) the defendant has not violated the order; or
(d) the defendant violated the order but has subsequently complied.
(4) Decisions on complaints seeking civil enforcement of an agency's order are
reviewable in the same manner as other civil cases.

Enacted by Chapter 161, 1987 General Session
63-46b-20. Emergency adjudicative proceedings.
(1) An agency may issue an order on an emergency basis without complying with the
requirements of this chapter if:
(a) the facts known by the agency or presented to the agency show that an immediate
and significant danger to the public health, safety, or welfare exists; and
(b) the threat requires immediate action by the agency.
(2) In issuing its emergency order, the agency shall:
(a) limit its order to require only the action necessary to prevent or avoid the danger to
the public health, safety, or welfare;
(b) issue promptly a written order, effective immediately, that includes a brief
statement of findings of fact, conclusions of law, and reasons for the agency's utilization
of emergency adjudicative proceedings; and
(c) give immediate notice to the persons who are required to comply with the order.
(3) If the emergency order issued under this section will result in the continued
infringement or impairment of any legal right or interest of any party, the agency shall
commence a formal adjudicative proceeding in accordance with the other provisions of
this chapter.
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Enacted by Chapter 161, 1987 General Session
63-46b-21. Declaratory orders.
(1) Any person may file a request for agency action, requesting that the agency issue a
declaratory order determining the applicability of a statute, rule, or order within the
primary jurisdiction of the agency to specified circumstances.
(2) Each agency shall issue rules that:
(a) provide for the form, contents, and filing of petitions for declaratory orders;
(b) provide for the disposition of the petitions;
(c) define the classes of circumstances in which the agency will not issue a declaratory
order;
(d) are consistent with the public interest and with the general policy of this chapter;
and
(e) facilitate and encourage agency issuance of reliable advice.
(3) (a) An agency may not issue a declaratory order if:
(i) the request is one of a class of circumstances that the agency has by rule defined as
being exempt from declaratory orders; or
(ii) the person requesting the declaratory order participated in an adjudicative
proceeding concerning the same issue within 12 months of the date of the present request.
(b) An agency may issue a declaratory order that would substantially prejudice the
rights of a person who would be a necessary party, only if that person consents in writing
to the determination of the matter by a declaratory proceeding.
(4) Persons may intervene in declaratory proceedings if:
(a) they meet the requirements of Section 63-46b-9; and
(b) they file timely petitions for intervention according to agency rules.
(5) An agency may provide, by rule or order, that other provisions of Sections 63-46b4 through 63-46b-13 apply to declaratory proceedings.
(6) (a) After receipt of a petition for a declaratory order, the agency may issue a
written order:
(i) declaring the applicability of the statute, rule, or order in question to the specified
circumstances;
(ii) setting the matter for adjudicative proceedings;
(iii) agreeing to issue a declaratory order within a specified time; or
(iv) declining to issue a declaratory order and stating the reasons for its action.
(b) A declaratory order shall contain:
(i) the names of all parties to the proceeding on which it is based;
(ii) the particular facts on which it is based; and
(iii) the reasons for its conclusion.
(c) A copy of all orders issued in response to a request for a declaratory proceeding
shall be mailed promptly to the petitioner and any other parties.
(d) A declaratory order has the same status and binding effect as any other order
issued in an adjudicative proceeding.
(7) Unless the petitioner and the agency agree in writing to an extension, if an agency
has not issued a declaratory order within 60 days after receipt of the petition for a
declaratory order, the petition is denied.
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Amended by Chapter 72, 1988 General Session
63-46b-22. Transition procedures.
(1) The procedures for agency action, agency review, and judicial review contained in
this chapter are applicable to all agency adjudicative proceedings commenced by or
before an agency on or after January 1, 1988.
(2) Statutes and rules governing agency action, agency review, and judicial review
that are in effect on December 31, 1987, govern all agency adjudicative proceedings
commenced by or before an agency on or before December 31, 1987, even if those
proceedings are still pending before an agency or a court on January 1, 1988.

Amended by Chapter 5, 1991 General Session
63-46b-23. Electronic records and conversion of written records by
governmental agencies.
A governmental agency may make rules regarding electronic records and conversion
of written records as prescribed by Title 46, Chapter 4, Part 5, Electronic Records in
Government Agencies.

Enacted by Chapter 138, 2001 General Session

U.C.A. §78-2a-3 (2) (j)
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court.

Other Authorities
Executive Order # 10289
See Addendum 2.
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Rules
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 7 (a) — The Indictment and the
Information.
(a) When Used.
(1) Felony.
An offense (other than criminal contempt) must be prosecuted by an indictment if
it is punishable:
(A) by death; or
(B) by imprisonment for more than one year.
(2) Misdemeanor.
An offense punishable by imprisonment for one year or less may be prosecuted in
accordance with Rule 58(b)(1).

Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 803 (d).
(6) Records of regularly conducted activity. A memorandum, report, record, or
data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses,
made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with
knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if
it was the regular practice of that business activity to make the memorandum,
report, record or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian
or other qualified witness, or by certification that complies with Rule 902(11),
Rule 902(12), or a statute permitting certification, unless the source of information
or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness.
The term "business" as used in this paragraph includes business, institution,
association, profession, occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or not
conducted for profit.
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 801. Definitions.
The following definitions apply under this article:
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(a) Statement. A "statement" is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2) nonverbal
conduct of a person, if it is intended by the person as an assertion.
(b) Declarant. A "declarant" is a person who makes a statement.
(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted.
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if:
(1) Prior statement by witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is
subject to cross-examination concerning the statement and the statement is (A)
inconsistent with the declarant's testimony or the witness denies having made the
statement or has forgotten, or (B) consistent with the declarant's testimony and is
offered to rebut an express or implied charge against the declarant of recent
fabrication or improper influence or motive, or (C) one of identification of a
person made after perceiving the person; or
(2) Admission by party-opponent. The statement is offered against a party and is
(A) the party's own statement, in either an individual or a representative capacity,
or (B) a statement of which the party has manifested an adoption or belief in its
truth, or (C) a statement by a person authorized by the party to make a statement
concerning the subject, or (D) a statement by the party's agent or servant
concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or employment, made during
the existence of the relationship, or (E) a statement by a coconspirator of a party
during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.

Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 802. Hearsay rule.
Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by law or by these rules

Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 803. Hearsay exceptions; availability of
declarant immaterial.
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is
available as a witness:
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(1) Present sense impression. A statement describing or explaining an event or
condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition or
immediately thereafter.
(2) Excited utterance. A statement relating to a startling event or condition made
while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or
condition.
(3) Then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition. A statement of the
declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition
(such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily health), but
not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or
believed unless it relates to the execution, revocation, identification, or terms of
declarant's will.
(4) Statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. Statements made
for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or
past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character
of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis
or treatment.
(5) Recorded recollection. A memorandum or record concerning a matter about
which a witness once had knowledge but now has insufficient recollection to
enable the witness to testify fully and accurately, shown to have been made or
adopted by the witness when the matter was fresh in the witness' memory and to
reflect that knowledge correctly. If admitted, the memorandum or record may be
read into evidence but may not itself be received as an exhibit unless offered by an
adverse party.
(6) Records of regularly conducted activity. A memorandum, report, record, or
data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions or diagnoses,
made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with
knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if
it was the regular practice of that business activity to make the memorandum,
report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian
or other qualified witness, or by certification that complies with Rule 902(11),
Rule 902(12), or a statute permitting certification, unless the source of information
or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness.
The term "business" as used in this paragraph includes business, institution,
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association, profession, occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or not
conducted for profit.
(7) Absence of entry in records kept in accordance with the provisions of
paragraph (6). Evidence that a matter is not included in the memoranda, reports,
records, or data compilations, in any form, kept in accordance with the provisions
of Paragraph (6), to prove the nonoccurrence or nonexistence of the matter, if the
matter was of a kind of which a memorandum, report, record, or data compilation
was regularly made and preserved, unless the sources of information or other
circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness.
(8) Public records and reports. Records, reports, statements, or data compilations,
in any form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth (A) the activities of the
office or agency, or (B) matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to
which matters there was a duty to report, excluding, however, in criminal cases
matters observed by police officers and other law enforcement personnel, or (C) in
civil actions and proceedings and against the Government in criminal cases,
factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted
by law, unless the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of
trustworthiness.
(9) Records of vital statistics. Records or data compilations, in any form, of births,
fetal deaths, deaths, or marriages, if the report thereof was made to a public office
pursuant to requirements of law.
(10) Absence of public record or entry. To prove the absence of a record, report,
statement, or data compilation, in any form, or the nonoccurrence or nonexistence
of a matter of which a record, report, statement, or data compilation in any form,
was regularly made and preserved by a public office or agency, evidence in the
form of a certification in accordance with Rule 902, or testimony, that diligent
search failed to disclose the record, report, statement, or data compilation, or
entry.
(11) Records of religious organization. Statements of births, marriages, divorces,
deaths, legitimacy, ancestry, relationship by blood or marriage, or other similar
facts of personal or family history, contained in a regularly kept record of a
religious organization.
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(12) Marriage, baptismal, and similar certificates. Statements of fact contained in a
certificate that the maker performed a marriage or other ceremony or administered
a sacrament, made by a clergyman, public official, or other person authorized by
the rules or practices of a religious organization or by law to perform the act
certified, and purporting to have been issued at the time of the act or within a
reasonable time thereafter.
(13) Family records. Statements of fact concerning personal or family history
contained in family Bibles, genealogies, charts, engravings on rings, inscriptions
on family portraits, engravings on urns, crypts, or tombstones, or the like.
(14) Records of documents affecting an interest in property. The record of a
document purporting to establish or affect an interest in property, as proof of the
content of the original recorded document and its execution and delivery by each
person by whom it purports to have been executed, if the record is a record of a
public office and an applicable statute authorizes the recording of documents of
that kind in that office.
(15) Statements in documents affecting an interest in property. A statement
contained in a document purporting to establish or affect an interest in property if
the matter stated was relevant to the purpose of the document, unless dealings with
the property since the document was made have been inconsistent with the truth of
the statement or the purport of the document.
(16) Statements in ancient documents. Statements in a document in existence
twenty years or more the authenticity of which is established.
(17) Market reports, commercial publications. Market quotations, tabulations,
lists, directories, or other published compilations, generally used and relied upon
by the public or by persons in particular occupations.
(18) Learned treatises. To the extent called to the attention of an expert witness
upon cross-examination or relied upon by the expert witness in direct examination,
statements contained in published treatises, periodicals, or pamphlets on a subject
of history, medicine, or other science or art, established as a reliable authority by
the testimony or admission of the witness or by other expert testimony or by
judicial notice. If admitted, the statements may be read into evidence but may not
be received as exhibits.
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(19) Reputation concerning personal or family history. Reputation among
members of a person's family by blood, adoption, or marriage, or among a person's
associates, or in the community, concerning a person's birth, adoption, marriage,
divorce, death, legitimacy, relationship by blood, adoption, or marriage, ancestry,
or other similar fact of personal or family history.
(20) Reputation concerning boundaries or general history. Reputation in a
community arising before the controversy, as to boundaries of or customs
affecting lands in the community, and reputation as to events of general history
important to the community or State or nation in which located.
(21) Reputation as to character. Reputation of a person's character among
associates or in the community.
(22) Judgment of previous conviction. Evidence of a final judgment, entered after
a trial or upon a plea of guilty (but not upon a plea of nolo contendere), adjudging
a person guilty of a crime punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one
year, to prove any fact essential to sustain the judgment, but not including, when
offered by the prosecution in a criminal prosecution for purposes other than
impeachment, judgments against persons other than the accused. The pendency of
an appeal may be shown but does not affect admissibility.
(23) Judgment as to personal, family or general history, or boundaries. Judgments
as proof of matters of personal, family or general history, or boundaries, essential
to the judgment, if the same would be provable by evidence of reputation.
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 804. Hearsay exceptions; declarant unavailable.
(a) Definition of unavailability. "Unavailability as a witness" includes situations in
which the declarant:
(a)(1) is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of privilege from testifying
concerning the subject matter of the declarant's statement; or
(a)(2) persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of the declarant's
statement despite an order of the court to do so; or
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(a)(3) testifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of the declarant's
statement; or
(a)(4) is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of death or then
existing physical or mental illness or infirmity; or
(a)(5) is absent from the hearing and the proponent of the declarant's statement has
been unable to procure the declarant's attendance by process or other reasonable
means.
A declarant is not unavailable as a witness if the exemption, refusal, claim of lack
of memory, inability, or absence is due to the procurement or wrongdoing of the
proponent of the declarant's statement for the purpose of preventing the witness
from attending or testifying.
(b) Hearsay exceptions. The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the
declarant is unavailable as a witness:
(b)(1) Former testimony. Testimony given as a witness at another hearing of the
same or a different proceeding, or in a deposition taken in compliance with law in
the course of the same or another proceeding, if the party against whom the
testimony is now offered, or, in a civil action or proceeding, a predecessor in
interest, had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct,
cross, or redirect examination.
(b)(2) Statement under belief of impending death. In a civil or criminal action or
proceeding, a statement made by a declarant while believing that the declarant's
death was imminent, if the judge finds it was made in good faith.
(b)(3) Statement against interest. A statement which was at the time of its making
so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended
to subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim by
the declarant against another, that a reasonable person in the declarant's position
would not have made the statement unless believing it to be true. A statement
tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the
accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the
trustworthiness of the statement.
(b)(4) Statement of personal or family history. (A) A statement concerning the
declarant's own birth, adoption, marriage, divorce, legitimacy, relationship by
blood, adoption or marriage, ancestry, or other similar fact of personal or family
history, even though the declarant had no means of acquiring personal knowledge
of the matter stated; or (B) a statement concerning the foregoing matters, and
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death also, of another person, if the declarant was related to the other by blood,
adoption, or marriage or was so intimately associated with the other's family as to
be likely to have accurate information concerning the matter declared.

Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 805. Hearsay within hearsay.
Hearsay included within hearsay is not excluded under the hearsay rule if each
part of the combined statements conforms with an exception to the hearsay rule
provided in these rules.
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 807. Other Exceptions.
A statement not specifically covered by Rule 803 or Rule 804 but having
equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness is not excluded by the
hearsay rule if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of
a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is
offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through
reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purpose of these rules and the interests of
justice will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence. However,
a statement may not be admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it
makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to
provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, the
proponent's intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the
name and address of the declarant.
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 8. General rules of pleadings.
(a) Claims for relief. A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, whether an
original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party claim, shall contain (1) a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief;
and (2) a demand for judgment for the relief to which he deems himself entitled.
Relief in the alternative or of several different types may be demanded.

(b) Defenses; form of denials. A party shall state in short and plain terms his
defenses to each claim asserted and shall admit or deny the averments upon which
the adverse party relies. If he is without knowledge or information sufficient to
form a belief as to the truth of an averment, he shall so state and this has the effect
of a denial. Denials shall fairly meet the substance of the averments denied. When
a pleader intends in good faith to deny only a part or a qualification of an
averment, he shall specify so much of it as is true and material and shall deny only
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the remainder. Unless the pleader intends in good faith to controvert all the
averments of the preceding pleading, he may make his denials as specific denials
of designated averments or paragraphs, or he may generally deny all the averments
except such designated averments or paragraphs as he expressly admits; but, when
he does so intend to controvert all its averments, he may do so by general denial
subject to the obligations set forth in Rule 11.

(c) Affirmative defenses. In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set
forth affirmatively accord and satisfaction, arbitration and award, assumption of
risk, contributory negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, duress, estoppel, failure of
consideration, fraud, illegality, injury by fellow servant, laches, license, payment,
release, res judicata, statute of frauds, statute of limitations, waiver, and any other
matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense. When a party has
mistakenly designated a defense as a counterclaim or a counterclaim as a defense,
the court on terms, if justice so requires, shall treat the pleadings as if there had
been a proper designation.

(d) Effect of failure to deny. Averments in a pleading to which a responsive
pleading is required, other than those as to the amount of damage, are admitted
when not denied in the responsive pleading. Averments in a pleading to which no
responsive pleading is required or permitted shall be taken as denied or avoided.
Rule 402. Relevant evidence generally admissible; irrelevant evidence
inadmissible.
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the
ConstitutioQ of the United States or the Constitution of the state of Utah, statute, or
by these rules, or by other rules applicable in courts of this state. Evidence which
is not relevant is not admissible.

Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 803 (6)
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is
available as a witness:
(6) Records of regularly conducted activity. A memorandum, report, record, or
data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions or diagnoses,
made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with
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knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if
it was the regular practice of that business activity to make the memorandum,
report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian
or other qualified witness, or by certification that complies with Rule 902(11),
Rule 902(12), or a statute permitting certification, unless the source of information
or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness.
The term "business" as used in this paragraph includes business, institution,
association, profession, occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or not
conducted for profit.

Regulations

26 C.F.R. § 301,7805-1
Sec.

301.7805-1

Rules and regulations.

(a) Issuance. The Commissioner, with the approval of the Secretary,
shall prescribe all needful rules and regulations for the enforcement
of
the Code (except where this authority is expressly given by the Code to
any person other than an officer or employee of the Treasury
Department), including all rules and regulations as may be necessary by
reason of any alteration of law in relation to internal revenue.
(b) Retroactivity. The Commissioner, with the approval of the
Secretary, may prescribe the extent, if any, to which any regulation or
Treasury decision relating to the internal revenue laws shall be
applied
without retroactive effect. The Commissioner may prescribe the extent,
if any, to which any ruling relating to the internal revenue laws,
issued by or pursuant to authorization from him, shall be applied
without retroactive effect.
(c) Preparation and distribution of regulations, forms, stamps, and
other matters. The Commissioner, under the direction of the Secretary,
shall prepare and distribute all the instructions, regulations,
directions, forms, blanks, stamps, and other matters pertaining to the
assessment and collection of internal revenue.

26 C.F.R. § 601.101
Sec.

601.101

Introduction.

Subpart A_General Procedural Rules
Sec.
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601.101 Introduction.
601.102 Classification of taxes collected by the Internal Revenue
Service.
601.103 Summary of general tax procedure.
601.104 Collection functions.
601.105 Examination of returns and claims for refund, credit or
abatement; determination of correct tax liability.
601.106 Appeals functions.
601.107 Cuminal investigation functions.
601.108 Review of overpayments exceeding $200,000.
601.109 Bankruptcy and receivership cases.
Subpart B_Rulings and Other Specific Matters
601.201
601.202
601.203
601.204
601.205
601.206
under

Rulings and determinations letters.
Closing agreements.
Offers in compromise.
Changes in accounting periods and in methods of accounting.
Tort claims.
Certification required to obtain reduced foreign tax rates
income tax treaties.

Subpart C [Reserved]
Subpart D_Provisions Special to Certain Employment Taxes
601.401 Employment taxes.
Subpart E_Conference and Practice Requirements
601.501 Scope of rules; definitions.
601.502 Recognized representative.
601.503 Requirements of power of attorney, signatures, fiduciaries and
Commissioner's authority to substitute other requirements.
601.504 Requirements for filing power of attorney.
601.505 Revocation, change in representation and substitution or
delegation of representative.
601.506 Notices to be given to recognized representative; direct
contact
with taxpayer; delivery of a check drawn on the United States
Treasury to recognized representative.
601.507 Evidence required to substantiate facts alleged by a recognized
representative.
601.508 Dispute between recognized representatives of a taxpayer.
601.509 Power of attorney not required in cases docketed in the Tax
Court of the United States.
Requirements for Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms Activities
601.521
601.522
601.523
601.524

Requirements for conference and representation in conference.
Power of attorney.
Tax information authorization.
Execution and filing powers of attorney and tax information
authorizations.
601.525 Certification of copies of documents.
601.526 Revocation of powers of attorney and tax information
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authorizations.
601.527 Other provisions applied to representation in alcohol, tobacco,
and firearms activities.
Subpart F_Rules, Regulations, and Forms
601.601 Rules and regulations.
601.602 Tax forms and instructions.
Subpart G_Records (Note)
601.702 Publication and public inspection.
Subpart H_Tax Counseling for the Elderly
601.801 Purpose and statutory authority.
601.802 Cooperative agreements.
601.803 Program operations and requirements.
601. 804 Reimbursements.
601.805 Miscellaneous administrative provisions.
601.806 Solicitation of applications.
Subpart I_Use of Penalty Mail m the Location and Recovery of Missing
Children
601.901 Missing children shown on penalty mail.
Authority: 5 U.S.C. 301 and 552.
Subpart I also issued under 39 U.S.C. 3220.
Source: 32 FR 15990, Nov. 22, 1967, unless otherwise noted.

(a) General. The Internal Revenue Service is a bureau of the
Department of the Treasury under the immediate
[[Page 6]]
direction of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. The Commissioner has
general superintendence of the assessment and collection of all taxes
imposed by any law providing internal revenue. The Internal Revenue
Service is the agency by which these functions are performed. Within an
internal revenue district the internal revenue laws are administered by
a district director of internal revenue. The Director, Foreign
Operations District, administers the internal revenue laws applicable
to
taxpayers residing or doing business abroad, foreign taxpayers deriving
income from sources within the United States, and taxpayers who are
required to withhold tax on certain payments to nonresident aliens and
foreign corporations, provided the books and records of those taxpayers
are located outside the United States. For purposes of these procedural
rules any reference to a district director or a district office
includes
the Director, Foreign Operations District, or the District Office,
Foreign Operations District, if appropriate. Generally, the procedural
rules of the Service are based on the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 and
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the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, and the procedural rules in this
part
apply to the taxes imposed by both Codes except to the extent
specifically stated or where the procedure under one Code is
incompatible with the procedure under the other Code. Reference to
sections of the Code are references to the Internal Revenue Code of
1954, unless otherwise expressly indicated.
(b) Scope. This part sets forth the procedural rules of the
Internal
Revenue Service respecting all taxes administered by the Service, and
supersedes the previously published statement (26 CFR (1949 ed., Part
300-End) Parts 600 and 601) with respect to such procedural rules.
Subpart A provides a descriptive statement of the general course and
method by which the Service's functions are channeled and determined,
insofar as such functions relate generally to the assessment,
collectior, and enforcement of internal revenue taxes. Certain
provisions special to particular taxes are separately described in
Subpart D of this part. Conference and practice requirements of the
Internal Fevenue Service are contained in Subpart E of this part.
Specific matters not generally involved in the assessment, collection,
and enforcement functions are separately described in Subpart B of this
part. A description of the rule making functions of the Department of
the Treasury with respect to internal revenue tax matters is contained
in Subpart F of this part. Subpart G of this part relates to matters of
official record in the Internal Revenue Service and the extent to which
records and documents are subject to publication or open to public
inspectior. This part does not contain a detailed discussion of the
substantive provisions pertaining to any particular tax or the
procedures relating thereto, and for such information it is necessary
that reference be made to the applicable provisions of law and the
regulations promulgated thereunder. The regulations relating to the
taxes administered by the Service are contained in Title 26 of the Code
of Federal Regulations.
[38 FR 4955, Feb. 23, 1973 and 41 FR 20880, May 21, 1976, as amended at
45 FR 7251, Feb. 1, 1980; 49 FR 36498, Sept. 18, 1984; T.D. 8685, 61 FR
58008, Nov. 12, 1996]
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Executive Order 10289-Providing for the performance of certain functions of the President by the
Secretary of the Treasury
Source: The provisions of Executive Order 10289 of Sept 17, 1951, appear at 16 FR 9499, 3 CFR, 19491953 Comp , p 787, unless otherwise noted
By virtue of the authority vested in me by section 1 of the act of August 8, 1950, 64 Stat 419 (Public Law
673, 81st Congress), and as President of the United States, it is ordered as follows
1 The Secretary of the Treasury is hereby designated and empowered to perform the following-described
functions of the President without the approval, ratification, or other action of the President
(a) The authority vested in the President by section 1 of the act of August 1, 1914, c 223, 38 Stat 609,
623, as amended (19 U S C 2), (1) to rearrange, by consolidation or otherwise, the several customscollection districts, (2) to discontinue ports of entry by abolishing the same and establishing others in their
stead, and (3) to change from time to time the location of the headquarters in any customs-collection
district as the needs of the service may require
(b) The authority vested in the President by section 1 of the Anti-Smuggling Act of August 5, 1935, c 438,
49 Stat 517 (19 U S C 1701), (1) to find and declare that at any place or within any area on the high seas
adjacent to but outside customs waters any vessel or vessels hover or are being kept off the coast of the
United States and that, by virtue of the presence of any such vessel or vessels at such place or within such
area, the unlawful introduction or removal into or from the United States of any merchandise or person is
being, or may be, occasioned, promoted, or threatened, (2) to find and declare that certain waters on the
high seas are in such proximity to such vessel or vessels that such unlawful introduction or removal of
merchandise or persons may be carried on by or to or from such vessel or vessels, and (3) to find and
declare that, within any customs-enforcement area, the circumstances no longer exist which gave rise to
the declaration of such area as a customs-enforcement area
(c) The authority vested in the President by section 1 of the Act of August 26, 1985 Public Law 98-89 97
Stat 510 (46 U S C 3101), to suspend the provisions of law requiring the inspection of foreign-built vessels
admitted to American registry
(d) The authority vested in the President by section 5 of the act of May 28, 1908, c 212, 35 Stat 425, as
amended (46 U S C Appendix 104), to determine (as a prerequisite to the extension of reciprocal
privileges by the Commissioner of Customs) that yachts used and employed exclusively as pleasure
vessels and belonging to any resident of the United States are allowed to arrive at and depart from any
foreign port and to cruise in the waters of such port without entering or clearing at the custom-house
thereof and without the payment of any charges for entering or clearing, dues, duty per ton, tonnage taxes,
or charges for cruising licenses
(e) The authority vested in the President by section 2 of the act of March 24, 1908, c 96, 35 Stat 46 (46
U S C Appendix 134), to name the hospital ships to which section 1 of the said act shall apply to indicate
the time when the exemptions thereby provided for shall begin and end
(f) The authority vested in the President by section 4223 of the Revised Statutes, as amended (46 U S C
Appendix 141), (1) to declare that-upon satisfactory proof being given by the government of any foreign
nation that no discriminating duties of tonnage or imposts are imposed or levied in the ports of such nation
upon vessels wholly belonging to citizens of the United States, or upon the produce, manufactures, or
merchandise imported in the same from the United States or from any foreign country-the foreign
discriminating duties of tonnage and impost within the United States are suspended and discontinued, so
far as respects the vessels of such foreign nation, and the produce, manufactures, or merchandise
imported into the United States from such foreign nation, or from any other foreign country, and (2) to
suspend in part the operation of section 4219 of the Revised Statutes, as amended (46 U S C Appendix
121), and section IV, J, subsection 1 of the act of October 3 1913 c 16 38 Stat 195 as amended (46
U S C Appendix 146), so that foreign vessels from a country imposing partial discriminating tonnage duties
upon American vessels, or partial discriminating import duties upon American merchandise may enjoy in
our ports the identical privileges which the same class of American vessels and merchandise may enjoy in
such country Provided, that prior to the issuance of an order of the Secretary of the Treasury suspending
and discontinuing (wholly or in part) discriminating tonnage duties imposts, and import duties within the
United States, the Department of State shall obtain and furnish to the Secretary of the Treasury the proof
required by the said section 4228, as amended as the basis for that order
(g) The authority vested in the President by section 3650 of the Internal Revenue Code (26 U S C 3650) to
establish convenient collection districts (for the purpose of assessing, levying, and collecting the taxes
provided by the internal revenue laws), and from time to time to alter such districts
(h) The authority which is now vested in the President by section 2564 (b) of the Internal Revenue Code
(26 U S C 2564 (b)), and which on and after January 1, 1955, will be vested in the President by section

4735 (b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, to issue, in accordance with the provisions of the said
section 2564 (b) or 4735 (b), as the case may be, orders providing for the registration and the imposition of
a special tax upon all persons in the Canal Zone who produce, import compound, deal in, dispense, sell,
distribute, or give away narcotic drugs.
(i) The authority vested in the President by Section 5318 of the Revised Statutes, as amended (19 U.S.C.
540), to employ suitable vessels other than Coast Guard cutters in the execution of laws providing for the
collection of duties on imports and tonnage;
[Para. 1 amended by EO 10583 of Dec. 18, 1954, 19 FR 8725, 3 CFR, 1954-1958 Comp., p. 232; EO
10882 of July 18, 1960, 25 FR 6869, 3 CFR, 1959-1963 Comp., p. 413; EO 11110 of June 4, 1963, 28 FR
5605, 3 CFR, 1959-1963 Comp., p. 770; EO 12608 of Sept. 9, 1987, 52 FR 34617, 3 CFR, 1987 Comp., p.
245]
2. The Secretary of the Treasury is hereby designated and empowered to perform without the approval,
ratification, or other action of the President the following functions which have heretofore, under the
respective provisions of law cited, required the approval of the President in connection with their
performance by the Secretary of the Treasury:
(a) The authority vested in the Secretary of the Treasury by section 6 of the act of July 8, 1937, c. 444, 50
Stat. 480 (5 U.S.C. 134c), to make rules and regulations necessary for the execution of the functions
vested in the Secretary of the Treasury by the said act, as amended.

(b) [Revoked]
(c) [Revoked]
(d) [Revoked]
(e) The authority vested in the Secretary of the Treasury by section 1 of Title II of the act of June 15, 1917,
c. 30, 40 Stat. 220 (50 U.S.C. 191), to make rules and regulations governing the anchorage and movement
of any vessel, foreign or domestic, in the territorial waters of the United States.
(f) [Revoked]
[Para. 2 amended by EO 11110 of June 4, 1963, 28 FR 5605, 3 CFR, 1959-1963 Comp., p. 770; EO 11825
of Dec. 31, 1974, 40 FR 1003, 3 CFR, 1971-1975 Comp., p. 929; EO 12608 of Sept. 9, 1987, 52 FR 34617,
3 CFR, 1987 Comp., p. 245]
3. (a) The Secretary of the Treasury and the Postmaster General are hereby designated and empowered
jointly to prescribe without the approval of the President regulations, under section 1 of the act of July 8,
1937, c. 444, 50 Stat. 479 (5 U.S.C. 134), governing the shipment of valuables by the executive
departments, independent establishments, agencies, wholly-owned corporations, officers, and employees
of the United States.
(b) The Postmaster General is hereby designated and empowered to exercise without the approval,
ratification, or other action of the President the authority vested in the President by section 504 (b) of title
18 of the United States Code to approve regulations issued by the Secretary of the Treasury under the
authority of the said section 504 (b) (relating to the printing, publishing, or importation, or the making or
importation of the necessary plates for such printing or publishing, of postage stamps for philatelic
purposes), and to approve any amendment or repeal of any of such regulations by the Secretary of the
Treasury.
[Para. 3 amended by EO 10583 of Dec. 18, 1954, 19 FR 8725, 3 CFR, 1954-1958 Comp., p. 232]
4. As used in this order, the term "functions" embraces duties, powers, responsibilities, authority, or
discretion, and the term "perform" may be construed to mean "exercise".
5. All actions heretofore taken by the President in respect of the matters affected by this order and in force
at the time of the issuance of this order, including regulations prescribed by the President in respect of such
matters, shall, except as they may be inconsistent with the provisions of this order, remain in effect until
amended, modified, or revoked pursuant to the authority conferred by this order.
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Addendum 3
Trial Court's Writ of Mandate and Judgment

T silii^
TIMOTHY A. BODILY #6496
Assistant Attorney General
MARK L. SHURTLEFF #4666
Attorney General
Attorneys For Utah State Tax Commission
160 East 300 South, Fifth Floor
PO Box 140874
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0874
Telephone: 801.366.0375

FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

SEP 2 1 200*1
SALT LAKE COUNTY

By.

Deputy Clerk

AdOO

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION,
WRIT OF MANDATE
AND JUDGMENT

Petitioner,
vs.
H. DOUGLAS GOFF and
LISA GOFF,

Civil Nos. 040911367 & 040911368

Respondent.

Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki

Petitioner's Verified Petition for Writ of Mandate and Judgment came on for hearing
before this Court on August 16, 2004 at 1:30 p.m. The Court having considered the Petitioner's
written petition, affidavit, and statutory references, and Respondents' motion to dismiss, together
with oral testimony, exhibits, and argument of the parties, and for good cause appearing
therefore:
HEREBY ORDERS that the Respondents' motion to dismiss is denied and a Writ of

1

Mandate and Judgment is hereby issued against the Respondents, H. Douglas Goff and Lisa
Goff, as follows:
1. Respondent H. Douglas Goff is ordered to file true, accurate and complete 1996,
1997, 1998, 2000, 2001, and 2002 Utah Individual Income Tax Returns, Forms TC-40 series,
with Petitioner on or before September 30, 2004, at 5:00 p.m.
2. Respondent Lisa Goff is ordered to file true, accurate, and complete 1996, 1997, 1998,
1999, 2000, 2001, and 2002 Utah Individual Income Tax Returns, Forms TC-40 series, with
Petitioner on or before September 30, 2004, at 5:00 p.m.
3. Each complete Utah Individual Income Tax Return shall include any applicable W-2,
1099, and/or W-2P forms, and shall contain information from which the correctness of reported
tax liability can be determined.
4. All returns shall be filed with Dan Engh, Audit Division of the Utah State Tax
Commission, 210 North 1950 West, Salt Lake City, Utah 84134.
5. Based upon the affidavit of Timothy A. Bodily, an award as provided for in Utah
Code Ann. § 59-1-707(1) (2003) is granted in favor of Petitioner and against Respondents in the
following particulars:

,

a) Attorney Fees
b) Service Costs

$ fvC/C/
$ 24.00

c) Filing Fees

$ 155.00

TOTAL
6. Payment of awarded fees and costs shall be made on or before September 30, 2004, at

5:00 p.m. to the attention of Timothy A. Bodily, Assistant Utah Attorney General, 160 East 300
South, Fifth Floor, PO Box 140874, Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0874.
7. Failure to comply with this Writ of Mandate and Judgment will be considered
contempt of this Court's order.
8. Service of this Writ of Mandate and Judgment may be made by first class mail.

is
DATED this

v

day of yA~7rS/

,

HONORABLE GLENNiClWftSAKI
Third Judicial District Court
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Docket as of August 13, 2003 6 36 pm

U.S. District Court
Western District of Tennessee (Memphis)
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1

DOCKET
INDICTMENT by USA

ENTRY
Counts filed against

Vernice

(1) count (s) 1-6 (pwm) [Entry date 03/27/03]

3/26/03
Judge

2

ARREST Warrant issued for Vernice B. Kuglm

by Mag

James H. Allen (pwm) [Entry date 03/27/03]

4/1/03
3
Kuglm on

ARREST Warrant returned executed as to Vernice B.
4/1/03 (pwm) [Entry date 04/04/03]

4/1/03

4

MINUTES: Before Mag Judge James H. Allen $10,000.00
SECURETY Bond set for Vernice B. Kuglm, & ;

arraignment
set for 9:30 4/9/03 before Mag Judge Diane K. Vescovo
Type
of hearing held: Initial Appearance - Court read the
charges & advised of rights; DFt. retain counsel; BRA
explained & signed; Bond set; Arraignment set. AUSA:
C.
Andre for J. Murphy Dft Atty: R. Pierce (LIMITED
APPEARANCE) C/R: FTR (pwm) [Entry date 04/04/03]

4/1/03
Kuglm

5

^ ORDER setting conditions of release for Vernice B.
by Mag Judge James H. Allen (pwm) [Entry date

04/04/03]

SETTING LETTER ; arraignment set for 9:30 4/9/03 for
Vernice B. K u g l m
before Mag Judge Diane K. Vescovo

4/1/03
(pwm)

[Entry date 04/04/03]

BOND Posted ( 10,000.00 SURETY) 00249841 by Liberty

4/1/03
Bail

Bonds Vernice B. K u g l m

(pwm) [Entry date 04/04/03]

NOTICE OF DELIVERANCE OF FOREIGN PASSPORT & RECEIPT

4/2/03
(FILED

UNDER SEAL) (document placed in vault) (pwm)
[Entry date 04/04/03] [Edit date 04/04/03]

4/9/03
9
EXCLUDABLE

MINUTES:

Before Mag Judge Diane K. Vescovo

ON

DELAY for period from 4/9/03 thru 4/29/03 as to dft ,
arraignment reset for 9:30 4/30/03 for Vernice B.
Kuglm
before Mag Judge Diane K. Vescovo As To: V. K u g l m
Type of
hearing held: Arraignment - Dft requested continuance
to
retain counsel. AUSA: T. A r v m for Murphy Dft Atty: R.
Pierce C/R: FTR (pwm) [Entry date 04/10/03]

4/9/03
10
EXCLUDABLE

ORDER ON CONTINUANCE AND SPECIFYING PERIOD OF
DELAY by Mag Judge Diane K. Vescovo period of

excludable
time from 4/9/03 to 4/29/03 (cc: all counsel)
[Entry date 04/10/03]

4/30/03
Vernice

11

MINUTES:
B. K u g l m

Before Mag Judge Diane K. Vescovo

(pwm)

dft

arraigned; Not Guilty plea entered;

Attorney
Lowell H. Becraft Jr. present;

As To: V. K u g l m

Type
of hearing held: Arraignment - Dft was arraigned &

formal reading of charges; Speedy Trial deadline
7/8/03;
Trial & report date to be set before Mag Judge. Trail
Report Date notices handed to attys; Dft to remain on
present bond. AUSA: D. Henry for Murphy Dft Atty: L.
Becraft C/R: FTR (pwm) [Entry date 05/02/03]

5/1/03
Diane

12

—

ORDER ON ARRAIGNMENT AS TO DFT V. KUBLIN by Mag Judge
K. Vescovo re [11-1] (cc: all counsel)
[Entry date 05/02/03]

(pwm)

5/1/03

13

APPEARANCE for defendant Vernice B. K u g l m by Attorney
Vernice B. K u g l m (pwm) [Entry date 05/02/03]

5/20/03
Vernice

14

SETTING LETTER report date set for 9:00 5/23/03 for

5/23/03
held

15

B. K u g l m

(pwm) [Entry date 05/21/03]

MINUTES:

Before Judge Jon P. McCalla

Report date

5/2/03. Dft on bond. Request for cont by dft. Cont
trial
to 7/7/03, report date set for 9:00 6/27/03

for

Vernice B.
Kuglm,

ON EXCLUDABLE DELAY as to defendant Vernice

B.
K u g l m . Time excluded through 7/18/03. Reason for cont
-additional time to prepare. Dft's counsel did not
appear
due to insufficient/untimely notice. AUSA: J. Murphy
Dft
Atty: L. Becraft
C/R: Brenda Parker
[Entry date 05/30/03]

5/29/03
16
EXCLUDABLE

(ehg)

ORDER ON CONTINUANCE AND SPECIFYING PERIOD OF
DELAY

by Judge Jon P. McCalla

period of excludable

time
from 6/13/03 to 7/18/03 (cc: all counsel)
[Entry date 05/30/03]

(ehg)

5/30/03
Vernice

17

^

SETTING LETTER report date set for 9:00 6/27/03 for
B. K u g l m

6/26/03 19
6/20/03,

(ehg) [Entry date 06/02/03]

NOTICE; by plaintiff USA
requesting discovery

6/27/03

18

in response to a letter

(ccp) [Entry date 07/02/03]

-= CONSENT ORDER ON CRIMINAL by Judge Jon P. McCalla to
continuance, and to exclusion of time as to Vernice B.
K u g l m ; case reset for report at 2:00pm on 7/24/03

(cc:
all counsel)

6/27/03 20
trial (ccp)

(ccp) [Entry date 07/01/03]

UNOPPOSED MOTION by Vernice B. K u g l m to continue
[Entry date 07/03/03]

6/27/03
for

21

MINUTES:

Before Judge Jon P. McCalla report date set

2:00 7/24/03 for Vernice B. K u g l m ; request for
continuance by dft; continued trial to 8/4/03; time
excluded through 8/15/03; reason for continuance
additonal
time to prepare; AUSA: Colthurst for J. Murphy Dft
Atty: L.
Becraft C/R: Brenda Parker (ccp) [Entry date 07/03/03]

7/2/03
be

22

NOTICE by plaintiff USA; additional documents are to
included with the documents previously delivered to

you on
6/26/03 (ccp) [Entry date 07/10/03]

7/16/03
Vernice

23

== SETTING LETTER report date set for 2:00 7/24/03 for
B. K u g l m

7/24/03

24

(ccp) [Entry date 07/17/03]

BRIEF Concerning Trial Issues by defendant Vernice B.
K u g l m (ccp) [Entry date 07/25/03]

7/24/03
Kuglin

25

DEFENDANT KUGLIN'S REQUESTED VOIR DIRE by Vernice B.
proposed to the jury panel

7/24/03
for

39

MINUTES:

(ccp) [Entry date 07/25/03]

Before Judge Jon P. McCalla ; jury trial set

8/4/03 for Vernice B. Kuglin
AUSA: J. Murphy
Atty: L. Becraft
C/R: Brenda Parker (ccp)
[Entry date 08/12/03]

7/24/03
for

40

MINUTES:

Before Judge Jon P. McCalla ; jury trial set

8/4/03 for Vernice B. Kuglin
AUSA: J. Murphy
Atty: L. Becraft
C/R: Brenda Parker (ccp)
[Entry date 08/13/03]

7/28/03

26

Dft

Dft

RESPONSE by plaintiff USA; to prior discovery and the
evidence in this case will also include copies of

blank
Forms W-4 and the Deduction and Adjustment Worksheets
for
1996-2001; (ccp) [Entry date 07/28/03]

7/30/03

27

RULE 16 Discovery Response as to defendant Vernice B.
Kuglin (jae) [Entry date 07/30/03]

8/1/03
Kuglin

28

PROPOSED JURY Instructions by defendant Vernice B.
(ccp) [Entry date 08/04/03]

8/4/03
receipt

--

PRO HAC VICE FEE PAID:
# 081962

in the amount of $ 100.00

by Robert G. Bernhoft

(ccp) [Entry date

08/05/03]

8/4/03
29
attorney

MOTION as to Vernice B. Kuglin for admission of
Robert G. Bernhoft to appear pro hac vice
[Entry date 08/05/03]

(ccp)

8/4/03
(ccp)

30

AFFIDAVIT/Declaration of Attorney Robert G. Bernhoft
[Entry date 08/05/03]

J/4/03

31

GOVERNMENT'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS by and through
Terrell L. Harris (ccp) [Entry date 08/05/03]

J/4/03

32

APPEARANCE for defendant Vernice B. Kuglin by Attorney
Robert G. Bernhoft (ccp) [Entry date 08/05/03]

8/4/03
pro

33

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE; Robert G. Bernhoft to Appear
hac vice as to Vernice Kuglin (ccp) [Entry date

08/05/03]

8/4/03
on

34

MINUTES:

Before Judge Jon P. McCalla jury trial held

8/4/03; trial will resume on 8/5/03;

AUSA: J.

Murphy
Dft Atty: L. Becraft, R. Bernhoft C/R: Brenda Parker
(ccp)
[Entry date 08/13/03]

8/5/03
35
resume on

MINUTES:

Before Judge Jon P. McCalla trial will

8/6/03 at 9:00 AUSA: J. Murphy Dft Atty: Becraft,
Bernhoft
C/R: Brenda Parker (ccp) [Entry date
08/13/03]

8/6/03
on

36

MINUTES:

Before Judge Jon P. McCalla

Trial resumes

8/7/03 at 9:00 AUSA: J. Murphy Dft Atty: Becraft,
Bernhoft C/R: Brenda Parker (ccp) [Entry date
08/13/03]

J/7/03
J/8/03

37

MINUTES:
at 8:30

Before Judge Jon P. McCalla trial resume
AUSA: J. Murphy Dft Atty: Becraft, Bernhoft

C/R:
Brenda Parker (ccp) [Entry date 08/13/03]

8/8/03
cts

38

MINUTES: Criminal Jury Trial; verdict: not guilty on
1-6 as charged; jury deliberations resumed at 8:45 on

day 5
; Before Judge Jon P. McCalla AUSA: J. Murphy Dft
Atty:
Becraft, Bernhoft C/R: Brenda Parker (ccp)
[Entry date 08/13/03]

J/8/03

39

VERDICT as to Vernice B. Kuglm; find the defendant ,
Vernice B. Kuglm as to 1-6 not guilty (ccp)
[Entry date 08/13/03]

END OF DOCKET: 2:03cr20111-0
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unclear as to whether -- whether he realized that our motion to

2

dismiss is for both writs of mandate which were filed one against

3

my wife, one against me.

4

THE COURT:

5

MR. GOFF:

6

THE COURT:

Well, this is a consolidated action.
Yes.
I've done both -- I'm hearing both cases,

7

and that includes by definition yours and your wife's motions.

8

Do you have any other understanding than that, Mr. Bodily9

9

MR. BODILY:

10

THE COURT:

11

MR. BODILY:

12
13
14
15

No, your Honor.

I--

All right.
—intended drafting the response to address

both; I thought I had.
THE COURT:
indicates that.

My cursory reading of your response

I don't think that's an issue, Mr. Goff.

MR. GOFF:

Okay.

Then also additionally, in prior

16

proceedings there's been an attempt to cast us as taxpayers

17

want to reiterate that our position is that that -- that is not

18

an issue that has been affirmatively established in any record,

19

either here before the Court or elsewhere.

20

well, that would be it, your Honor.

21

THE COURT:

We

Then I also have a --

All right, or want of better identification

22

you're the respondents, as far as I'm concerned, and I guess what

23

your position is you have not yet been judged a taxpayer by any

24

competent Court, and I don't care.

25

can call you Mr. Goff.

I can call you respondent

I

It doesn't matter to me, so I understand

1

submitted that my only earnings have been at -- through

2

Bonneville High School, my activities there, my teaching.

3
4

Q.

So are you a teacher, then, for the -- is it the

Bonneville High School?

5

A.

Yes, I am.

6

Q.

Is that located in Utah 7

7

A.

Yes, it is.

8

Q.

What do you get paid for your services?

9

A.

I'm compensated —

10

Q.

What do you receive presently on an annual basis?

11

MR. GOFF:

it varies per year.

Your Honor, objection.

Ms. Goff has issued

12

a previous -- a previous statement that she has -- that she has

13

sworn to, and she -- I believe she's entitled to review her

14

statement before she offers her answer.

15

THE COURT:

No, she's not.

If she wanted to do that

16

in preparation for her testimony, that's fine.

17

examination at this time and objection overruled.

18

the -- you may answer.

19
20

THE WITNESS:
Q.

BY MR. BODILY:

This is an
You may answer

Would you restate the question, please 7
What do you presently receive on an

21

annual basis in compensation for your services to the Bonneville

22

High School?

23

A.

If you're asking about my income -- and that's been

24

my -- one of my questions is whether that income is indeed a

25

taxable income, but I receive a compensation of around 40 plus

-191
2
3

thousand dollars.
Q.

Okay.

Do you know what you would have received in

compensation in 1996?

4

A.

No, I don't know.

5

Q.

Would it be -- if I were to give you the number $33,802

6
7

I don't recall.

would that sound approximately correct?
A.

I suppose.

That would again, be one of my questions,

8

though, whether that would be a taxable income

9

the things that we've been seeking information about

10

Q.

That's one of

Right, but if I gave you the figure of $33,802 in

11

compensation, was that approximately what you received in 1996

12

for your services to Bonneville High School?

13

A.

Approximately.

14

Q.

Do you know for 1997 what you would have received?

15

MR. GOFF:

Your Honor, I o b j e c t —

16

THE WITNESS:

17

MR. GOFF:

No, I don't.

I object to these questions.

Mrs

Goff has

18

rights under the -- under the Utah Constitution and the Federal

19

Constitution not to -- not to incriminate herself

20

questions may tend to lead to the self incrimination on future

21

charges, and I -- and she has not been advised by the Court of

22

these rights.

23

THE COURT:

24

You're not representing her.

25

make the objections.

These

Mr. Goff, you are representing yourself
If she's got any objections she can

Now that you've told her what objections to
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THE COURT:

2

THE WITNESS:

3

THE COURT:

4
5

Q.

Are you the keeper of the records?
I am the keeper of the records.
All right.

BY MR. BODILY:

Does this reflect the information

transmitted from the Internal Revenue Service?

6

A,

Yes, it does.

7

Q.

Is that made at the time the commission receives that

8

information?

9

A.

Pardon me?

10

Q.

Is it made at the same time the commission receives the

11
12

information from the Internal Revenue Service?
A.

Yes, it is.

Yes.

13

MR. BODILY:

I would move that this be admitted.

14

THE COURT:

15

MR. GOFF:

Any objections, Mr. Goff?
If you could delay the admission until after

16

my cross examination of Ms. Furniss.

17

object.

18

THE COURT:

19

MR. GOFF:

Okay.

Otherwise, yes, I do

State your objection.

I believe —

I believe that the evidence from

20

my cross examination, but I would object on the grounds that

21

these records come from the IRS.

22

or not they came from the IRS under seal and to the tax

23

commission, and also discover if Ms

24

someone submitting that information to the IRS prior

25

these records -- the records that Mr. Bodily is referring are

I would want to explore whether

Furniss has any knowledge of
I believe

-34Even though they are under seal from the tax

1

hearsay documents.

2

commission, they are not under seal from the IRS and they are not

3

under seal f rom the originator of that information.
Okay.

THE COURT:

4

Thank you.

As to hearsay the

5

Court finds this is business records exception.

6

foundation. the Court denies subject to you bringing it back up

7

again after you finish your cross examination.
MR. GOFF:

8

Okay.

As to other

Your Honor, just if we could have the

9

record note that you've overruled my objection and the -- note

10

the objection itself and that you've overruled it subject to-That's what the record says, sir.

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. GOFF:

13

MR. BODILY:

Thank you.
I would note, as well, your Honor, I think

14

it would be admissible under 803(a) as public record kept

15

(inaudible).

16

THE COURT:

17

(Exhibit No. P-l received into evidence)

18

MR. BODILY:

P-l is received.

I would also note to clarify that we have

19

not -- with respect to exhibits 12 through 15 we do not believe

20

that they are necessary at this time since the (inaudible)

21

domicile.

22

THE COURT:

23

MR. BODILY:

24

THE COURT:

25

Okay.
So we're not going to introduce those.
So do you want me to delete 12 through 15,

or do you want to just keep the packet as it is and not refer to

-351

12 through 15?

2
3

MR. BODILY:

refer to 12 through 15.

4
5

THE COURT:

Very well.

Thank you.

MS. GOFF:

first of all,

I would request that Mr. Goff go first and I

could follow if necessary.

8

THE COURT:

9

MR. GOFF:

Very well.

Mr. Goff, go ahead.

Your Honor, if I could just have a moment to

10

confer with opposing Counsel.

11

THE COURT:

12

(Mr. Goff confers with Mr. Bodily)

13
14

Mr. —

Lisa Goff, any questions of Ms. Furniss?

6
7

Let's just keep the packet as it is and not

Yes.

!

CROSS EXAMINATION
BY MR. GOFF:

15

Q.

Hello, Ms. Furniss.

16

A.

Yeah.

17

Q.

Ms. Furniss, does the commission disclose these records

18
19
20
21
22

It's been awhile.

to anyone that comes and asks for them?
A.

No, not just anyone.

There are authorized individuals

who can receive this information.
Q.

Okay.

So it's a limited list and not -- they're not

available to the public at large?

23

A.

No.

24

Q.

So this is your statement?

25

A.

It is.

You swear to it9

'
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Q.

Okay.

Now referring to the exhibits in the affidavit,

2

are these normal type records that the commission uses for -- in

3

petitions for writs of mandates in matters such as this7

4

A.

Yes.

5

Q.

Okay.

6
7

Where does the information that makes up these

records come from?
A.

This is transmitted to the tax commission from the

8

Internal Revenue Service under our exchange and information

9

agreement.

10
11

Q.

Transmitted?

Does that indicate that they are -- you

receive through electronically?

12

A.

No, we receive it on extract.

13

Q.

(Inaudible).

14

A.

Right, that is correct.

15

Q.

Okay.

It's--

It's on magnetic media.

With respect to these records which you say come

16

from the IRS, how do you know that the IRS is the source of

17

those?

18

A.

19
20
21
22

By the transmittals that come to me certifying that it's

come directly from their agency.
Q.

Okay.

So there is a certification to the fact that the

information came -- that comes on a tape that comes from the IRS9
A.

There is a transmittal that comes with it that I have to

23

acknowledge that we received the data and that all the extracts

24

are there.

25

Q.

Okay.

Who in the Internal Revenue Service sent this

-371
2

information as it pertains to me and to Mrs. Goff?
A.

This would have come out of Martmsburg Computing

3

Center.

As far as an individual, it may come from different

4

individuals, but it comes out of Martmsburg Computing Center.

5

Q.

Okay.

6

A.

No, I cannot.

7

Q.

Okay.

8
9

Can you identify those individuals, please?

So the record -- the records themselves, has

anyone certified to the accuracy and the truth of those records9
A.

Not in a formal certification.

The information is

10

gathered by the Internal Revenue Service, put in an extract form

11

and sent to the different state agencies for state tax

12

administration.

13

Revenue Code, and we also have formal agreements with the IRS

14

that the data is accurate.

15

been sent is accurate.

This is done under 6103(d) of the Internal

It's our assumption that what has

16

Q.

It's assumed to be accurate?

17

A.

It is presumed to be accurate.

18

Q.

That presumption is based on?

19

A.

On our exchange agreement with the Internal Revenue

20

Service.

21

Q.

Is it possible for those records to be inaccurate7

22

A.

I have no personal knowledge of that.

23

Q.

But it's possible?

24

A.

I do not know that.

25

Q.

Did the records come to you with any sort of affidavit
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attesting to the truth of the records?

2

A.

No.

3

Q.

Now with respect to your affidavit -- this one -- did

4

you choose the words in your affidavit very carefully?

5

A.

I believe it's basically standard language for an

6

affidavit of this type.

7

it's a general statement that I attest to.

8
9

Q.

Okay.

It was not specific to this case, but

By signing that those words become your words and

you testify -- and you know those statements to be accurate?

10

A.

I do.

11

Q.

Now with respect to the records in general that you

12

received you from the IRS, have you ever requested authentication

13

from the IRS of any of those documents -- of those records or

14

documents?

15

A.

Of these individual ones?

16

Q.

Generally.

17

A.

Just generally?

When —

we at times on a case-by-case

18

basis will request certified records in addition to these records

19

when we are going into a criminal proceeding because that's

20

required by the Court in that particular setting.

21

Q.

Okay.

22

A.

These here, this is as correct as the data sent to the

23

IRS.

They don't manipulate the data.

The information has been

24

sent to them by the banks, by trusts, by Social Security

25

Administration, and they put that data together for this extract.
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Q.

So the IRS is not the originator of that information?

2

A.

They are not the originator of the W-2 information.

The

3

W-2 information is first sent to Social Security Administration,

4

who accounts for the wages of those individuals for Social

5

Security purposes.

6

the IRS.

7

IRS.

They then create the database and send it to

1099s, K-ls, that type of thing is sent directly to the

8

Q.

Okay, sent to the IRS and they forward it on to you?

9

A.

That is correct.

10

Q.

Who sends that information to the IRS?

11

A.

Well, it depends on what the documents are.

You've got

12

1099s —

13

may come from banks, contractors, whoever is required to report

14

that information to the IRS will send it directly to them.

15

information, however, is first sent to Social Security and then

16

sent on to the Internal Revenue Service.

17

K-ls may come from corporations or partnerships, 1099s

MR. GOFF:

W-2

Your Honor, I'd like these marked as exhibits

18

for identification.

19

THE COURT:

20

MR. GOFF:

21

THE COURT:

22

MR. GOFF:

23

THE COURT:

24

COURT CLERK:

25

THE COURT:

Okay.
Two.

How many do you have?
I also have copies for Mr. Bodily.

And for the Court?

And for the Court?

Yes.
Which is which?
The miscellaneous income is 2, D-2.
Okay.
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any findings of fact and conclusions of law o n —

2

MR. GOFF:

3

THE COURT:

4
5

Q.

Well, I withdraw that question, your Honor.

BY MR. GOFF:

MR. BODILY:

7

THE COURT:

9

Objection sustained.

Have you ever had occasion to prepare a

W-2 for myself -- for me?

6

8

Thank you.

Q.

BY MR. GOFF:

Same objection, your Honor.
Sustained.

Beyond the scope.

Are you custodian of the Internal Revenue

Service records?

10

A.

I'm custodian of the State Tax Commission records.

11

Q.

That's not my question, ma'am.

12

Are you custodian of the

Internal Revenue Service records?

13

A.

No.

14

Q.

That these came from, okay.

Are you the person who made

15

the entries to the Internal Revenue Service's records which these

16

came from?

17

A.

No.

18

Q.

Do you have the capacity to verify these records?

19

A.

Yes.

20

Q.

How does that happen?

21

A.

I can do it several ways.

I can -- we have this median

22

in different forms that I can match one against the other.

23

also request this information on paper from the IRS on a case-by-

24

case basis which would verify what's already here.

25

Q.

Okay.

I can

Do you have the capacity to verify these records
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as IRS -- do you have the capacity to verify the records that

2

came from the IRS which these records reflect?

3

A.

Yes.

4

Q.

Have you done so?

5

A.

No.

6

MR. GOFF:

Your Honor, I object -- I move to strike this

7

Exhibit P-l in that there is —

8

question, if I may.

9

Q.

BY MR. GOFF:

one moment, your Honor.

One more

What personal knowledge do you have that

10

the income as reported on those records was received by Mrs. Goff

11

or myself?

12

A.

13
14

Service.
Q.

This information was reported to the Internal Revenue
How you received it I don't have personal knowledge of.
Okay.

You have no personal knowledge of how we may have

15

received that income.

16

did receive that income?

17
18
19

A.

Do you have any personal knowledge that we

Just by the fact that it was reported under your name to

the Internal Revenue Service.
Q.

Okay.

So then you were relying on the -- what you have

20

read in these reports rather than any -- any personal experience

21

or personal knowledge?

22

MR. BODILY:

Objection, your Honor.

23

testified she relied on anything.

24

documents.

25

She hasn't

She's identified the

We're going to present (inaudible).

MR. GOFF:

Your Honor, I'm asking.

I'm asking her if
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she -- what the basis of her -- of her knowledge is, whether

2

it's —

3

based on a reading of the records.

whether it's based on personal firsthand knowledge or

4

THE COURT:

5

THE WITNESS:

It would be based on the reading of the

Not on any personal firsthand knowledge?

6

Ask her.

records.

7

Q.

BY MR. GOFF:

8

A.

That's not in my scope of work at my job.

9
10

my scope of work.

I would not be an investigator or whatnot to

show personal knowledge.

11

Q.

Is that a yes or a no?

12

A.

No.

13

Q.

No personal—

14

A.

No personal knowledge.

15

It's not in

MR. GOFF:

Your Honor, then, you know, for that reason

16

since Ms. Furniss has no personal knowledge of the truth of the

17

matter contained in the records, I move that we strike Exhibit

18

P-l and also Ms. Furniss' testimony.

19
20
21

THE COURT:

Her testimony will remain.

As to the

striking of P-l, what is your response, Mr. Bodily?
MR. BODILY:

Your Honor, we've had her testify and

22

identify that these are true and correct documents and tax

23

commission records, and so they're coming under the exception

24

to the hearsay rule, so obviously she won't have any personal

25

knowledge as to anything that's on there.

It's not required,
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who in turn puts together a larger file with other information

2

returns and sends that to the tax commission on an annual basis.

3
4
5

Q.

So that would generally reflected information submitted

by the Weber County School District?
A.

6

That is correct.
MR. BODILY:

Your Honor, I have no other questions at

7

this point.

I would submit to the Court that we are submitting

8

these documents reflecting commission records, and that would be

9

admissible under 803-6 or 803-8, other records -- the business

10

records exception for the purposes of showing the commission's

11

records.

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. GOFF:

14

THE COURT:

15

MR. GOFF:

16
17
18

Thank you.

Any further argument, Mr. Goff?

A couple questions of Ms. Furniss.
Okay.
Okay.
RECROSS EXAMINATION

BY MR. GOFF:
Q.

Now you testified that the -- well, in the specific case

19

of the Weber County School District W-2 that was prepared by the

20

school district?

21

A.

As far as I'm aware,

22

Q.

Okay.

23
24
25

yes.

So those are not documents prepared by the tax

commission or the IRS but by yet another party?
A.
County?

The W-2?

Are you talking about the W-2 from Weber
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Q.

Yes.

2

A.

That--

3

Q.

Well, all of the W-2's from Weber County School

4

District.

5

A.

All of the W-2's in your records.

The W-2's would have been prepared by the respective

6

employers and then reported to the respective agencies as

7

required by law.

8

Q.

So we have yet another —

another party involved?

9

A.

Well, the only way IRS or Social Security received that

10

information is what's reported to them.

11

employers.

12

Q.

Okay.

They don't prepare for

Now you state -- you testified earlier that

13

the records from the IRS did not come to you under seal.

14

these

15

reports from the employers or other parties, and other parties

16

with respect to the 1099s that are in these records, did any of

17

those records —

18

under seal from employers and payers?

19
20

A.

-- these reports —

do you have any knowledge of these

or did the origin of any of that reporting come

It's not a requirement.

Under the law they're required

to file, but they're not required to send them in under seal.

21

Q.

So is that a yes or a no that they—

22

A.

Then the answer would be no.

23
24
25

Did

MR. GOFF:

Okay.

motion to strike.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Your Honor, I renew my motion --
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MR. GOFF:

2

THE COURT:

The grounds—
You're submitting -- no, you're submitting

3

it now?

I understand your grounds.

4

denied.

The Court is satisfied that this is under the business

5

records exception as well as the public documents exception.

6

Furthermore, the added testimony of Ms. Furniss as to the

7

procedures and the reliance upon the -- on the federal code as

8

to the exchange information and the manner in which it was

9

transferred, so the Court overrules the objection

10

MR. GOFF:

Your Honor, can I have a few moments here,

your Honor?

13
14

P-l is again

admitted.

11
12

Motion to strike P-l is

THE COURT:

Do you have any more questions for this

witness?

15

MR. GOFF:

I'm trying to evaluate whether she can -- I

16

have a letter here that I -- I only have this -- our own copy of

17

this letter that I would like to have marked.

18
19

MR. BODILY:

I'd like to see it first, your Honor, if I

may.

20

THE COURT:

Sure.

21

(Mr. Bodily examines letter)

22

MR. BODILY:

Your Honor, it's a letter addressed to me

23

I don't see what this witness could testify to about contents in

24

the letter.

25

THE COURT:

Unfortunately, Mr. Bodily, he can mark
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for him.

2
3

THE COURT:

I stand corrected.

Feature Films for

Families?

4

THE WITNESS: Yes.

5

THE COURT:

Then that's cross referenced by the numbers

6

and then the computer spits out the numbers as matching and

7

Douglas Goff's name comes up with these payments.

8

THE WITNESS: Yes.

9

THE COURT:

10

That's for the purpose of unemployment

compensation in the event that he is entitled to it.

11

THE WITNESS:

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. GOFF:

Correct.

Any objections, Mr. Goff?
Yes, your Honor

There's no certification

14

here from -- of -- from the parties who reported this information

15

to Workforce Services.

16

THE COURT:

They--

At least you're consistent.

That's the same

17

objection you made on the other one and it has a ring of

18

authenticity of it.

19

based upon the certifications and based upon the 804 business

20

records, as well as the public records.

21

allow P-5 to be received, but as I said, you're consistent and

22

that's the same objection you made before and that's an arguable

23

one.

24
25

However, I'm going to overrule the objection

The Court is going to

(Exhibit No. P-5 received into evidence)
Q.

BY MR. BODILY:

Mr. Engh, if I could have you turn
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MR. GOFF:

2

THE COURT:

Yes, your Honor.
Okay.

3
4

CROSS EXAMINATION
BY MR. GOFF:

5

Q.

Good afternoon, Mr. Engh.

6

A.

Good afternoon.

7
8

MR. GOFF:
evidence?

9
10

Do we have Mr. Engh's affidavit into

MR. BODILY:

His affidavit, I did not admit into

evidence at this time.

11

MR. GOFF:

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. GOFF:

14

THE COURT:

15

MR. GOFF:

16

THE COURT:

17

COURT CLERK:

18

THE COURT:

19

COURT CLERK:

Uh-huh.

20

COURT CLERK:

Here's a copy of D-4.

21

THE COURT:

22

COURT CLERK:

23

THE COURT:

24
25

Q.

Your Honor, I'd like these marked.
Okay.
Or one document.

I have a copy for Counsel.

A copy for me?
May I approach?
Thank you.

Thank you.

This is what, Janef

D-6.
D-6?

Which we haven't received.

BY MR. GOFF:

Which we haven't received.
It hasn't been offered.
Mr. Engh, you had indicated in your

testimony that (inaudible) reference to returns of taxpayers
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hadn't been filed.

Has there been -- has there been a

2

determination that I'm a taxpayer, a formal determination by the

3

commission?

4

A.

Through judicial proceedings, no.

5

Q.

Has there been for Mrs. Goff?

6

A.

No.

7

Q.

Now you're relying on these same records that

8

Ms. Furniss testified -- testified earlier to?

9

A.

Yes.

10

Q.

In Exhibit P-l?

11

A.

Yes.

12

Q.

Now your —

may I approach the witness?

THE COURT:

Yes.

13
14

Q.

15

6 or D-7?

16
17
18

BY MR. GOFF:

THE COURT:
Q.

I just handed to you Exhibit -- is that D-

D-6.

BY MR. GOFF:

D-6 for identification and ask you what is

that?

19

A.

It's an affidavit that I signed.

20

Q.

That you signed?

21

A.

Yes.

22

Q.

The exhibits or the attachments thereto, are they the

23

same as the exhibits that are attached to P-l?

24

A.

Yes.

25

Q.

Which I've earlier referred to as to the records or
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THE COURT:

D-6 is received, but with the observation of

2

the Court that while P-1 was referred to in its entirety as

3

records contained in D-6, only part of the records of P-1 are

4

contained.

5

in D-6.

6

included in P-1, or am I mistaken, Mr. Engh?

The last three or four pages of P-1 are not contained

Plus the last page on D-6 is something that is not

7

THE WITNESS:

8

MR. GOFF:

9

THE COURT:

It's not included on P-1.

I believe it is included, your Honor, m

P-5.

Well, it may or may not, but I'm just

10

correcting the record when you said that these are the same as

11

contained in P-1.

12

they are those that have been referenced, but P-1 has other pages

13

into it that are not included in D-6.

14

with that observation.

For the most part they are.

For the most part

Go ahead.

15

(Exhibit No. D-6 received into evidence)

16

MR. GOFF:

17

Q.

So D-6 is in

Thank you, your Honor.

BY MR. GOFF:

Calling your attention to the first page

18

in your affidavit, you state that you're legally competent to

19

offer the following testimony.

20

A.

Yes.

21

Q.

Okay.

22

What is your understanding of what it means to be

legally competent to offer testimony?

23

A.

A person over 21, is not certified insane.

24

Q.

Have you ever been certified insane?

25

A.

No.
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that r s not just a general statement.

2

witn SSS.

SO are you talking the stand now?

3

MR. GOFF:

4

THE COURT:

5

MR. GOFF:

7

THE COURT:

9
10
11
12

All right.

Thank you.
You're already under oath.

I'll help you out a little bit.

6

8

You'll do that as a

Take the stand.

State your name for the record.

Harvey Douglas Goff, Jr.
You are the -- one of the respondents

m

this matter?
MR. GOFF:
THE COURT:

Yes, I am, your Honor.
All right.

As succinctly and as directly as

you possibly can, tell me your side of what's happening here.
MR. GOFF:

On August 4th we mailed a letter to Tim

13

Bodily, who --- that -- wherein we asked for the name, add]:ess and

14

tele]shone number of the person -- person who has personal or

15

firs thand knowledge of the truth of the matters contained therein

16

that attachments to Daniel Engh's affidavit.

17
18

THE COURT:

So you move for the admission of D-4 based

upon your testimony that your wrote and sent it?

19

MR. GOFF:

20

THE COURT:

21

MR. BODILY

22

THE COURT:

23

(Exhibit D--4 received into evidence)

24
25

MR. GOFF:

We —

I do.

Any objections, Mr. Bodily?
No objection.
D-4 is received.

I might add that -- that we made -- we made

this request knowing that we intended to object to Mr. -- to the
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presentation of what the tax commission claims of -- claims to be

2

the records of our -- of our income in that--

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. GOFF:

As I s a i d —
That there's no one with firsthand knowledge

5

We've requested pursuant to Rule 803, I believe paragraph 24, the

6

name, address and telephone number of the person who has personal

7

or firsthand knowledge of the truth of the matters contained in

8

the attachments to the exhibit.

9

Mr. Bodily responded with the -- on Wednesday of last

10

week with an affidavit from Dolores Furniss, which is Exhibit P-1

11

in this matter.

12

firsthand knowledge of the truth of the matters contained in

13

those attachments -- or contained in P-1.

14

Ms. Furniss has declared that she does not have

THE COURT:

Okay.

As I said before, in both of your

15

arguments to keep out documents you were consistent in that your

16

position was there was no -- and I will use legal terms -- there

17

was a lack of foundation as to the authenticity of the proffered

18

statements and the information.

19

is in as further evidence of your objections.

20

have?

21

MR. GOFF:

22

THE COURT:

23

That's
Okay.

The Court has already ruled, D-4
What else do we

it for me, your Honor.
Thank you.

Ms. Goff, do you wish to

testify?

24

MS. GOFF:

25

THE COURT:

No, I do not.
All right.

You may call your next witness,
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just because she stated her name and her employment does not make

2

her hostile, sir.

3

MR. GOFF:

4
5

Q.

Thank you, your Honor.

BY MR. GOFF:

I'll wait.

Is one of your duties to respond to the

questions that people ask about their tax status?

6

A.

Yes.

7

Q.

Back in April did you receive a letter from my wife and

8

I —

or my wife and me titled a notice access and evidentiary

9

hearing request?

10

A.

I did.

11

Q.

The subpoena you were served told you to bring that

12
13

letter with you.
A.

Do you have the letter?

I have a copy of it.

14

MR. GOFF:

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. GOFF:

Okay.

Your Honor?

Yes.
Exhibit D-7 is a copy -- an exact copy of

17

what we sent to Ms. Salter, with the provision that at the tail

18

end of the exhibit there are pages that show certified mail

19

receipts, a receipt from the--

20

MR. BODILY:

21

MR. GOFF:

22
23
24
25

Your Honor-— p o s t office and so forth, and if we could

use D-7.
THE COURT:

What's the relevance of all this

information?
MR. GOFF:

I intend to show relevance here.
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2

THE COURT:
admitted.

3
4

Well, I want to know before it even gets

What are you using this for7
MR. GOFF:

Well, if -- if the Court is to rule on -- on

our motion to dismiss, this is the basis.

5

THE COURT:

Well, tell me what —

tell me what you

6

use —

what you're using this for and how is Ms. Salter going to

7

be aiding me in the use of D-7 if it's admitted?

8

MR. GOFF:

9

admission yet, your Honor.

10

THE COURT:

I haven't asked —

I haven't asked for its

I'm asking that—

I'm asking you.

I'm trying to short circuit

I'm asking you, what are you using D-7 for9

11

this.

12

There's a letter to Ms. Salter and to another

13

certain things.

14

that apply to this hearing today?

15

What is D-79

You're asking for

What is it that you're asking for and how does

MR. GOFF:

In this letter we ask —

we ask for specific

16

con -- findings of fact and conclusions of law as to our status,

17

whether or not we have the status of taxpayer, whether or not we

18

are persons liable for income tax.

19

that if and when the Utah State Tax Commission personnel can

20

find -- show us with findings of fact and conclusions of law that

21

we are persons liable to file a state tax return, we will file

22

whatever return is required by law for us to file.

23
24
25

THE COURT:

Okay.

We state —

we state therein

So you're asking this information

from Ms. Salter and others in the tax commission?
MR. GOFF:

Yes, sir.
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1

THE COURT:

All right.

Isn't that why we're here today

2

just to find out whlether or not you have to file or not?

3

not answer a 11 the questions that you have, but isn't -- the

4

issue today is whether or not I order you and your wife to file

5

tax returns '.oased upon the evidence that is before me, right?
MR. GOFF:
THE COURT:

It may

It is, your Honor.
All right.

What is this?

All of this

requested in formation have to deal with that at all, and through

9
10

Ms . Salter, of all people?
MR. GOFF:

Well, a part -- a part of --- a part of our

11

argument why this matter should have never come here to this

12

Court is tha t we resquested a determination from the tax

13

commission.

14

determination by the IRS and the tax commission whether we are

15

persons that are required to file income tax returns, wh ether we

16

are persons that are liable for an income tax.

We stated we're willing to accept, you know

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. GOFF:

Okay.

Their only response --- we've never

received a r eply tc) it.

20

this Court to compe»1 us to file.
THE COURT:

22

MR. GOFF:

23

THE COURT:

24

MR. GOFF:

25

THE COURT:

a

Okay.

19

21

'

Their only response has been to petition

Okay.
That's why I have Ms. Salter up here
All right.
Asking her about-Mr. Bodily?
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MR. BODILY:

Your Honor, I don't see any relevance.

I

2

do have a concern here that if he's —

3

pleading an issue here as to -- as to his income and his

4

liability and so forth, and then he takes the Fifth Amendment on

5

the stand, so if he's going to inquire or get into this issue and

6

proffer evidence and so forth, then I think -- I think arguably

7

he's waiving -- if not already his Fifth Amendment objections to

8

that particular issue.

9
10

THE COURT:

he appears to try to be

You can make your argument as you want.

Ms. Salter, you may have received this.

11

THE WITNESS:

12

THE COURT:

Did you ever answer it9

I did not.

You did not.

She didn't answer it.

Okay.

So that was what you

13

wanted.

14

that without her answering it there is no findings or

15

conclusions, using your words, to indicate that you're liable in

16

any way, correct?

17

that.

18

MR. GOFF:

19

THE COURT:

So there -- what your position is

Is that your position?

And then you can argue

I'd like to proffer it into evidence, too.
You've proffered it.

I'm not receiving it.

20

D-7 is not received as being irrelevant here.

21

at the end of the case, Mr. Goff, and I understand what your

22

argument is.

23

dense that it doesn't get it, but you can argue it at the correct

24

time.

25

You can argue it

You've said it a number of times, and I'm not that

MR. GOFF:

Thank you.
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taxes subject to the state federal piggybacking arrangements."

2

I'm reading from page 3 if you want to follow along there, your

3

Honor.

4

The -- authorized by 31-CFR part 215, or if we are
Therefore, we need

5

required to collect any of the taxes.

6

Internal Revenue Service and Utah State Tax Commission's

7

assistance in determining if we are liable for any of the -- any

8

given tax imposed on subtitles (a) and (c) of the Internal

9

Revenue Code, or if we are required to collect imposed -- taxes

10

imposed by subtitles (a) and (c) and what qualified state income

11

tax we are personally liable for or are required to collect."

12

Your Honor, we've asked the commission for its help to

13

produce -- well, for its help in first determining if we are

14

required to file these returns, and -- and if we are, to give us

15

the knowledge base that would enable them to -- as Mr

16

asked in the petition —

17

enable us to file true, correct and accurate returns for those

18

years.

19

in their original petition that would

What we've received from the tax commission is silence.
Dismissing the commission's petition is proper as an

20

equitable remedy m

21

of knowledge on our part.

22

Bodily

that -- in that we've -- we recognize a lack

We've sought -- we've sought to discover how the income

23

tax laws apply to us, and we've asked the commission to provide

24

their findings of fact and conclusions of law to those questions

25

and specifically one to determine whether we come within the
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confines within the income tax laws.

2

1992 through 2002 for those years.

3

Our request pertains to

Our request meets all six requirements of a request for

4

agency action as outlined in the Administrative Procedures Act,

5

Utah Code 63-46-3, paragraph 3, subparagraph (a).

6

Now the commission as the agency responsible to

7

administer and supervise the tax laws of the state has a duty to

8

notify us of their action.

9

we —

This is a request for agency action

that we have submitted, or it -- it qualifies to be such

10

but not titled as such.

11

to Utah Code Annotated 63-46-3, paragraph 3, subparagraph (d).

12

You could also take a look a t —

13

THE COURT:

They have a duty to notify us pursuant

So is your argument based upon the fact that

14

they didn't give you this information that I ought to dismiss

15

this petition today?

16

argument?

17

MR. GOFF:

Is that —

is that the crux of your

Well, your Honor, until they do, we lack the

18

capacity to comply with the -- with an order to -- to make the

19

returns, if such would be your order, and precisely because we're

20

going to be asked to sign a perjured jurat on that return or on

21

those returns.

22

We're signing to the best of our knowledge and belief

23

that that -- and we would be signing to the best -- that to the

24

best of our knowledge and belief that —

25

accurate return.

that is a true and
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But what the tax commission desires from us certainly is

2

not to the best of our knowledge and belief.

3

depend on their answer, and they -- well, I don't know if I can

4

say they withheld it from us.

5

been silent up to this point.

6

That damages us.

Therefore we -- we

They have not replied.

They've

It gives us injury because we --

7

they're asking us to do something we don't know how to do.

8

don't know what to do.

9

THE COURT:

We

You don't know how to file a tax return and

10

you don't know what a tax return is supposed to be; is that what

11

you're telling me?

12

MR. GOFF:

13

THE COURT:

No. No.
You cannot go to a tax accountant to find

14

out that?

You could not go to a tax attorney to help you with

15

these questions?

16

can get this right -- those requests that you proffered in D-7

17

have never been answered to your satisfaction, therefore I ought

18

to equitably dismiss this action.

Your basis for dismissal is -- let me see if I

19

MR. GOFF:

20

THE COURT:

Your Honor, they have never been answered.
I know, and that's —

and that's your —

21

that's your basis for dismissal is that you didn't ever receive

22

this information; is that -- is that the basis for your -- one of

23

the bases for your dismissal?

24

MR. GOFF:

25

THE COURT:

That's one of them.
All right, your second basis is that neither
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MR. BODILY:

Yes.

2

THE COURT:

Okay.

3

MR. BODILY:

It was admitted, I would it pointed out.

4

So you do have this evidence that I believe would fall under any

5

one of those exceptions, and the Court has sufficient authority

6

to allow those -- and you did grant those and allow those in.

7

I would add that obviously they've had notice of what we

8

were going to do here.

We submitted the affidavits some time ago

9

when we filed our response, and they have presented no other

10

evidence to whether that's inaccurate or not.

11

you really have are those documents before you and their refusal

12

to answer on questions of the same.

13

THE COURT:

So the only thing

What consideration, if any, does the Court

14

need to give to the fact that D-7, the letter requesting all that

15

information, was not answered?

16

saying, "If you gave me the right information I would--" meaning

17

me, Mr. Goff — " w i l l make the determination if I needed to file

18

or not.

19

move to dismiss this matter."

20

on the different ways the tax commission can proceed?

21

It seems to me that Mr. Goff is

You didn't give me that information, therefore we ought

MR. BODILY:

Are we talking apples and oranges

Yes, absolutely.

Mr. and Mrs. Goff

22

apparently have their own understanding of what their

23

requirements are to file; we have ours.

24

information showing the income and the laws that we rely on, and

25

they're asking for us to prove something other than that, which

We provided our

-1221

we're not going to be able to because we don't agree with their

2

interpretation of the law.

3

THE COURT:

Is there any issue at all regarding

4

exhaustion of administrative remedies before you bring a petition

5

in district court?

6

MR. BODILY:

Well, we've made no determination of their

7

tax liability, your Honor.

8

the Court for them to file their income tax returns, and--

9
10

THE COURT:

MR. BODILY:

12

THE COURT:

MR. BODILY:

15

THE COURT:

They may have after deductions no

taxable

Exactly.
They may have a tax liability of thousands

of dollars, but we don't know.

17

MR. BODILY:

18

THE COURT:

19

Yes.

income.

14

16

Tax liability may follow after the filing of

the returns,

11

13

We're only asserting here an order of

I mean-All you're asking from me is to have them

file.

20

MR. BODILY:

21

THE COURT:

Absolutely.
All right.

What about the issue -- and I'm

22

clear on that, but what's your understanding of the issue about

23

having them sign a perjured jurat?

24

of what his position was on that (inaudible) to the--

25

MR. BODILY:

Yes.

Do you have an understanding

He's required to prepare an income

-126THE COURT:

D-6 is still in evidence, isn't it?

care what purpose you used it for.
use any purpose I want.
MR. BODILY:
THE COURT:
MR. BODILY:
THE COURT:

Once it's m

evidence I can

Prepare the orders, Mr. Bodily.

Thank you, your Honor.
Anything more?
I think (inaudible).
We're in recess.

(Hearing concluded)

I don't
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PER CURIAM:
H. Douglas and Lisa Goff appeal from a trial court writ of
mandate requiring them to file state tax returns for specified
years. This is before the court on the Tax Commission's
(Commission) motion for summary disposition.
Pursuant to Utah Code section 59-1-707, the Commission
petitioned the trial court for a writ of mandate compelling the
Goffs to file state tax returns for several years. See Utah Code
Ann. § 59-1-707 (2000) . After a hearing, the trial court granted
the writ and ordered the Goffs to file required returns. The
Goffs assert on appeal that the Commission failed to exhaust its
administrative remedies and failed to present evidence that the
Goffs were required to file federal tax returns, and that
documents showing the Goffs' income were inadmissable hearsay.
The Goffs have not shown any requirement for the Commission
to exhaust administrative remedies before exercising its
statutorily provided remedy. Under the plain language of Utah
Code section 59-1-707, the Commission is permitted to petition
for mandate regardless of administrative proceedings. Section

59-1-707 provides: "If a taxpayer fails to file any return
required pursuant to Title 59 within 60 days of the time
prescribed, the commission may petition for a writ of mandate to
compel the taxpayer to file the return." Utah Code Ann. § 59-1707(1) (a) (2000). Additionally, " [n]othing in this section shall
limit the remedies otherwise available to the commission under
Title 59 or other laws of this state." IcL_ § 59-1-707(2). The
fact that the statute provides a specific court-based remedy
supports that exhaustion is not required because the court remedy
is not consistent with administrative process. Furthermore, the
statute specifically notes that these judicial proceedings do not
impact other administrative processes.
Utah Code section 59-10-502 provides that a state income tax
return "shall be filed by every resident individual . . .
required to file a federal income tax return for the taxable
year." Utah Code Ann. § 59-10-502(1) (2000). The Goffs assert
that the Commission failed to present evidence that they were
required to file federal income tax returns, a prerequisite to
the state return requirement. This assertion is refuted by the
record.
The Commission presented testimony that individuals
receiving gross income above threshold amounts are required to
file federal tax returns. The Goffs argue that the evidence was
insufficient because at one point the Commission witness
misstated the section number requiring the filing of returns.
However, the correct section was identified in other testimony,
and the substance of the requirement was presented, even if the
number was in error. In addition, the correct section was
presented in the Commission's memoranda supporting the writ.
The requirement for an individual to file federal tax
returns is based on gross income threshold determinations. Gross
income is broadly defined as "all income from whatever source
derived." -26 EL-S. CL it-61 (£fiQ_0}_. Individuals_with gross income
greater than a threshold amount, generally the exemption amount
plus the standard deduction, are required to file federal tax
returns. See 26 U.S.C. § 6012 (2000) . The Commission presented
testimony regarding this tax structure. The Goffs argue that the
Commission did not show that the Goffs were engaged in taxable
activities. Their argument is off point. The federal tax
structure does not depend on "taxable activities." The
determining factor of tax return obligations is income, not
activity. The Goffs' implication that their activities did not
come within the scope of the tax code is a mere distraction. The
Goffs concede that individuals with gross income greater than a
specified level are required to file federal tax returns.
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The Goffs also challenge the documentary evidence admitted
to establish that their income exceeded the threshold amount.
The records were from the Commission, but were transmitted by the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) or the Division of Workforce
Services (DWS)
The sources of the information in the documents
were employers or other entities even further removed from the
IRS and DWS. Therefore, the Goffs argue the documents are
inadmissible hearsay
Although the Commission asserts that this evidentiary issue
is also not worthy of additional review, the Goffs have presented
a substantial issue warranting further court consideration. The
Goffs have identified a legitimate issue and have provided case
support for their position. This court would benefit from full
briefing on the hearsay issue
Based on the foregoing, the Commission's motion for summary
disposition is granted in part and denied in part. The
Commission was not required to exhaust administrative remedies
prior to filing for a writ of mandate, and the Commission
presented sufficient evidence regarding the federal tax structure
and definitions to determine that the Goffs would be required to
file federal tax returns if their income exceeded the threshold.
The trial court's order is summarily affirmed as to these issues.
Briefing shall move forward regarding the issue of whether
the trial court properly admitted the Commission's exhibits P-l
and P-5.

liilL^
Judith M. Billings,
Presiding Judge

Russell W Bench,
Associate Presiding Judge

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge
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January 6, 2 005
H. Douglas Goff
Lisa Goff
163 6 OAKCREST DR
OGDEN UT 84403-3184
RE: TX CMMN v. Goff

Appellate Case No. 20040867

Dear Mr. Goff:
The record index (#040911367) on this appeal was filed in this
court. The record remains on file with the trial court for your
use in preparing your brief. The purpose of this letter,
therefore, is to set the briefing schedule.
Pursuant to Rules 13 and 26, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure,
the appellant's brief must be served and filed on or before
February 18, 2005. This due date takes into consideration the
three days mailing provision of Rule 22(d).
Parties are advised to refer to Rules 24, 26 and 27, Utah R. App.
P., for content and format requirements. These requirements are
strictly enforced, and the brief may be returned pursuant to Rule
27(d) if not properly prepared.
All parties are specifically advised that the typeface
requirements of Rule 27(b), Utah R. App. P., will be strictly
enforced and noncomplying briefs will be rejected. A
proportionally spaced typeface must be 13-point or larger for
text and footnotes. A monospaced typeface may not contain more
than ten characters per inch for both text and footnotes.
Motions for additional time to file briefs must comply with the
requirements of Rules 22(b) or 26(a) of the Utah Rules of

Appellate Procedure. Please note that all extension requests,
other than the first one requested by each party, that are not
stipulated to by the opposing party, will not be acted upon until
the time for response has expired.
Parties may request oral argument and/or published decision by so
indicating at the bottom on the cover of their brief. The court
will not formally respond to such requests, but will consider the
same during its regular calendaring process.
This court is interested in evaluating the usefulness of
receiving briefs in electronic form. To assist in this
evaluation, you are encouraged to submit a CD which contains the
electronic version of your^brief„at the same time you file the
required number of written briefs. The electronic version of the
brief must be in Word or WordPerfect format. Your participation
in this study will be appreciated.
Failure to perfect an appeal at any time during the appeal
process may result in dismissal of the appeal.
Sincerely,

Maren Larson
Deputy Clerk
cc: TIMOTHY A BODILY
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